Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted possession of at least five kilograms of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district court erroneously allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence that after his arrest, law enforcement agents discovered roughly $45,000 in a storage locker that he rented, and (2) the prosecutor's closing argument contained improper comments that violated his right to a fair trial. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) in light of the evidence, there was little risk of unfair prejudice in the admission of the cash seized from Defendant's storage locker; and (2) viewed in their proper context and under the circumstances, the prosecutor's comments were not improper. View "United States v. Matias" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of possessing firearms and ammunition after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). As a predicate offense to the charge, the indictment listed a 2008 misdemeanor conviction for Defendant's assault of his wife. After the district court denied Defendant's pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment, Defendant entered a guilty plea conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. Defendant appealed, asking the First Circuit Court of Appeals to reconsider arguments regarding (1) whether section 922(g)(9) should be construed to exclude a purportedly non-violent offensive physical contact misdemeanor conviction as a predicate offense, and (2) whether applying section 922(g)(9) to such a prior conviction would violate Defendant's Second Amendment rights. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that First Circuit precedent in United States v. Booker and United States v. Nason foreclosed the arguments made here. View "United States v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to unlawfully distribute Oxycodone, Oxycontin, Suboxone, Larzepam, and Ativan. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying Defendant's Speedy Trial Act claims in her motion to dismiss on the basis that the exclusion of time for her co-defendant's continuance was unreasonable as to her; (2) failing to sua sponte order a mental competency evaluation after Defendant sustained an injury during trial; and (3) denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal based on a prejudicial variance between the conspiracy proven at trial and that charged in the superseding indictment. View "United States v. Maryea" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) received funds appropriated by Congress under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In 2006, HHS contracted with the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) to provide services to trafficking victims. At USCCB's insistence, the contract incorporated a restriction pursuant to which neither USCCB nor any of its subcontractors would use funding to counsel or provide contraceptive services and prescriptions or abortions to trafficking victims. The ACLU of Massachusetts (ACLUM) brought suit, alleging that HHS violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In 2012, the district court issued a declaratory judgment that HHS had violated the Establishment Clause. The federal defendants appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated on grounds of mootness, where the 2006 contract expired in 2011. Remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Darryl Tavares and Eddie Jones were both convicted of conspiracy to knowingly transport an individual in interstate commerce with the intent that such individual engage in prostitution. Tavares was also convicted of knowingly transporting a minor across state lines to engage in prostitution and of sex trafficking of a child. Jones was also convicted of aiding and abetting the transportation of a minor across state lines to engage in prostitution and of knowingly transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent that she engage in prostitution. The district court sentenced Defendants to 300 months' imprisonment and to three years' supervised release. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its rulings during trial; (2) substantial evidence supported the convictions; and (3) the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendants. View "US v. Tavares" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of having, among other things, engaged in a scheme to conceal and avoid her company's employment tax liability. The district court determined that Defendant was responsible for approximately $1.2 million in tax losses. Defendant was sentenced to eighty-seven months incarceration. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant waived her argument that the district court erred by submitting a set of summary charts to the jury; (2) the district court did not err by adopting the government's calculation of the tax losses for which Defendant should be held responsible as a result of her fraudulent payroll scheme; and (3) the district court did not plainly err by failing to inquire specifically as to whether Defendant had reviewed the presentence report (PSR) with her attorney because the evidence showed Defendant reviewed the PSR with her sentencing counsel. View "United States v. Deleon" on Justia Law

At the turn of this century, the Massachusetts legislature passed a law that created fixed and floating buffer zones around abortion clinics. The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected several challenges to the law's constitutionality. In 2007, the legislature amended the statute to create a fixed thirty-five-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics. The First Circuit upheld the law against a facial challenge. Plaintiffs pursued an as-applied challenge in district court, where it was rejected. Plaintiffs again appealed, principally raising First Amendment arguments. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute is a content-neutral, narrowly tailored time-place-manner regulation that protects the rights of prospective patients and clinic employees without offending the First Amendment rights of others. View "McCullen v. Coakley" on Justia Law

In 1984, following the denial of his motion to suppress, a jury convicted Petitioner of one count of conspiracy to possess marijuana, and the sentencing court sentenced Petitioner to four years incarceration. After various appeals, Petitioner reached an agreement with the government wherein he abandoned his suppression challenge and the government recommended that his sentence be reduced to eighteen months' imprisonment. In 2007, Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of error coram nobis, attacking the denial of the suppression motion in the 1984 case based on newly available evidence. Although Petitioner had been released from imprisonment for the 1984 crime, that conviction operated to increase the sentence he received as the result of his next criminal conviction, for which Petitioner was still serving time. The district court denied Petitioner's petition. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that issuance of the writ would not be warranted under the facts and circumstances of this case. View "Murray v. United States" on Justia Law

Upon an investigation by the Maine Bureau of Insurance (Bureau) and the Maine Attorney General's Office (AG's Office) into the questionable business practices of Bankers Life and Casualty Company (Company), Appellant, the Company's employee, accepted responsibility for his own unlawful conduct. In exchange, several state officials (Appellees) representing the Bureau and the AG's Office agreed to take no further action against Appellant. Appellees, however, subsequently agreed to Appellant's termination in a separate agreement with the Company. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees, asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(2). The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) Appellees were entitled to absolute immunity on the section 1983 claim, and (2) Appellant failed to plead a plausible section 1985(2) claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellees met their burden in establishing they were entitled to absolute immunity for entering into the consent agreements with Appellant and the Company, and the district court did not err by refusing to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel on Appellees' immunity defense; and (2) because the complaint failed to allege any racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus underlying Appellees' actions, the district court properly dismissed Appellant's section 1985(2) claim. View "Knowlton v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a home on Grassy Pond Road in Hopkinton, Rhode Island. The Hopkinton Planning Board granted a developer's application to develop a residential subdivision on a tract adjacent to Plaintiff's land on the condition that Grassy Pond Road be reconfigured and reconstructed. The reconstruction required a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), which was issued. Plaintiff attempted to appeal the issuance of the permit. In the meantime, the developer sold its land, and the DEM permit expired. The subdivision proposal was subsequently abandoned, and Plaintiff's state-court appeal was dismissed as moot. Plaintiff, however, filed suit in federal district court against the State of Rhode Island, the DEM, the town of Hopkinton, the Board, the developer, and others, alleging various constitutional and pendent state-law claims, including a takings claim. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding, among other things, that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's takings claim because Plaintiff failed to pursue available state procedures in an endeavor to secure just compensation. The First Circuit Court of affirmed for substantially the reasons limned in the district court's opinion. View "Marek v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law