Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of tampering with a federal witness, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and related crimes. Because the acts for which Appellant was convicted resulted in the death of the witness, Appellant faced the death penalty. The jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court violated Appellant’s immunity agreement with the government when it insisted that, before a defense expert would be permitted to testify, the defense expert be informed a proffer made in an attempt to negotiate a plea despite the proffer being protected by direct-use immunity. View "United States v. Jimenez-Bencevi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of wire and mail fraud. The district court calculated Defendant’s sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines at thirty to thirty-seven months but imposed a below-Guidelines prison sentence of twenty-six months. Defendant appealed, raising claims of error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings with respect to a key witness and purportedly improper vouching by the government. Defendant also appealed his sentencing, claiming error in the application of an enhancement for violating securities laws and the loss calculation. The First Circuit affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing, holding (1) none of Defendant’s evidentiary challenges had any merit, nor did any of his related due process claims; (2) Defendant waived his argument that the government improperly vouched for its case and its witnesses; (3) the district court did not err in applying the enhancement for violating securities laws; and (4) where the government confessed error as to the loss calculation, and the error was not harmless, a remand was required. View "United States v. Reda" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a lawsuit against the Narragansett Indian Tribe alleging breach of contract. Plaintiff alleged that the Tribe contractually waived the sovereign immunity that would otherwise have prevented him from bringing this suit outside the tribal courts. The district court denied the Tribe’s motion to dismiss the case on sovereign immunity grounds. The Tribe did not appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. Instead, the Tribe filed an untimely Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration. The district court denied the Rule 59(e) motion. The Tribe subsequently filed a notice purporting to appeal from both the denial of the motion to dismiss and the denial of the untimely Rule 59(e) motion. A prior duty panel of the First Circuit dismissed as untimely any appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit subsequently denied interlocutory review of the order denying its motion to reconsider, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal because the denial of the Tribe’s untimely 59(e) motion did not qualify as a collateral order that the Court may review prior to the end of the litigation in the district court. View "Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and misuse of a government seal, as well as conspiring to commit these crimes. The First Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court (1) did not violate Defendants’ confrontation rights by admitting into evidence customer complaints and cease-and-desist letters from regulators; (2) did not constructively amend the indictment by admitting evidence of Defendants’ lies to the IRS; (3) did not err in instructing the jury on the elements of misuse of a government seal; and (4) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ request mid-trial to remove a juror for bias. View "United States v. Godfrey" on Justia Law

After a second jury trial, Defendant was convicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) there was no probable cause for his arrest, and therefore, the incriminating statements he made shortly after his arrest must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree; and (2) defense counsel’s failure to file a timely motion to suppress on those grounds constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The First Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction, holding that trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion to suppress amounted to constitutionally deficient performance, and Defendant was prejudiced as a result. Remanded. View "United States v. Mercedes-De la Cruz" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant to search Appellant’s home, vehicle, and workplace, the police seized a computer, hard drive, and compact disc that were found to contain sexually explicit images and videos depicting minors. Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of possession of child pornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, asserting that the officer who applied for the search warrant had deliberately or recklessly omitted material information from her affidavit. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that an officer seeking to obtain a search warrant has no duty as a matter of law to inquire further in order to dispel serious doubts about either the credibility of an informant upon whom the officer relies or the veracity of the allegations underlying the attempted showing of probable cause. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that an affiant never has a duty to make further inquiry before presenting a warrant application to a magistrate. View "United States v. Tanguay" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The conviction stemmed from a search of Defendant’s apartment by police pursuant to a search warrant that resulted in the police finding a pistol and eight rounds of ammunition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as the affidavit used to support the search of Defendant’s person and apartment was sufficient to establish probable cause; (2) the government met its burden of establishing the interstate commerce element of the felon-in-possession charge; and (3) the district court’s jury instructions concerning the interstate commerce element were not in error. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

A multi-count indictment alleged that the four appellants in this case and their forty-three co-defendants participated in a drug trafficking conspiracy. Following a joint trial, the appellants were convicted and sentenced to various prison terms ranging from 151 months to life imprisonment. The First Circuit (1) remanded two of the appellants’ cases for a new trial, holding that the district court erred in denying those appellants’ motions for a new trial based on the government’s failure to disclose evidence required to be disclosed under Brady v. Maryland and that the withheld evidence had a reasonable probability of changing the result for those two appellants; and (2) otherwise affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error arising from the claims that the remaining two appellants brought. View "United States v. Flores-Rivera" on Justia Law

In two separate murder trials in Puerto Rico’s courts, jurors convicted a group of individuals based in large part on the testimony of a single witness. When that witness later recanted her testimony, the Commonwealth courts vacated the convictions and dropped the charges against the convicted individuals. Thereafter, the wrongfully convicted individuals (and/or their heirs and family members) filed these consolidated civil damages actions against police officers and prosecutors involved in their prosecutions, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various constitutional and tort claims under Puerto Rico law. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on absolute or qualified immunities. The district court rejected the defenses. The First Circuit (1) reversed in part the denial of summary judgment for the assistant district attorney, holding that absolute immunity shielded the assistant district attorney from having to stand trial for Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims under section 1983; and (2) otherwise affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, holding that, to the extent the appeal was predicated on Defendants’ qualified immunity defense under federal or state law, Defendants’ claims were waived for inadequate briefing. View "Diaz-Colon v. Solivan-Solivan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the prosecutor impermissibly commented on the court interpreter’s translation of certain testimony given by police officers, and (2) the prosecutor invited the jury to infer guilt from Defendant’s silence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) even assuming that there was an error in the prosecutor’s remarks as to the interpretation of witness testimony, the error was not so prejudicial as to warrant relief; and (2) the prosecutor did not impermissibly comment on Defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent. View "United States v. Baez-Martinez" on Justia Law