Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A multi-count indictment alleged that the four appellants in this case and their forty-three co-defendants participated in a drug trafficking conspiracy. Following a joint trial, the appellants were convicted and sentenced to various prison terms ranging from 151 months to life imprisonment. The First Circuit (1) remanded two of the appellants’ cases for a new trial, holding that the district court erred in denying those appellants’ motions for a new trial based on the government’s failure to disclose evidence required to be disclosed under Brady v. Maryland and that the withheld evidence had a reasonable probability of changing the result for those two appellants; and (2) otherwise affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error arising from the claims that the remaining two appellants brought. View "United States v. Flores-Rivera" on Justia Law

Since 2001, Cape Wind Associates, LLC has attempted to acquire the necessary permits and approvals for a wind power generation facility in Nantucket Sound. Under a settlement agreement, NSTAR Electric Company agreed to purchase one-quarter of Cape Wind’s output. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) approved the contract. Plaintiffs - the Town of Barnstable, a non-profit advocacy group, and businesses and individuals residing near the proposed facility - filed this action in federal district court seeing an injunction and a declaratory judgment against officials of the DPU, the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources, Cape Wind, and NSTAR. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that the Eleventh Amendment barred the assertion of federal court jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of dismissal and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims fell outside the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment; and (2) the case was not moot or unripe. View "Town of Barnstable v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

In two separate murder trials in Puerto Rico’s courts, jurors convicted a group of individuals based in large part on the testimony of a single witness. When that witness later recanted her testimony, the Commonwealth courts vacated the convictions and dropped the charges against the convicted individuals. Thereafter, the wrongfully convicted individuals (and/or their heirs and family members) filed these consolidated civil damages actions against police officers and prosecutors involved in their prosecutions, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various constitutional and tort claims under Puerto Rico law. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on absolute or qualified immunities. The district court rejected the defenses. The First Circuit (1) reversed in part the denial of summary judgment for the assistant district attorney, holding that absolute immunity shielded the assistant district attorney from having to stand trial for Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims under section 1983; and (2) otherwise affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, holding that, to the extent the appeal was predicated on Defendants’ qualified immunity defense under federal or state law, Defendants’ claims were waived for inadequate briefing. View "Diaz-Colon v. Solivan-Solivan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the prosecutor impermissibly commented on the court interpreter’s translation of certain testimony given by police officers, and (2) the prosecutor invited the jury to infer guilt from Defendant’s silence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) even assuming that there was an error in the prosecutor’s remarks as to the interpretation of witness testimony, the error was not so prejudicial as to warrant relief; and (2) the prosecutor did not impermissibly comment on Defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent. View "United States v. Baez-Martinez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of drug conspiracy and two counts of murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in (1) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress wiretap evidence; (2) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his car and farm pursuant to a search warrant; (3) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate allegations of juror bias and by failing to grant a new trial on account of that alleged bias; (4) denying Defendant’s motions challenging the Government’s decision to seek the death penalty; and (5) denying Defendant’s motion for acquittal or new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence to convict. Lastly, the evidence presented at trial regarding the duration of the drug conspiracy did not constitute a fatal variance from that charged in the indictment, and any possible error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Burgos-Montes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Junior H. De La Cruz-Feliciano and Sandri Rigo were convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine and aiding and abetting the same. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s questioning of a witness did not evince judicial bias in violation of De La Cruz’s right to due process; (2) the Government’s belated disclosure of errors in an investigative report prior to Rijo’s counsel’s opening statement did not prevent defense counsel from using it in preparing and presenting Rijo’s case; (3) the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Rijo’s prior bad acts; and (4) the Government’s closing argument accurately described Rijo’s role in the offense. View "United States v. De La Cruz-Feliciano" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 280 grams of crack. Defendant did not admit that he was responsible for a particular quantity of either form of drug. During the sentencing hearing, the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant was personally responsible for 765.5 grams of crack. The court imposed a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court handed down Alleyne v. United States, which held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees that such qualifying fact issues are subject to jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the court’s judicial fact-finding of drug quantities in this case was impermissible; but (2) the error was harmless in light of concessions made by Defendant’s counsel and overwhelming evidence that Defendant was responsible for at least 280 grams of crack. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Before Defendant was under suspicion on federal child pornography charges, the Puerto Rico police carried out two searches that resulted in the seizure of various electronic devices. After the Puerto Rico police had informed federal authorities about images they had found on the devices, federal agents approached Defendant’s then-wife, who consented to the federal agents’ examination of the family’s desktop computer. A federal grand jury subsequently indicted Defendant for numerous child pornography counts. Defendant pleaded guilty and then appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the two searches carried out by the Puerto Rico police violated the Fourth Amendment; and (2) because the district court did not address whether those unlawful searches tainted the evidence federal authorities acquired pursuant to the consent of Defendant’s then-wife, the case must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue. View "United States v. Cordero-Rosario" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and distribution of heroin. The First Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the district court (1) did not violate the Confrontation Clause by allowing into evidence testimony from an FBI agent that relayed the agent’s own observations and not statements made out of court by someone Defendant could not confront at trial; (2) did not deprive Defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense by denying his request to call a particular witness; and (3) did not err in its factual determinations under the Sentencing Guidelines or impose a term of imprisonment that was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Occhiuto" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. 922(n), which makes it unlawful for a person who is under indictment for a certain category of crime to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the evidence seized from his home was discovered pursuant to a state search warrant filled with false statements, and that without those statements, probable cause for the warrant was lacking. After a Franks hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the motion to suppress, concluding that the sworn statement in support of the search warrant had false and misleading information, without which probable cause for the search warrant was insufficient. After a de novo Franks hearing, the district court rejected the magistrate’s report and recommendation and denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s argument boiled down to a credibility determination by the district court - something that the First Circuit will not second-guess - there was easily probable cause to issue the search warrant, and therefore, Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied. View "United States v. Guzman-Batista" on Justia Law