Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted in the United States district court for his role in a scheme to illegally obtain and distribute prescription drugs. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in allowing testimony about the guilty pleas of Appellant's former co-defendants, but the error was harmless; and (2) in determining the appropriate sentence within the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), or in varying guidelines, a sentencing court has discretion to consider the defendant's cooperation with the government as an 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factor, even if the government has not made a USSG 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure. View "United States v. Landron-Class" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of outrageous government misconduct in manufacturing federal jurisdiction and in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of jurisdictional entrapment. Both arguments depended on the contention that the government created United States jurisdiction by unlawfully orchestrating a change in location for the crimes that Appellant conspired to commit. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) without evidence that Appellant was coerced or unduly induced, or evidence that the government engaged in some other type of outrageous misconduct, the district court did nor err by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss; and (2) as Appellant plainly failed to satisfy his burden to make a threshold showing of inducement, the district court did not err in refusing to give Appellant's proposed jurisdictional entrapment jury instruction. View "United States v. Djokich" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the forty-six-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in connection with his shipping an assault rifle and pistol from Florida to Puerto Rico. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence, where (1) the district court's application of an upward departure was reasonable; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing how far to enhance the sentence; and (3) the district court did not fail to balance the relevant mitigating factors. View "United States v. Lozada-Aponte" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from entry of summary judgment against his claims of race-based disparate treatment and of hostile work environment against Employer. Plaintiff's complaint alleged Employer punished him more harshly for a rules violation, on the basis of his Hispanic heritage, than it did a similarly situated white co-worker and permitted other employees to harass him in violation of Title VII. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate on both of Plaintiff's claims, as (1) Employer's reasons for disciplining Plaintiff, on the record, did not allow inferences or pretext or discrimination, and there was no differential treatment; and (2) Employer took reasonable steps to address the alleged co-worker harassment. View "Espinal v. Nat'l Grid NE Holdings 2, LLC " on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the implementation of a federally-assisted Medicaid program by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, represented by its Secretary of Health. This was the sixth time the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered issues related to a dispute between the Commonwealth and several federally qualified health centers (FQHCs). The FQHCs here took to federal courts their claims for reimbursement payments owed to them under the Medicaid program. The district court, among other things, set a formula in place by way of a preliminary injunction that calculated payments the Commonwealth owed the FQHCs for providing Medicaid services. The First Circuit (1) concluded the formula that the district court endorsed in its preliminary injunction was not sufficiently supported by the factual record, and therefore, the Court remanded for further reformulation; (2) affirmed the district court's denial of the FQHCs' request for indemnification from debts owed to third party managed care organizations; and (3) affirmed the district court's determination that the Eleventh Amendment precludes a federal court from imposing a judgment for money damages upon the Commonwealth to make payments for periods predating the date of the district court's preliminary injunction. View "Consejo de Salud De La Communidad de Playa de Ponce, Inc. v. Gonzalez-Feliciano" on Justia Law

Based on challenges of planting evidence and conducting illegal searches and seizures, officers in the Puerto Rico Police Department were convicted (in different combinations) of conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate persons in the town of Mayagüez in the free exercise or enjoyment of their constitutional rights, 18 U.S.C. 241, and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846. The First Circuit affirmed all convictions against challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Santiago-Mendez" on Justia Law

The federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721, establishes a cooperative federal-state-tribal regime for regulating gaming by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands. The Massachusetts Gaming Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K, sect. 3(a), establishes a licensing scheme and other standards for gaming. KG, a potential applicant for a gaming license, argued that the state Act provides unauthorized preferences to Indian tribes and on that basis treats the southeast section of the state differently, and this constitutes a classification on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and is inconsistent with congressional intent in the federal Indian gaming statute. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit vacated with respect to the equal protection claim and otherwise affirmed. Whether the tribal provisions are "authorized" by the IGRA such that is subject to only rational basis review is far from clear, presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation, and implicates a practice of the Secretary of the Interior not challenged in this suit. There is apparently no judicial authority addressing the question of whether a state may negotiate a tribal-state compact with a federally recognized tribe that does not presently possess Indian lands. View "KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick" on Justia Law

DEA obtained permission to wiretap telephones. Symonevich arranged by phone to buy heroin at McDonald's off I-495. During a call, "Tony," asked Symonevich what kind of car he was driving; the answer was a green Subaru. Agents sent units to I-495; they observed what they thought was a meeting between Symonevich and a courier. Agents planned to stop Symonevich, but lost sight of the car. Later that day, unrelated to the DEA investigation, officer Sweeney stopped the car for a broken light, observed Symonevich, reaching under the seat and looking "scared." Officers smelled marijuana on Symonevich's clothing. The driver refused permission to search the car; Sweeney searched, fearing a safety threat. During the stop, Sweeney learned that Symonevich was the subject of a DEA investigation. Sweeney found a can of tire sealant under the seat. The weight was unexpected and he felt movement inside. The bottom of the can was separated; he unscrewed it and found bundles that he believed to be heroin. Convicted of conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with the intent to distribute, cocaine and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, Symonevich appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, admission of certain testimony and charts, and the conspiracy instruction given to the jury. View "United States v. Symonevich" on Justia Law

Carta pled guilty to child pornography in 2002 and was sentenced to five years in prison and three years of supervised release. Prior to his scheduled release, the Bureau of Prisons certified that Carta was a "sexually dangerous person" and commenced civil commitment proceedings under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a). A "sexually dangerous person" is one "who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and is sexually dangerous to others." A determination that an individual is a sexually dangerous person requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that he "suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released." After a district judge ruled that the government had failed to establish that Carta's diagnosis of "paraphilia not otherwise specified characterized by hebephilia" was a "serious mental illness, abnormality or disorder" under the Act, the First Circuit reversed. A different district court judge subsequently ruled in the government's favor. The First Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Carta" on Justia Law

Crooker was charged with possession of firearms and ammunition by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and possession of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 844. He was convicted of possession of marijuana and fined $4000. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court's denial of a motion to suppress statements and evidence recovered during the search of the residence where he lived with his parents and brothers. Given the familiarity of the surroundings in which Crooker was questioned, the calm and peaceable nature of the conversations, and the lack of physical restraint or show of force during questioning, Crooker was not in custody for Miranda purposes. In light of secretive conversations between Crooker’s father and uncle about the biological toxin ricin, their discussion about moving the uncle’s possessions while the uncle was incarcerated, and information provided by confidential informants, including information that the uncle had buried ricin in Crooker's backyard, there was probable cause to believe that evidence of the enumerated crimes would be found at Crooker's house. View "United States v. Crooker" on Justia Law