Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brian Watson was convicted in 2017 by a jury for the felony sale of a controlled drug (fentanyl) resulting in death. The prosecution's evidence included testimony from Dr. Daniel Isenschmid, a forensic toxicologist, who discussed toxicology tests conducted by his colleagues, revealing fentanyl and its metabolites in the victim's blood. Watson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Isenschmid to testify about tests he did not perform. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that Dr. Isenschmid's involvement in the case was sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.Watson then filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, claiming that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by Dr. Isenschmid's testimony. The warden moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, concluding that the state court's decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the district court's decision. The court found that Watson did not provide clear and convincing evidence to show that the state court's factual findings were incorrect. The court also determined that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The First Circuit noted that Dr. Isenschmid had personally reviewed all relevant documentation, data, and test results, and had issued and signed the toxicology report, making his testimony permissible under the Confrontation Clause. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the warden. View "Watson v. Edmark" on Justia Law

Joseph Segrain, an inmate at Rhode Island's Adult Correctional Institutions, filed a civil lawsuit against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and several correctional officers, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and various state laws. Segrain claimed that on June 28, 2018, officers used excessive force by executing a leg-sweep maneuver, spraying him with pepper spray, and delaying his decontamination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on all claims, leading Segrain to appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island initially reviewed the case. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers' conduct constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. It granted summary judgment on the basis that the force used was minimal and necessary to maintain order. The court also dismissed the state law claims, concluding that the officers' actions did not meet the legal standards for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or excessive force under Rhode Island law.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Officer Walter Duffy's use of pepper spray violated Segrain's Eighth Amendment rights. It found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Duffy's use of pepper spray was excessive and not in good faith. The court vacated the district court's judgment on the Rhode Island Constitution Article I, Section 8 claim regarding Duffy's use of pepper spray and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on all other claims, including the leg-sweep maneuver and the delayed decontamination, granting qualified immunity to the officers on those issues. View "Segrain v. Duffy" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, a state prisoner, challenged the dismissal of his federal habeas petition, which alleged violations of his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The petitioner, along with two accomplices, planned and executed a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pizza delivery driver. The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and breaking and entering, and was sentenced to life in prison without parole.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the petitioner's conviction, rejecting his claims of insufficient evidence, improper admission of redacted statements from a co-defendant, and errors in jury instructions. The SJC found that the evidence was sufficient to support the petitioner's conviction under theories of felony-murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty. It also held that the redacted statements did not violate the petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights and that the trial court's jury instructions were appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the habeas petition de novo. The court applied the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which requires deference to state court decisions unless they are contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or are based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the SJC's rulings were not unreasonable. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the petitioner's conviction, the redacted statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause, and the jury instructions were proper. The court also concluded that any errors in the trial court's rulings were harmless and did not prejudice the petitioner. View "St. Jean v. Marchilli" on Justia Law

The appellants, Meredith O'Neil, Jessica Svedine, Deanna Corby, and Roberto Silva, sued various officials from the Canton Police Department and the Town of Canton, Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of Massachusetts witness intimidation statutes, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268 §§ 13A and 13B. They claimed that these statutes violated their First Amendment rights, fearing prosecution for their actions during a November 5, 2023 protest and alleging that their speech would be chilled for a planned protest on November 12, 2023. The appellants moved for emergency relief to enjoin the enforcement of these statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the emergency motion on November 10, 2023. The court assumed the plaintiffs had standing but found they did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court held that the statutes served compelling interests in protecting the administration of justice and were narrowly tailored. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown they faced a risk of irreparable harm, noting that the plaintiffs had other public forums to express their views. The balance of harms and public interest considerations also weighed against granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal as moot. The court noted that the state court had dismissed the charges against the appellants for lack of probable cause, and no ongoing conduct remained for the court to enjoin. The court also found that the appellants' general allegations of future protests did not show a credible threat of prosecution, failing to establish standing for their pre-enforcement challenges. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings as appropriate. View "O'Neil v. Canton Police Department" on Justia Law

Jaden Brown, a pregnant inmate at Cumberland County Jail, was transported to Maine Medical Center for childbirth. During her hospital stay, correction officers Daniel Haskell and Sam Dickey were present in her room. Brown alleged that Haskell and Dickey observed her naked body during medical procedures and the delivery of her baby, which she claimed violated her Fourth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied Haskell and Dickey's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the officers' observations of Brown's naked body were more than inadvertent, occasional, casual, or restricted. The court also ruled that such observations, if they occurred, would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the appeal in part, stating it lacked jurisdiction to consider the officers' argument that they did not observe Brown's naked body, as this was a factual dispute. The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment, holding that if the officers did observe Brown's naked body, it would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court emphasized that a search does not require deliberate intent to inspect a naked body and that such observations could violate clearly established law. View "Brown v. Dickey" on Justia Law

