Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for receipt and possession of child pornography, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain text-message evidence as inadmissible hearsay.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant failed sufficiently to describe ether pornographic images to be found and that the court erred in excluding from his trial the text message evidence at issue. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress; and (2) the district court did not err in barring the text messages from Defendant's trial. View "United States v. Chiu" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court that the prosecutor in the underlying Rhode Island case transgressed the Batson rule in the course of jury selection but that Petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief, holding that the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court could not withstand habeas review.Petitioner, a Rhode Island state prisoner and an African-American man who was convicted of murder and other crimes, claimed in his petition for writ of habeas corpus that the prosecutor violated Batson during jury selection. The federal district court concluded that Petitioner's rights under Batson were violated but that the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in finding sufficient race-neutral reasons for a peremptory challenge against the juror in question. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor's explanation for his peremptory strike was not race-neutral on its face and thus violated Batson; and (2) the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision rested on either an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, an unreasonable determination of the facts, or both. View "Porter v. Coyne-Fague" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's claims challenging the termination of his employment on free speech grounds, holding that summary judgment was improper in this case.Plaintiff, a former bus driver for the Worcester Regional Transit Authority (WRTA), brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that Defendants violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment to the federal constitution and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) when they terminated his employment following public comments that he made to a television network about proposed budget cuts to the WRTA. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not speaking "as a citizen" during the television interview; and (2) Defendants did not have an adequate justification for treating Plaintiff differently from other members of the general public by terminating him for his protected speech. View "Bruce v. Worcester Regional Transit Authority" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion for entry of an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 922, incorporated into Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. 2101-2241, through 48 U.S.C. 2161(a), holding that Defendants were entitled to an automatic stay.Plaintiffs, who owned an operated the Integrand Assurance Company, sued Defendants, Puerto Rico government officials whose defense was assumed by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico pursuant to the Commonwealth's legal representation and indemnification statute, alleging, among other claims, that the government officials violated their First Amendment rights, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Defendants, who were granted legal representation under Law 9, filed a notice of automatic stay. The district court denied the motion, concluding that PROMESA did not stay the litigation. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the automatic stay provision in Title III of PROMESA applied to this action. View "Victor J. Salgado & Associates v. Cestero-Lopategui" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint alleging a First Amendment claim and seeking a preliminary injunction, holding that Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation.At issue was the electronic case filing system piloted by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) for the state's trial courts, which resulted in delayed access. Plaintiffs, state and federal news agencies, sued Defendants, state court officials, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights. Thereafter, the SJC changed its rules. The district court held that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim, dismissed the complaint, and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation. View "Courthouse News Service v. Quinlan, Bangor Publishing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession with intent to distribute forty grams or more of fentanyl, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a stop and warrantless search of his vehicle.After Defendant was indicted he filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained a result of the stop and search in this case. The district court denied the motion and found Defendant guilty. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress and that, alternatively, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because he was de facto placed under arrest without probable cause. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) if there was an arrest it was a lawful one; and (2) no evidentiary hearing was necessary in this case. View "United States v. Batista" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 alleging that the prosecution violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.C. 79 (1986) during his criminal trial, holding that there was no error.Based on an interaction with four white men outside an apartment building Petitioner was convicted in the Maine Superior Court of reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. Petitioner later filed his petition for habeas corpus. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that the prosecution's race-neutral explanation for striking the sole person of color from the jury pool was not pretextual and, therefore, that there was no purposeful discrimination. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error. View "Hollis v. Magnusson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court issued under the stay-put provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415(j), ordering Portland Public Schools to pay for John Doe's placement at a private school during the pendency of these proceedings, holding that the district court erred.During Doe's fourth-grade year, his parents unilaterally placed him at a private school. The Does subsequently filed for a due process hearing alleging that Portland violated the IDEA by previously finding Doe ineligible for special education services. The district court ordered Portland to pay for Doe's tuition for the duration of this litigation at Aucocisco School, where his parents had unilaterally placed him despite the fact that the hearing officer whose decision was being reviewed had determined that the individualized education plan issued by Portland would provide a free appropriate public education. Portland appealed, arguing that the district court impermissibly ordered it to pay for Doe's placement at the private school during the pendency of these proceedings. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the purposes of the IDEA were not served by having Portland continue to pay for Doe's tuition at Aucocisco. View "Doe v. Portland Public Schools" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting motions to dismiss filed by defendants Charles Taylor Consulting Mexico, S.A. de C.V., James Heiden, and Pierre Barron (collectively, Charles Taylor) and Universal Insurance Co. for failure to state a claim under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs OK Resorts of Puerto Rico, Inc., Executive Fantasy Hotel, Inc., and Riverside Resort, Inc. (collectively, OK Resorts) brought this action against Charles Taylor under RICO and Puerto Rico law. The district court granted Charles Taylor's motions to dismiss after the agreed-upon discovery deadline had passed. On appeal, OK Resorts argued that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing he amended complaint at the time it did. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "OK Resorts of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Charles Taylor Consulting Mexico, S.A. de C.V." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court denying Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in this case arising from a decision by the Speaker of the New Hampshire House of Representatives to enforce a House rule precluding any representative from participating in proceedings involving the full House, including House matters, other than in person, holding that there was no error.At issue in this COVID-19 pandemic-related case was whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RHA) authorizes a federal court to resolve a dispute among members of a state legislative body about whether votes on bills may be cast remotely rather than in person. The underlying suit named Sherman Packard, the Speaker of the House, in his official capacity. The district court denied a preliminary injunction based on the Speaker's assertion of legislative immunity. A panel of the First Circuit first vacated the injunction, but the Court subsequently granted a rehearing en banc. The First Circuit then affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in holding that the Speaker's assertion of legislative immunity prevented Plaintiffs from obtaining their requested relief. View "Cushing v. Packard" on Justia Law