Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a Canadian company, contracted with Plaintiff, a Massachusetts investment bank, to be its exclusive financial advisor for the sale of its business. The parties negotiated and executed the agreement from their respective home offices, contacting each other by phone, e-mail, and internet. Plaintiff later sued in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging breach of contract, among other claims. Defendant removed the case to federal district court. The district court subsequently dismissed the case, concluding that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant consistently with the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit reversed, holding that, in light of the nature, number, origin, and duration of the parties’ contacts in this case, the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by Massachusetts was consistent with fair play and substantial justice. View "C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp." on Justia Law

An initial criminal complaint issued against Defendant on August 6, 2010 charging him with a drug-related offense. Over the next fourteen months, the government brought four superseding indictments against him. Five days before jury empanelment was set to begin, Defendant moved to dismiss the fourth superseding indictment, asserting impermissible trial delay. The government conceded a breach of 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), which requires a criminal defendant to be brought to trial within seventy days of the filing of an indictment. The district court determined that the appropriate remedy for exceeding the statutory time limit was a dismissal of the fourth superseding indictment without prejudice and that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had not been violated. Defendant was subsequently convicted. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the district court (1) properly decided that dismissal without prejudice was the appropriate remedy for the Speedy Trial Act violation; and (2) properly concluded that Defendant had not been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. View "United States v. Worthy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the district court did not err by declining to grant Appellant’s motion to suppress cocaine found in the trunk of a vehicle in which Appellant was a passenger; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing the attorneys of the driver of the vehicle to testify about her statements claiming responsibility for the drugs; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not declaring a mistrial based on certain statements made at trial. View "United States v. Awer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine base. Appellant was sentenced to seventy months in jail. On appeal, Appellant challenged his conviction and his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly admitted testimony from a government agent because the testimony was not improper overview; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting law enforcement officers to interpret for the jury what was taking place on recordings; (3) the government’s failure to lay a foundation for certain identification testimony did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights; and (4) Appellant’s sentence was not violative of Alleyne v. United States. View "United States v. Etienne" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the regulation by the state of Massachusetts of the display of billboards and other outdoor signage. Plaintiffs, related companies engaged in the business of erecting and displaying billboards and outdoor signage, brought suit against Massachusetts state agencies and officials charged with administering the regulations, alleging, among other things, that the regulations violated Plaintiff’s free speech rights under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the First Amendment claim for want of standing. The First Circuit reversed the order dismissing the First Amendment claim, holding that Plaintiffs had standing to proceed with their challenge because the complaint plausibly alleged that Plaintiffs were subject to a regulatory permitting scheme that chilled protected expression by granting a state official unbridled discretion over the licensing of their expressive conduct and that posed a real threat of censorship. View "Van Wagner Boston, LLC v. Davey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the parents of a minor child with Asperger’s Syndrome, filed suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Department of Education under a number of federal and state statutes for alleged retaliation and discrimination against their child. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the claims against it pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead either discrimination or retaliation, and therefore, dismissal of their federal claims was proper; and (2) Plaintiffs’ argument that the Commonwealth waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment was waived for lack of development. View "Lebron v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

Defendant was driving a rental car he had retrieved from his son’s girlfriend when he was stopped by a police officer. The officer subsequently discovered a bag on the passenger seat containing a gun and two boxes of ammunition. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the stop was illegal. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that because Defendant was an unlicensed, unauthorized driver of the rental car, he did not have standing to challenge the stop. A jury returned a guilty verdict, and Defendant was sentenced to 210 months in prison. The First Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Defendant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the stop. View "United States v. Starks" on Justia Law

The Town of Mendon, Massachusetts set forth zoning restrictions regulating the size and height allowances for buildings operating adult-entertainment businesses, limiting the operating hours of such businesses, and banning the sale or consumption of alcohol on their premises. The stated purposes for these bylaws were to control the secondary effects uniquely related to adult entertainment. Showtime Entertainment, LLC filed suit, claiming (1) the restrictions on its operating hours and size and height of its building were unconstitutional restrictions of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment; and (2) the alcohol restrictions violated the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Mendon, concluding that the restrictions were sufficiently tailored towards controlling the secondary effects of speech. The First Circuit (1) reversed the summary judgment in favor of Mendon as it related to the bylaws regarding the size, height, and operating hours of Showtime’s business, holding that the bylaws unconstitutionally infringed on Showtime’s right to engage in a protected expressive activity; and (2) certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court questions related to Mendon’s restriction on adult entertainment occurring within establishments licensed to serve alcohol. View "Showtime Ent., LLC v. Town of Mendon" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff retired from his employment with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) he filed an administrative claim for employment discrimination, alleging that he was constructively discharged on the basis of his age or national origin. Plaintiff’s claim was denied. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action claiming liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and Puerto Rico law. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding the action time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) to the extent Plaintiff’s complaint asserted an FTCA claim, it must be dismissed on the grounds that Plaintiff did not present an FTCA claim in his administrative complaint; and (2) Plaintiff’s remaining claims were time-barred. View "Acevedo-Perez v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex offender. The plea agreement contained a waiver of appeal provision, which provided that if the court accepted the agreement and sentenced Defendant according to its terms, Defendant would be waiving and permanently surrendering his right to appeal the judgment and sentence. The court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea, and the district court judge sentenced Defendant to twelve months in prison and ten years supervised release. The judge imposed a number of special sex offender conditions as terms of Defendant’s supervised release. Defendant appealed, seeking to vacate the special sex offender conditions. The First Circuit dismissed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, holding that Defendant waived his right to appeal all of the special sex offender conditions of supervised release save the condition providing that Defendant could not use or possess sexually explicit material or frequent any establishments providing pornography or sexual services, as the condition was not announced at sentencing.View "United States v. Santiago" on Justia Law