Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was fired from his place of employment after his employer (Defendant) learned that Plaintiff had consistently falsified his time cards over the course of several years, costing the company “1.25 hours of labor per week.” Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that Defendant had terminated him in retaliation for taking family leave in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff did not offer evidence of retaliatory animus sufficient to raise a disputed question of fact or to defeat Defendant’s right to judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving that Defendant’s stated reason for his termination was a pretext. View "Ameen v. Amphenol Printed Circuits, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a town official for the town of Raymond, claimed that Michael Reynolds, a fellow town official, told the sheriff’s department that Plaintiff had driven while intoxicated, that the reports were false, and the false statements damaged his reputation. Plaintiff brought suit in state superior court, alleging state law claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy, as well as federal claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The case was removed to federal court on the basis of the federal claims. The district court dismissed the federal claims and proceeded to resolve the state law claims. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the dismissal of the federal claim; and (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claims as to Reynolds and remanded the claims to state court, holding the state law claims involved resolution of a potential conflict between Maine’s Anti-SLAPP statute and Maine’s Constitution, a conflict that “is best resolved by the Maine courts.” View "Desjardins v. Willard" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of two firearms, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court subsequently sentenced Defendant as an armed career criminal to fifteen years imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) district court correctly refused to suppress two statements Defendant made regarding the presence of firearms inside his residence based on alleged Miranda violations; and (2) the district court did not err in labeling Defendant an armed career criminal subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Canadian company, contracted with Plaintiff, a Massachusetts investment bank, to be its exclusive financial advisor for the sale of its business. The parties negotiated and executed the agreement from their respective home offices, contacting each other by phone, e-mail, and internet. Plaintiff later sued in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging breach of contract, among other claims. Defendant removed the case to federal district court. The district court subsequently dismissed the case, concluding that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant consistently with the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit reversed, holding that, in light of the nature, number, origin, and duration of the parties’ contacts in this case, the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by Massachusetts was consistent with fair play and substantial justice. View "C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp." on Justia Law

The decedent died from electrocution while working on a telephone pole that was the purported partial responsibility of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). Appellants, the decedent’s sisters, filed a wrongful death suit against PREPA and others in federal district court. PREPA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that an additional, non-diverse member of the decedent’s estate, who was not made a party to the action, was indispensable, and his joinder destroyed the parties’ complete diversity. The district court agreed and dismissed the entire action, including the decedent’s estate survivorship action as well as individual actions by estate members and Appellants, who were not the decedent’s heirs. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Appellants’ personal actions, as the non-diverse absent party was not required to adjudicate the action because the members of the estate requested voluntary dismissal of their claims, which eliminated the survivorship action, leaving only Appellants’ claims, which were jurisdictionally sound. View "Aguayo-Cuevas v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth." on Justia Law

In this case involving a class action complaint filed against CVS Pharmacy Inc. in Massachusetts Superior Court for wage and hour violations, the First Circuit clarified the removal time periods and mechanisms under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. CVS filed a second notice of removal, claiming that there was a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, holding (1) CVS’s notice of removal came too late to meet the thirty-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1), and the second thirty-day deadline in section 1446(b)(3) did not apply; and (2) CVS had not met its burden to establish the substantive amount in controversy requirement. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the time limits in section 1446(b) apply when the plaintiffs’ pleadings or the plaintiffs’ “other papers” provide the defendant with a clear statement of the damages sought or with sufficient facts from which damages can be readily calculated; (2) CVS’s second notice of removal was timely under section 1446(b)(3); and (3) CVS sufficiently demonstrated that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. View "Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice complaint in the Puerto Rico Court of the First Instance then voluntarily dismissed their suit and re-filed in federal court. In their federal complaint, Plaintiffs named as defendants Hospital Damas, Inc., various hospital employees, and several unnamed entities. Six weeks before the scheduled start of trial, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint to include Fundacion Damas, Inc. as a defendant. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion because of Plaintiffs’ undue delay in moving to amend. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to act with sufficient speed in seeking to add the new defendant. View "Perez v. Hosp. Damas, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an exotic dancer employed by an adult entertainment club (“Club”) operated in Providence, Rhode Island by Defendant, a Rhode Island corporation. Plaintiff sued the Club, alleging that she was injured when a fellow dancer assaulted her. The Club removed the action to the United States District Court of the District of Massachusetts and then moved to dismiss the action for improper venue and want of in personam jurisdiction. The district court’s Judge Saylor subsequently transferred the case to the District of Rhode Island, determining that the Club had insufficient contacts with Massachusetts to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Club again moved to dismiss, alleging that the suit had been commenced outside the applicable limitations period. Plaintiff did not respond to this motion. The district court summarily granted the motion and dismissed the action. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged Judge Saylor’s determination that the Massachusetts district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Club. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s argument was not reviewable on appeal. View "Cioffi v. Gilbert Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Pinpoint and Atlas filed federal court actions against each other based on a 2009 contract between them. Two months after answering and counterclaiming Pinpoint in the Virginia action, Atlas filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Atlas's filing automatically stayed the Virginia and Puerto Rico actions. At issue was Pinpoint's appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's judgment dismissing Pinpoint's challenge to the bankruptcy court's no-stay-relief order. The court rejected the blanket-rule approach and, like the Third Circuit, held that it was possible that in some cases an order denying stay relief may lack finality. Because the order denying stay relief in this case was not final, the court dismissed Pinpoint's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.View "Pinpoint IT Services, LLC v. Atlas IT Export, Corp." on Justia Law

Maribel Vazquez-Robles (Plaintiff) commenced a civil action in a federal district court against CommoLoCo, Inc. (Defendant), her former employer, alleging workplace discrimination claims. Plaintiff served the summons and complaint on Prentice-Hall Corporation System Puerto Rico, which she believed to be Defendant’s registered agent for service of process. When no answer was filed, Plaintiff obtained an entry of default, and a jury awarded Plaintiff nearly $1 million in damages. Plaintiff procured a writ of execution, and the full amount of the judgment was seized from Defendant’s bank account. Defendant immediately moved to vacate the judgment as void, arguing that Prentice was not its registered agent and that it had no prior knowledge of the action. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that, in this case, the district court never acquired jurisdiction over Defendant, as Prentice was not Defendant's registered agent at the time the service of process was attempted by Plaintiff.View "Vazquez-Robles v. CommoLoco, Inc." on Justia Law