Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

PRTC and T-Mobile entered into an interconnection agreement under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in 1999 and into a second agreement in 2001. The agreements provided that certain intrastate access services provided by PRTC, an incumbent local exchange carrier, would be billed at a rate contained in PRTC's federal tariff filed with the FCC. T-Mobile was billed at this rate until 2002, when PRTC announced its view that this billing rate was in error, the disputed services were not covered under the agreement, and the applicable billing rate was a higher rate found in PRTC's local tariff. Roughly $2 million is at issue. The Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico ruled in favor of T-Mobile as a matter of contract law, holding that the FCC tariff rate applied. The district court granted summary judgment for PRTC and vacated the order as discriminating against third-party carriers, in violation of federal law. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the agreement was neither discriminatory nor violative of any other provision of federal law. View "PR Tel. Co., Inc. v. T-Mobile PR, LLC" on Justia Law

Having lost his bid for a Maine Senate seat, plaintiff sued Republican party leadership for defamation libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and publicly placing him in a false light. The complaint referred to flyers, brochures, and radio and TV ads days before the election that conjured up imaginary wrongs that he had supposedly done as a selectman for the town of Blue Hill, primarily concerning discontinuance of fireworks on the Fourth of July. The complaint referred to "actual malice." The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that false statements were made negligently, not with actual malice. Defamation law "does not require that combatants for public office act like war-time neutrals, treating everyone evenhandedly and always taking the high road. Quite the contrary. Provided that they do not act with actual malice, they can badmouth their opponents, hammering them with unfair and one-sided attacks"

After several failed attempts to establish a voluntary interconnection agreement, the two telecommunications companies went into arbitration with defendant, the Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico. Following a remand, the Board approved a final interconnection agreement pursuant to its authority under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 251. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Board. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that various provisions were arbitrary.

Defendant, a film company, released a documentary, "The Price of Sugar," in 2007 that depicts treatment of Haitian laborers at sugar plantations in the Dominican Republic. The film mentions plaintiffs, senior executives of family plantations, by name. In a suit for defamation, the court entered summary judgment for defendant and denied a motion to compel production of discovery materials. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The plaintiffs are limited public figures in the entire United States, who used their access to the press to launch a PR blitz, thereby risking public scrutiny. Their conduct was beyond a reasonable reply to negative publicity. The court remanded for consideration of actual malice, based on communications between defendant and a fact-checker, hired at the suggestion of defense counsel.

Defendant, convicted of interstate stalking, cyberstalking, and mailing a threatening communication (18 U.S.C. 2261A(1)-(2), 876(c)), based on communications with his estranged wife and minor child, was sentenced to 137 months. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a change of venue or transfer. There was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Defendant waived challenge to the indictment under FRCP 12(e); he did not show good cause for failing to raise the challenge before trial. The court acted within its discretion in allowing evidence of prior bad acts and imposing the sentence.

PRTC, telecommunications local exchange carrier under the jurisdiction of the Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico and the FCC, entered into an interconnection agreement with Sprint. In a dispute concerning compensation, the Board held that under the agreement''s change-of-law provision PRTC and Sprint were to reciprocally compensate each other for internet-service-provider bound traffic in accordance with an interim compensation order set forth by the FCC in its ISP Remand Order. The Board dismissed Sprint's claim that PRTC had overcharged for termination of transit traffic. The district court upheld the Board. The First Circuit reversed in part. The ISP Remand Order did not alter existing contractual obligations and, therefore, did not trigger the change-of-law provision. The court affirmed dismissal of the overbilling claim.

After agents traced an Internet site containing child pornography to a computer shop, they obtained a warrant and searched hard drives of the owner's personal computers, where they found files containing pornography. The owner was convicted of knowing possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and sentenced to 84 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that his own computer contained the files, even if he did not download them himself, and that they were obtained by Internet file sharing.

Recording companies sought statutory damages and injunctive relief under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101, claiming willful infringement of copyrights of music recordings by using file-sharing software to download and distribute recordings without authorization. The jury found that the infringement was willful and awarded statutory damages of $22,500 for each infringed recording, an award within the statutory range of $750 to $150,000 per infringement. The judge reduced the damages by a factor of ten, reasoning that the award was excessive in violation of defendant's due process rights. The First Circuit affirmed the finding of liability, but reinstated the original damage award. The district court erred in considering the constitutional issue without first addressing defendant's motion for remittitur. The court noted a number of issues concerning application of the Copyright Act that "Congress may wish to examine."

A regional television personality was discharged from his employment with Comcast Network after he publicly protested the selection of political commentator Bill O'Reilly for a prestigious broadcasting award. He filed a claim of speech-motivated retaliation under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11H, 11I. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Comcast. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's employment agreement permitted Comcast to terminate him for any reason, or no reason at all; termination, or threatened termination, of an employee under such a contract is not coercive in the relevant sense under the MCRA.

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Maine election laws (Me.Rev.Stat. title 21A sec. 1052) as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms, particularly with respect to the phrase "for the purpose of influencing," as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees and reporting of independent expenditures. The district court upheld the law. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the organization had standing. The record showed that its fears were objectively reasonable and led to self-censorship. With respect to the overbreadth claim, the court rejected an argument based on the distinction between issue discussion and express advocacy, characterizing the distinction as irrelevant and applying the "exacting scrutiny" standard because the law does not prohibit, limit, or impose any onerous burdens on speech, but merely requires maintenance and disclosure of certain financial information. There is a "substantial relation" between Maine's informational interest and each of the laws at issue. The terms "promoting," "support," "opposition," "influencing," "expressly advocate" and "initiation" are sufficiently clear.