Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After receiving information from an informant, conducting a controlled drug buy, and surveillance of the defendant, officers obtained warrants to search a house, an apartment, and the defendant's person. The defendant spotted the surveillance and led police on a high-speed chase before leaving the car in his mother's driveway and running. He was apprehended with $1,081 on his person. Police found a loaded gun and cocaine in the car, cocaine and needles in the house, and cocaine, a scale, and chemicals in the apartment. The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and gun possession in furtherance of a drug crime. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict. The trial court properly refused to suppress the gun; there was probable cause for a search of every part of the car, despite it being unoccupied and parked on a private driveway. The court affirmed the 25-year sentence, imposed months before the effective date of the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the sentence for certain drug crimes. The Act does not apply retroactively.

The inmate, convicted of second-degree murder in 1993 and violation of a domestic relations restraining order in 2010, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on a decision that he was ineligible for a pre-parole community diversion program. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were barred as res judicata. While the federal case was pending, the Puerto Rican Court of Appeals affirmed that the inmate was not entitled to participate in the program. The court took judicial notice of the decision, despite failure to provide a timely English translation and the government's failure to argue res judicata below.

After Massachusetts rejected the petitioner's appeals from his conviction on charges relating to distribution of cocaine, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, holding that chemical analysts were witnesses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and must be available for cross-examination and confrontation. The district court denied a subsequent petition for habeas corpus and the First Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, the issue is whether the state's decision violated clearly established federal law. Federal law was not clearly established at the time of the state decision.

The Puerto Rico Examining Board of Accountants required a CPA to submit to involuntary practice review and denied a requested postponement. The CPA failed to appear at a hearing. The Board did not respond to a request to reschedule, but suspended his license. Following a request for reconsideration, the Board sent notice that did not comply with statutory requirements, held a hearing, and declined to lift the suspension. The CPA completed the practice review after the deadline; the Board again declined to lift the suspension. The Board sent another non-compliant notice, held another hearing, and revoked the CPA's license. A Puerto Rico court ordered reinstatement. The federal district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the individual Board defendants perform functions similar to judges and are protected by immunity. They act under a statute that provides for due process and their actions are reviewable in Puerto Rico courts. Although they made serious procedural errors, the Board members had jurisdiction to take the actions at issue.

After the plaintiff publicly criticized town council policies, the council denied him reappointment to an unpaid advisory commission concerned with recreational facilities. The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights suit on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed. The court assumed that the council's decision was based on the plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment rights and held that the plaintiff's former position and his comments related to policy. Analogizing to firings based on political party affiliation, the court held that the balance weighs in favor of the town's need to accomplish its policy objectives through loyal, cooperative individuals whom the public will perceive as sharing the administration's goals.

Rhode Island discontinued its practice of pooling funds from inmate accounts for investment and paying inmates interest on their accounts. The district court rejected claims of taking and due process violations. The First Circuit affirmed. Noting the limited rights of prisoners and that, at common law, prisoners were not paid for their labor, the court concluded that state law creates no property right in earning interest. Prior policy was "administrative generosity" and did not obligate the state to continue the practice.

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in Massachusetts in 1992. The state supreme court affirmed in 1995 and, in 1999, denied appeal from denial of a motion for a new trial. The federal district court dismissed a habeas corpus petition that had been filed in 1997 and the defendant again pursued a new trial in state court. After the state supreme court again denied review and the federal court rejected an attempt to revisit the habeas petition, the defendant filed a second habeas petition. The petition was stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies and denied in 2009. The First Circuit affirmed, declining to address a "thorny" statute of limitations issue under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244, and rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on the merits. State court findings that a witness was not coerced were adequately supported. The jury instruction on malice erroneously referred to the possibility of grievous bodily injury, but the defense did not object. There was no "gross miscarriage of justice;" the defendant offered no evidence of actual innocence.

After a 15-year-old told a detective that defendant had nude pictures of her, officers visited the defendant's home, intending to take him to a medical facility. A doctor had previously notified the sheriff that the defendant was unstable. The defendant invited the officers in, admitted that he had photographed the girl in the bathroom, but claimed that it was not intentional. During the interview the defendant had a panic attack and received assistance. When officers asked to search computers, the defendant admitted that he looked at pictures of young girls and called himself a deviant. Assured that he was not under arrest, the defendant turned over tapes and signed a consent. Officers seized computers and took defendant to a medical center, where he was arrested days later. After the district court denied a motion to suppress, the defendant entered a conditional plea. The First Circuit affirmed. The defendant was not in custody and not entitled to Miranda warnings. The presence of four officers in a small house was "impressive," but not overwhelming. There was no show of force; the atmosphere was calm and polite and the defendant retained control of his activities. Despite the defendant's fragile mental state, his other characteristics and the behavior of the officers support a conclusion of voluntariness. Even if the consent to search had been coerced, discovery of the evidence was inevitable.

The defendant, serving a sentence in state prison, was ordered to testify in federal court under a grant of immunity. He refused, a civil contempt order issued, and he was placed in federal prison. The district court held that his state sentence would not run concurrently during his federal incarceration. The First Circuit affirmed. The recalcitrant witness law, 28 U.S.C. 1826, does not directly address the issue, but the federal contempt sanction would be less effective if it effectively reduced a state sentence.