Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals concerning the "categorical and sweeping nature" of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 99, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Section 99 violates the First Amendment in criminalizing the secret, nonconsensual audio recording of police officers discharging their official duties in public spaces, holding that the district court properly accounted for the values of both privacy and accountability within our constitutional system.Section 99 makes it a crime to record another person's words secretly and without consent, but Massachusetts does not recognize any exceptions based on whether that person has an expectation of privacy in what is recorded. In 2016, two sets of plaintiffs - the Martin Plaintiffs and Project Veritas Action Fund - filed suit alleging that Section 99 violates the First Amendment. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Martin Plaintiffs; and (2) affirmed the district court's order dismissing Project Veritas's First Amendment overbreadth challenge for failing to state a claim but vacated on ripeness grounds the dismissal with prejudice of Project Veritas's remaining First Amendment challenges to the statute and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, Martin v. Rollins" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and dismissing Plaintiff's claim that she was fired from her position because of her age, holding that Plaintiff's claims were without merit.After she was discharged, Plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). Plaintiff also asserted a number of supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law. At trial, once Plaintiff rested, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not contradict the law of the case doctrine when it excluded certain evidence at trial; (2) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence at trial; and (3) did not err in entering judgment as a matter of law. View "Daumont-Colon v. Coop de Ahorro y Cred Caguas" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Petitioner's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance in deciding not to call two witnesses during Petitioner's trial and introduce certain documents.After a trial, Petitioner was found guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine and of aiding and abetting others to do so as well. Thereafter, Petitioner field a timely habeas petition, arguing that his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated by deciding not to call two witnesses during trial. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that even if counsel's performance was deficient, Defendant's ineffective assistance claim failed because there was no reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been different had counsel called the two witnesses. View "Rijo v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a Union's motion to dismiss two Hampshire state employees' (Appellants) complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that Appellants' claim based on Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), was not cognizable under section 1983.Appellants sought retrospective relief for themselves and other state employees who were not members of the State Employees' Association of New Hampshire (the Union) but were forced to pay "agency fees" to it prior to the decision in Janus. In Janus, the United States Supreme Court overruled its decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and held that "agency fee" arrangements violate the First Amendment. The district court granted the Union's motion to dismiss Appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly held that Appellants' damages claim failed. View "Doughty v. State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the government failed to show that the district court granted reversible error by granting the motion for a new trial upon finding when the court deemed to be a violation of the Confrontation Clause.Defendant was convicted of three counts charging her with wire fraud, honest services wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit both types of wire fraud. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal or for a new trial. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the Confrontation Clause was violated in the proceedings below and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no plain error in the district court's choice of the applicable standard of harmlessness. View "United States v. Ackerly" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence for violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), holding that the life without parole sentence imposed by the district court was not unconstitutional and that Defendant's remaining claims of error were unavailing.On appeal, Defendant, who was twenty years old at the time he committed the charged crime, sought to vacate his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on Eighth Amendment grounds. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to make the case for extending the Miller ban on life-without-parole sentences to offenders like Defendant who were in the eighteen-to-twenty range when they committed the crimes of conviction; (2) the district court did not err in determining that Defendant had twice committed the predicate offense of first-degree murder even where the jury had been instructed only on second-degree murder; and (3) Defendant's sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) had associational standing to bring its claims against the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Board of Overseers (collectively, Harvard) and that Harvard's race-conscious undergraduate admissions program does not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.In its suit, SFFA alleged that Harvard's race-conscious admissions processed violated Title VI by discriminating against Asian American applicants in favor of white applicants. SFFA sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs. The district court denied Harvard's motion to dismiss for lack of standing and then found that Harvard had met its burden of showing its admissions process did not violate Title VI. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) SFFA had associational standing to bring its claims; and (2) under governing Supreme Court law, Harvard's admissions program does not violate Title VI. View "Students for Fair Admissions v. President & Fellows of Harvard College" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting judgment to the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Education in this federal constitutional challenge to the requirement of Maine's tuition assistance program that a private school must be "a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment" to qualify as "approved" to receive tuition assistance payments, holding that the program's condition violated neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause.To ensure that Maine's school administrative units (SAUs) make the benefits of a free public education available Maine provides by statute that SAUs that do not operate a public secondary school of their own may either contract with a secondary school for school privileges or pay the tuition at the public school or an approved private school at which the student from their SAU is accepted. Plaintiffs brought this suit against the Commissioner, arguing that the program's requirement that a private school be a nonsectarian school to receive tuition assistance payments infringed various of their federal constitutional rights. The district court granted judgment to the Commissioner. Having twice before rejected similar federal constitutional challenges to the "nonsectarian" requirement and even accounting for fresh United States Supreme Court precedent the First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges failed. View "Carson v. Makin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence for three counts related to distribution of heroin and one count of discharging a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, holding that the district court did not err.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence at trial and erroneously concluded that he was eligible for a two-level role enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly found that law enforcement officers had sufficient probable cause to substantiate a search warrant for Defendant's apartment before a protective sweep began, and Defendant did not establish that the government failed to meet the requirements for applying the inevitable discovery doctrine; and (2) the district court did not clearly err in applying the two-level role enhancement. View "United States v. Soto-Peguero" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant's vehicle was intercepted by the Maine State Police, and Defendant's vehicle was searched. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute oxycodone. On appeal, Defendant argued that the authorities lacked probable cause to search his vehicle and that the district court erred by refusing to suppress statements he made both before and after Miranda warnings were administered. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the authorities had probable cause to search Defendant's car, and therefore, the evidence seized during the vehicle search was admissible; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements. View "United States v. Simpkins" on Justia Law