Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After defendant had sexually-explicit online communications with a detective, posing as a 14-year-old, the detective researched defendant’s criminal history, which included convictions for public lewdness and disorderly conduct, obtained a warrant, and searched defendant’s home. Finding child pornography on a computer, police obtained a second warrant and discovered 3,366 images of child pornography, 95 emails sent from the computer with child pornography attachments, and 54 emails received with child pornography attachments. A district judge denied defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his home computer. Defendant pled guilty to unlawful transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The First Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, rejecting arguments that: the warrant allowed a search that was overbroad given the narrow scope of probable cause; the computer search unlawfully exceeded the broad scope of the warrant; and the plain-view and good-faith exceptions did not apply. View "United States v. Farlow" on Justia Law

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, denies federal economic and other benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts and to surviving spouses from those couples, by defining "marriage" as "only a legal union between one man and one woman." "Spouse" refers "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." DOMA absolves states from recognizing same-sex marriages solemnized in other states; prevents same-sex married couples from filing joint federal tax returns, affecting tax burdens; prevents a surviving same-sex spouse from collecting Social Security survivor benefits; leaves federal employees unable to share health insurance and other benefits with same-sex spouses. DOMA may result in loss of federal funding of programs such as Medicaid and veterans cemeteries if states recognize same-sex marriages in determining income or allowing burials. The district court declared Section 3 unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed, but stayed injunctive relief, anticipating certiorari review. The court applied "a closer than usual review" based on discrepant impact among married couples and on the importance of state interests in regulating marriage and tested the rationales for DOMA, considering Supreme Court precedent limiting which rationales can be counted and the force of certain rationales. View "Commonwealth v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

The trooper saw a minivan with what appeared to be a glinting blue light, like those mounted behind the windshields of police cars. Because Maine law prohibits such lights on civilian vehicles, the trooper gave chase with his siren going. The driver continued on for 39 seconds, making unusual motions. The trooper saw a television screen attached to the windshield by a large blue suction cup and a blue placard on the rearview mirror. The driver was talking on a cell phone, and, asked about his furtive motions, said he had dropped the phone, picked it up, and called his wife; he claimed to have left his license and registration at home. He gave a false name, which did not match computerized records, and eventually admitted that he did not have a valid license. Arrested, he refused to be fingerprinted. The officer was applying for a search warrant when the driver admitted that he was wanted for kidnapping. A pistol, ammunition, and marijuana were found in the van. He entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 36 months The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to denial of a motion to suppress and to the sentence. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

FBI agents executed a search warrant at an apartment; the search was one of six that day involving an alleged domestic terrorism plot by "Los Macheteros," an organization dedicated Puerto Rican independence that has been involved in numerous prior violent acts. When reporters entered the apartment complex during the search, there was a confrontation, and agents used pepper spray and struck or pushed plaintiffs, who brought Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. After the First Circuit vacated summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the district court again granted summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court's discovery limitations were consistent with resolving qualified immunity questions at the earliest possible stage and it acted within its discretion to consider depositions and video clips. The court concluded that it was not clearly established that a "non-arrest" could be considered a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, so that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Even if viewed as a seizure, the court found the force employed by defendants was reasonable in at the time of the events. View "Valentin v. Mueller" on Justia Law

In 1982, Jimenez was convicted of the parolable offense of second degree murder for killing a police officer and simultaneously acquitted of murder in the first degree, conviction of which would have carried no possibility of parole. The Massachusetts Parole Board denied his parole applications in 1999, 2004, and 2009. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of due process and equal protection and infringements of guarantees under the Commonwealth's constitution. The defendants are the six members of the Board, named in their official capacities, each of whom voted to deny parole. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim for constitutional violations, finding specific relief barred by the section 1983 prohibition of injunctions against judicial officers. The First Circuit affirmed. There is nothing shocking or arbitrary about the parole board’s discretion. A state may rationally take the position that a law enforcement officer’s constant exposure to violence calls for a more powerful deterrent to homicidal behavior than the general laws of homicide provide.View "Jimenez v. Conrad" on Justia Law

Puerto Rico has classified Coors as a large brewer under its beer tax schedule, taxed at a higher rate than small brewers, including local brewer Cervecería India. In 2006, Coors brought suit challenging this differential treatment under the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court originally dismissed the case on comity grounds, but the First Circuit reversed. While remand was pending in 2010, the Supreme Court decided Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., which expressly abrogated the First Circuit’s 2009 decision. The district court then dismissed on grounds of comity. The First Circuit affirmed. Puerto Rico’s Secretary of the Treasury did not consent to litigate in federal court and Puerto Rico courts provide an adequate state forum for adjudication of federal constitutional claims. View "Coors Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of first degree murder in Massachusetts, exhausted state appeals. No physical evidence linked him to the crime, but circumstantial evidence included his threats to kill the victim, testimony that the victim was last seen getting into a car with defendant, and defendant’s statements indicating guilt. The district court rejected his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which was based on an argument that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied a beyond a reasonable doubt standard contrary to that articulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), in evaluating his claim that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his conviction or incorrectly applied the correct standard. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. View "Morgan v. Pepe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs had a longstanding feud with neighbors, based on plaintiffs' "botanical menagerie" that served as a sanctuary for wild parrots. A marker tree spanned the boundary between the plaintiffs' and the neighbors' properties. Claiming that the tree threatened power lines, the neighbors obtained a permit to remove the tree from the Natural Resources Department. The Electric Power Authority temporarily shut off power to the lines and municipal employees removed all of the branches, so that the tree eventually died. Plaintiffs claim that the operation caused extensive damage to other plantings. Plaintiffs sued the municipality, the individual employees, and the neighbors under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming failure to provide pre-deprivation notice or opportunity to be heard, taking without just compensation, and intense pain and suffering. After a maze of cross-claims and counterclaims were filed, so that the electric authority became a party, the district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that, even if destruction of the vegetation was improper, plaintiffs did not state any constitutional cause of action.View "Elena v. Mun. of San Juan" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to stealing firearms and possessing stolen firearms, defendant received a sentence of 54 months' imprisonment, based, in part, on a finding that he qualified as a "prohibited person" who, because of his history of substance abuse, was barred from possessing firearms. The First Circuit affirmed. The court first held that defendant had waived an argument that an interview with the Pretrial Services Office during which defendant disclosed information about his drug use, involved a promise of confidentiality, and that inclusion of the information in the sentencing report violated his due process rights and FRCP 32. The court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his attorney allowing him to disclose the information. View "United States v. Caparotta" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Orthodox Jew, is serving a life sentence for murder without the possibility of parole, sought a transfer back to the prison in which he was previously held. Before the transfer, he regularly participated in Jewish religious activities, followed dietary restrictions, and met individually with a visiting rabbi. After the transfer to a prison in a less-populated area, the prison chaplain made efforts, largely fruitless, to provide Jewish services. Only one other practicing Jewish inmate was housed at the facility. The district court denied a preliminary injunction under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The First Circuit affirmed. Petitioner's disadvantages depend importantly on proximate actions and decisions not attributable to the government and are too attenuated from the transfer decision to be considered government imposed burdens under RLUIPA. He was not transferred for the purpose of restricting his religious opportunities or in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.View "Bader v. Wrenn" on Justia Law