Xiomara Santiago was hired as the Deputy Director for the Head Start Program in Utuado, Puerto Rico. Following a mayoral election, the new mayor, Jorge Pérez, terminated her employment. Santiago claimed her dismissal violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and was politically motivated, violating her First Amendment rights. She sought a preliminary injunction to be reinstated.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held hearings and ultimately denied Santiago's request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that Santiago had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of either her due process or political discrimination claims. The magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation, which the district judge adopted, found that Santiago's initial hire was contrary to Puerto Rico law, meaning she did not have a property interest in her employment. Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence to support her claim of political discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Santiago had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claims. The court noted that Santiago's argument regarding the incorrect application of Puerto Rico law was waived because it was raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the court found no clear error in the district court's assessment that Santiago's political affiliation was not a substantial factor in her termination. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Santiago v. Municipality of Utuado" on Justia Law

Sara Caruso, a flight attendant for Delta Air Lines, failed a breathalyzer test on August 4, 2018, after a layover in Dallas, Texas. Caruso claimed she was drugged and sexually assaulted by Delta First Officer James Lucas the night before. The Dallas Police Department found insufficient evidence to support her claim, and Delta also took no action against Lucas after its investigation. Caruso completed an alcohol rehabilitation program and sought accommodations from Delta for PTSD related to the alleged assault. Although Delta and Caruso initially agreed on accommodations, Caruso resigned after a month back at work.Caruso sued Delta in Massachusetts state court, alleging violations of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which granted summary judgment for Delta on all counts. The court found no causal connection between Delta's actions and the alleged harassment and determined that Delta responded reasonably to the allegations. Additionally, Caruso's disability discrimination claims failed because she did not engage in an interactive process in good faith with Delta to develop reasonable accommodations.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Caruso failed to show a causal connection between Delta's actions and the alleged harassment, and that Delta's investigation and response were reasonable. The court also found that Caruso did not cooperate in the interactive process for her disability accommodations, and her retaliation claims were either waived or undeveloped. Thus, the summary judgment for Delta was affirmed on all counts. View "Caruso v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Lupe Stratton, worked at Bentley University from August 2016 to July 2018. She alleged that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her gender, race, disability, and Guatemalan origin. After she complained to Bentley's human resources department, she was placed on a performance improvement plan, which she claimed was retaliatory. Stratton also contended that Bentley interfered with her right to medical leave and failed to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability. She resigned, claiming her workplace had become intolerable.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Bentley University on all of Stratton's claims. The court found that Stratton did not suffer an adverse employment action that could support her discrimination claims and that her retaliation claims failed because she could not establish a causal connection between her complaints and the adverse actions. The court also held that Bentley had provided reasonable accommodations for Stratton's disability and had not interfered with her FMLA rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Stratton did not experience an adverse employment action that could support her discrimination claims, as her working conditions were not so intolerable as to constitute a constructive discharge. The court also found that Stratton's retaliation claims failed because she could not show that her complaints were the but-for cause of the adverse actions. Additionally, the court held that Bentley had provided reasonable accommodations for Stratton's disability and had not interfered with her FMLA rights. The court clarified the relevant law governing Title VII retaliation claims in the circuit. View "Stratton v. Bentley University" on Justia Law

Amanda J. Bazinet, an executive office manager at Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital in Milton, Massachusetts, was terminated after the Hospital implemented a mandatory COVID-19 vaccine policy. Bazinet sought a religious exemption, citing her Christian beliefs and opposition to vaccines developed using fetal cell lines from aborted fetuses. The Hospital denied her request without engaging in an interactive process and subsequently terminated her employment.Bazinet filed a civil action alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Massachusetts anti-discrimination law. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed her religious discrimination claims sua sponte, ruling that Bazinet failed to allege a sincerely held religious belief and that accommodating her would cause the Hospital undue hardship.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Bazinet had sufficiently alleged a religious belief conflicting with the vaccine requirement, as her accommodation request and supporting letter detailed her religious objections. The court also determined that the sincerity of Bazinet's beliefs and the undue hardship defense required further factual development and could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage.The First Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of Bazinet's religious discrimination claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the claims to proceed past the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. View "Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Carl Langston was convicted of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute. Langston argued that this statute is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to him, given his prior convictions for theft and drug trafficking under Maine law. He also challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a police stop and several sentencing decisions.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied Langston's motion to suppress, finding that the police stop was based on reasonable suspicion. Langston then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm during a felony assault on an officer and denied Langston a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, citing his conduct during pretrial release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Langston's claims. The court held that Langston's Second Amendment challenge failed under the plain-error standard because it was not "clear" or "obvious" that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The court noted that the Supreme Court has consistently referred to felon-in-possession laws as "presumptively lawful."The court also upheld the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, agreeing that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion for the police stop. Additionally, the court found no plain error in the application of the sentencing enhancement for felony assault on an officer and ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on hearsay evidence to conclude that Langston violated his pretrial release conditions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility credit, noting the similarities between Langston's conduct at the time of his arrest and during his pretrial release.The First Circuit affirmed Langston's conviction and sentence. View "US v. Langston" on Justia Law