Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders denying Defendant’s motion to suppress wiretap evidence and denying Defendant’s two requests for evidentiary hearings in connection with the motion to suppress. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress and his related requests for evidentiary hearings. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the wiretap orders were not so lacking in particularity as to demand suppression, the wiretap applications were more than minimally adequate to justify the wiretap orders, and suppression was not required due to minimization deficiencies; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold either a general evidentiary hearing or a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions of first degree murder. Defendant took a collateral challenge to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The SJC affirmed Defendant’s conviction. A federal district court denied Defendant’s subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the SJC clearly understood and reasonably rejected Defendant’s claims on the merits in a manner consistent with federal constitutional law; and (2) to the extent that the SJC misapprehended Defendant’s argument regarding his Fifth Amendment rights, Defendant suffered no prejudice because his Strickland argument would not have prevailed. View "Johnston v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit challenging the revocation of his attorney’s license, holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred his suit.After the Rhode Island Supreme Court suspended Plaintiff from practicing law for one year, Plaintiff filed this federal suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against nearly two dozen judicial officers and administrators who had participated in his disciplinary proceedings, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under both the Rhode Island and the United States Constitutions. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss primarily on the grounds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly ruled that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. View "McKenna v. Curtin" on Justia Law

Police officers’ warrantless entry into the home of Plaintiffs and their subsequent arrest of one of the plaintiffs violated clearly established law. Plaintiffs, Charles and Lesa Morse, sued Defendants, police officers, alleging that Defendants’ warrantless entry into their home and the subsequent arrest of Charles violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs also claimed that Defendants transgressed the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that exigent circumstances justified their warrantless entry and that the events amounted to a doorway arrest. The district court refused to grant either summary judgment or, by implication, qualified immunity based on exigent circumstances. Defendants appealed. The First Circuit dismissed substantial portions of the interlocutory appeals for want of appellate jurisdiction and otherwise affirmed, holding that Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. View "Morse v. Cloutier" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because there was not reasonable suspicion for the stop-and-frisk that resulted in the discovery of the firearm and that the district court erred by allowing him to direct his attorney not to pursue certain factual lines of defense at trial. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) there was reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop and frisk, and therefore, Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied; and (2) there was no reversible error in the district court’s decision to allow Defendant to make certain choices in the conduct of his defense. View "United States v. Belin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence, including a loaded firearm found when law enforcement searched Defendant’s home.Defendant pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. The First Circuit held (1) the protective sweep of Defendant’s residence was not lawful in light of the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s arrest; and (2) therefore, the evidence that was recovered during and following the sweep should have been excluded as the illegal fruit of that sweep. View "United States v. Delgado-Perez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that was seized from Defendant’s apartment pursuant to a warrant. While law enforcement agents were seeking the warrant, other agents entered Defendant’s apartment, detained the individuals present in the apartment, and while securing the premises came upon some of the evidence that was later seized. The district court denied Defendant’s motion on independent-source grounds, concluding that there was no evidence that either the warrant or the decision to seek the warrant was tainted by what the officers saw during the initial entry. The First Circuit agreed, holding (1) the warrant was not based on information gleaned from the warrantless seizure and sweep of Defendant’s apartment; and (2) the officers’ conduct did not rise to a level that might arguably justify a departure from the normal rules governing suppression. View "United States v. Dent" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of his contention that a provision of the Maine Civil Rights Act facially violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of the freedom of speech. The challenged provision bars a person from making noise that “can be heard within a building” when such noise is made intentionally, following an order from law enforcement to cease making it, and with the additional intent either to jeopardize the health of persons receiving health services within the building or to interfere with the safe and effective delivery of those services. The district court granted Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the measure, as a content-based speech restriction, did not satisfy strict scrutiny. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that the noise provision was properly treated as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction that survived Plaintiff’s facial challenge under intermediate scrutiny. View "March v. Mills" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint in this federal-sector employment discrimination case in which Plaintiffs invoked “extravagant” theories of liability. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged deprivations of their First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought damages under the Bivens doctrine, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FBN, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). The complaint also proffered claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment in Defendants’ favor, ruling that Plaintiffs could not dodge the preclusive effect of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and Title VII by “creatively” pleading causes of action. The First Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that Plaintiffs’ theories ran “headlong into an impenetrable barrier” forged by the CSRA and Title VII. View "Gonzalez v. Otero" on Justia Law

In this complaint by a former employee alleging violations of the American Disabilities Act (ADA) there was no error in the district court’s jury instructions.Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer alleging that his termination violated the ADA. Plaintiff was fired from his job in the Town of Brookline’s Department of Public Works for unjustified absences from work and failing to provide adequate documentation for his use of sick leave. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he had been suffering from sleep apnea and that the Town violated the ADA by discriminating against him on the basis of his sleep apnea disability, denying him a reasonable accommodation, and failing to engage in an interactive dialogue as required under the ADA. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the district court did not err in its instructions to the jury. View "McDonald v. Town of Brookline, Massachusetts" on Justia Law