Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to strike the government's notice of intent to seek the death penalty on retrial in this case, holding that double jeopardy barred the government from seeking the death penalty.Defendant was charged with nine counts of committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering and nine counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence. In advance of trial, the government filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty on sixteen of those counts. The jury found Defendant guilty on all charges but could not reach a unanimous decision as to punishment. The district court imposed a life sentence without the possibility of release. The First Circuit vacated the conviction, concluding that a courtroom closure during trial constituted structural error. On remand, the government again notified the court of its intention to seek the death penalty. Defendant moved to strike the government's notice on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the first life sentence was an "acquittal," and therefore, double jeopardy barred the government from seeking the death penalty on retrial; and (2) the assumption that the initial penalty-phase jury was properly discharged was incorrect. View "United States v. Candelario-Santana" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Pembroke, New Hampshire and dismissing the complaint filed by Signs for Jesus and Hillside Baptist Church (collectively, the Church) challenging the Town's denial of the Church's application for a permit to install an electronic sign on its property, holding that the Town met its summary judgment burden on all counts.Hillside Baptist Church applied for a permit to install an electronic sign on its property to transmit messages provided by the nonprofit corporation Signs for Jesus. The Pembroke Zoning Board of Adjustment denied the permit, citing a provision in the Pembroke Sign Ordinance that bans the use of electronic signs in the zoning district where the Church was located. The Church later brought this complaint, alleging violations of the state and federal Constitutions, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and certain New Hampshire zoning laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the Town and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Church's state statutory claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err. View "Signs for Jesus v. Pembroke, New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution based on his prior conviction in a Commonwealth court for a local drug offense, holding that Defendant met his burden to make a prima facie case that he had been prosecuted twice for the same conduct under equivalent criminal laws.On March 15, 2016, Defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of Article 406 of the Puerto Rico Controlled Substances Act. About sixteen months later, Defendant was named in a federal indictment charging him with five drug-related federal offenses, including conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.c. 846. Defendant moved to dismiss the section 846 conspiracy count on double jeopardy grounds, alleging that his prior Article 406 conviction was for the same criminal conduct that the section 846 count charged him with committing. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Defendant met his burden of presenting evidence to establish a prima facie non frivolous double jeopardy claim, and the government failed to meet its burden to rebut it. View "United States v. Reyes-Correa" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction for transporting a minor in interstate or foreign commerce or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, holding that the trial judge violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to in-person confrontation when he allowed the victim to testify by two-way close-circuit television and without making specific on the record findings.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) 2423(a)'s ban on transporting a minor to commit a sex crime applies to transportation without Puerto Rico, which is a "commonwealth" of the United States under the statute; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; (3) the judge properly instructed the jury on the elements of the Puerto Rico crimes the government alleged Defendant had intended to commit at her destination; but (4) the judge violated Defendant's right to confront the victim in person absent a compelling need for remote testimony, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Cotto-Flores" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants - Maine's Cape Elizabeth School District and officials of Cape Elizabeth High School - from suspending A.M., a student at the high school, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction.A.M. anonymously posted a sticky note on a mirror at the high school girls' bathroom stating, "There's a rapist in our school and you know who it is." Defendants determined that the note constituted bullying under the school's policies and imposed a three-day suspension on A.M. Through her mother, A.M. filed a complaint requesting that the district court enjoin Defendants from suspending her, arguing, among other things, that the suspension violated her right to free expression under the First Amendment. A.M. also moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted a preliminary injunction based on A.M.'s First Amendment claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that A.M. showed a likelihood of success in demonstrating that her sticky note was constitutionally protected speech. View "Norris v. Cape Elizabeth School District" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search and seizure of his vehicle, holding that the warrantless seizure of Defendant's vehicle was unlawful.Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. On appeal, Defendant argued that law enforcement officers had no right to seize and tow his car, thereby setting it up for the inventory search that produced the evidence leading to his conviction. The First Circuit agreed, holding (1) the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in this case; (2) the government did not have probable cause to seize the vehicle pursuant to the Puerto Rico Uniform Forfeiture Act; and (3) the doctrine of inevitable discovery did not apply to justify the warrantless seizure of Defendant's vehicle. View "United States v. Del Rosario-Acosta" on Justia Law

In this case involving the bombing at the 2013 Boston Marathon, the First Circuit vacated Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's death sentences and reversed his three convictions for carrying a firearm during crimes of violence, holding that the judge did not meet the standard set by Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 318 (1st Cir. 1968), and erred in denying Tsarnaev's post-trial motion for judgments of acquittal.A jury convicted Tsarnaev of all charges for which he was indicted arising from the Boston Marathon bombing. The district judge imposed a sentence of death on six of the death-eligible counts. On appeal, Tsarnaev argued, among other things, that the judge erred in the way he handled Tsarnaev's venue-change motions and the jury-selection process. The First Circuit held (1) the trial judge in this high-profile case did not fully comply with Patriarca by running a voir dire sufficient to identify prejudice, which provided a sufficient ground to vacate Tsarnaev's death sentences; and (2) because not each of the underlying offenses constituted a crime of violence, three of Defendant's convictions for carrying a firearm for crimes of violence are reversed. View "United States v. Tsarnaev" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's plea-based conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, holding that Defendant's prosecution did not violate constitutional double jeopardy protections.In 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court of the District of Puerto Rico to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. In 2016, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court of the District of Puerto Rico to a drug trafficking conspiracy charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that his double jeopardy rights were violated because the two conspiracy prosecutions concerned conduct at the same "places" and charged him with violations of "the same statutory provision." The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was a rational basis to conduct that the two conspiracies were distinct. View "United States v. Perez-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint seeking to recoup assets purportedly gifted to a charitable institution for less than adequate consideration by Plaintiff's ex-husband, holding that the district court erred by dismissing Plaintiff's claims on the basis that she lacked standing.Janet and Robert Foisie entered into a divorce settlement agreement in which each party agreed to a mutually acceptable split of assets. When Janet discovered that Robert had fraudulent transferred several million dollars to the Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), Janet brought a civil action against WPI asserting claims of actual and constructive fraudulent transfers under both the common law and Connecticut's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). The district court dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding (1) Janet easily satisfied the three elements of Article III standing, and her claims were ripe; (2) a choice-of-law analysis would be better performed on a more fully developed factual record; (3) the district court erred by dismissing Janet's UFTA claims on the basis that she lacked standing as a creditor; (4) the dismissal of Janet's common law claims on preemption grounds cannot stand; and (5) Janet's UFTA and common law claims were adequately pleaded. View "Foisie v. Worcester Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motions to suppress all evidence obtained directly by a pole camera, holding that the doctrine of stare decisis controlled this case and required reversal of the district court.At issue was whether the Supreme Court's opinion in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), a cell phone location automatic tracking technology case, provided a basis for departing from otherwise binding First Circuit precedent in United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108 (1st Cir. 2009) and Supreme Court precedent on which Bucci was based. The First Circuit held that, by departing from that precedent in granting Defendants' motions to suppress, the district court violated the vertical rule of stare decisis. The Court thus remanded with instruction to deny the motions to suppress. View "United States v. Moore-Bush" on Justia Law