Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims as pertains to a handful of the original defendants in this case, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in bringing her Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 18 U.S.C. 1514A, claim to federal court.Plaintiff filed a complaint under SOX with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), claiming that she was retaliated against through termination in violation of SOX’s whistleblower protection provision. In the federal courts, the district court concluded that Plaintiff’s OSHA complaint was untimely and thus dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s OSHA complaint was filed outside the requisite timeframe, and Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to raise a plausible claim for relief under SOX. View "Newman v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Plaintiff, a faculty member, on her claim of retaliation under Title VII and the Maine Human Rights Act against Defendant, the university that employed her, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the university retaliated against her after she complained about sexual harassment by her department chair and supervisor. The alleged retaliatory acts included Plaintiff’s transfer to a new department after obtaining her consent to transfer by making misrepresentations about how the transfer would affect her professional responsibilities. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding that summary judgment was improper because there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Defendant misled Plaintiff into transferring departments and as to whether Plaintiff’s transfer was the true reason for her change in teaching assignments. View "Carlson v. University of New England" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed in connection with the district court’s revocation of Defendant’s supervised release, holding that Defendant’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and that the sentence was substantively reasonable.After he was released from federal custody following a drug trafficking conviction, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony drug possession in state court. The district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and imposed a sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment, concluding that Defendant’s conduct violated his conditions of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant challenged the substantive reasonableness of his sentence and argued that because his drug addiction is a disease, sentencing him to a term of imprisonment for manifesting a condition of his disease was cruel and unusual punishment. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) it is not “clear or obvious” that the practice of incarcerating defendants for drug use and possession is unconstitutional; and (2) Defendant’s two-year sentence is not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Sirois" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence for participating in a conspiracy to bribe an agent of an organization receiving federal funds and of receiving a bribe, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court proceedings.Defendant, a former Puerto Rico Superior Court Judge, was found guilty of both counts by a jury. Defendant was sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment for one count and 120 months of imprisonment for the other count, to be served concurrently. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence supporting Defendant’s convictions; (2) Defendant did not demonstrate that any alleged error in the government’s opening statement and closing argument or in the admission of certain testimony affected his substantial rights or that they impaired the fairness, integrity, or the public reputation of the judicial proceedings; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in upholding a witness’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege; and (4) any claimed sentencing error would be harmless. View "United States v. Acevedo-Hernandez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Medina & Medina, Inc. in this employment discrimination lawsuit, holding that summary judgment was properly granted as to Plaintiff’s discriminatory wage disparity claims and gender-based hostile work environment claims but improperly granted as to Plaintiff’s federal and Puerto Rico age-based hostile work environment claims and retaliation claims.The district court held that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment as to any of her claims. The First Circuit held (1) based on the evidence proffered by both parties, summary judgment was appropriate on Plaintiff’s discriminatory wage disparity and and gender-based hostile work environment claims; (2) where Plaintiff produced evidence that she was taunted about her age nearly every single day for over two years, summary judgment was not appropriate as to Plaintiff’s age-based hostile work environment claim; (3) there was a genuine issue of fact that precluded summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation; and (4) Plaintiff’s supplemental claims brought pursuant to Puerto Rico law were properly disposed of upon summary judgment. View "Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order granting summary judgment to Stericycle of Puerto Rico and other defendants on Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff’s related Puerto Rico law claims, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Court held that the district court (1) did not err in holding that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim for gender-based disparate treatment; (2) correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim for retaliation; and (3) did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. View "Micheo-Acevedo v. Stericycle of Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Brown University’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in this case brought by a college student alleging that she was sexually assaulted by three students of Brown University on Brown’s campus and that Brown abandoned the investigation and did not bring any disciplinary action against the Brown students.Plaintiff initiated this action seeking damages and equitable relief against Brown under Title IX of the Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 20 U.S. 1681 et seq. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts for a plausible Title IX claim against Brown. View "Doe v. Brown University" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the bankruptcy court allowing The Patriot Group, LLC to amend its pleadings in its adversary complaint requesting denial of the discharge in bankruptcy of Steven Fustolo’s debt and denying Fustolo’s discharge pursuant to the newly added claim, holding that the allowance of this belated amendment failed to satisfy the prescripts of due process underlying Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2) and was therefore an abuse of discretion. Specifically, the Court held that Appellant did not receive adequate notice of an unpleaded claim and did not provide his implied consent. Therefore, the bankruptcy court’s order must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Fustolo v. Patriot Group LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint filed by George Gillis against William Chase in this third complaint against Chase, Gillis III, seeking to reopen Gillis I.Gillis was operating a truck at a construction site when he struck and fatally injured Edward Hansen. Gillis was charged with motor vehicle homicide in state court but was acquitted after a trial. Gillis then sought vindication by filing lawsuits. Gillis I asserted that William Chase, the police chief when Hansen’s death occurred, violated his constitutional rights by knowingly charging him with a crime without probable cause. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. In Gillis II, Gillis sued two different defendants, and the case was dismissed on summary judgment. Gillis III, against Chase alone, sought to reopen Gillis I. Gillis argued that Chase conspired to charge Gillis in the criminal case as the result of undue influence exerted by a defendant in Gillis II. The district court found that Gillis III was time barred and failed to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court’s judgment was not in error. View "Gillis v. Chase" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Town of Camden, Maine on Plaintiff’s complaint claiming that Camden deprived him of his procedural due process rights when Camden laid him off because it violated the recall provision in his collective bargaining agreement (CBA).Plaintiff, a police dispatcher with Camden for thirty-one years, was laid off after Camden moved its police department’s dispatch operations to the Knox County Sheriff’s Department in the Town of Rockland. Plaintiff sued Camden pursuant to 42 .U.S.C. 1983. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Camden, determining (1) the CBA conditioned an employee’s recall right on the written submission, after layoff, of the employee’s mailing address and telephone number; and (2) Plaintiff had not contacted the town manager with his contact details after his layoff. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the jury’s determination undid Plaintiff’s case because, without a right to recall, there was no deprivation of a protected property interest and no violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights. View "Clukey v. Town of Camden, Maine" on Justia Law