Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a helicopter pilot, was forced to land a Bell 407 helicopter when the helicopter’s engine suddenly quit working. Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that the flameout was caused by false overspeed solenoid activation (FOSSA). Defendants asserted that Plaintiff’s engine flameout was not caused by FOSSA but by Plaintiff’s failure to adequately clear the helicopter of snow and ice before takeoff. The jury returned a defense verdict. After trial, two defendants issued bulletins applicable to the type of engine in Plaintiff’s helicopter addressing FOSSA. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and (3), arguing that the information contained in the bulletins compelled an inference that one or more defendants knew about a “circuit design error” existing at the time of Plaintiff’s accident rendering Bell 407s susceptible to FOSSA but failed to disclose it during discovery or at trial, which failure constituted misconduct. The district court denied Plaintiff’s post-trial motions. The First Circuit vacated in part and remanded, holding that the district judge misconstrued the requirements of the Rule 60(b)(3) burden-shifting inquiry set forth in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. Remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion. View "West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed claims individually and on behalf of three putative classes against Defendant seeking damages and injunctive relief under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Prior to the parties’ agreed-upon deadline for the class certification motion that Plaintiff announced it would pursue, Defendant tendered to Plaintiff an offer for judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Four days after receiving the offer, Plaintiff moved for class certification. The unaccepted offer was subsequently withdrawn due to Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the offer. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of matter jurisdiction, arguing that its unaccepted and withdrawn Rule 68 offer resolved any case or controversy between the parties, thereby mooting Plaintiff’s claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a rejected and withdrawn offer of settlement of the named plaintiff’s individual claims in a putative class action made before the named plaintiff moves to certify a class does not moot the named plaintiff’s claims and divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. ACT, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Quality Cleaning Products (QCP) entered into a distribution agreement with SCA Tissue North America (SCA) that designated QCP as a non-exclusive, authorized Puerto Rican distributor and wholesaler of SCA’s “Tork” brand product line. QCP claimed that SCA breached that agreement in 2001. In 2012, QCP filed this breach of contract action. The district court dismissed the action as time barred under the relevant three-year statute of limitations. The First Circuit affirmed after applying Puerto Rico’s statute of limitations and accrual rules, holding that QCP’s claim accrued in 2001, and thus the three-year statute of limitations had been far exceeded. View "Quality Cleaning Prods. R.C., Inc. v. SCA Tissue of N.A." on Justia Law

Appellant, a family-owned retail clothing and footwear business with two stores in Massachusetts, had sold Nike footwear for approximately twenty-eight years before Nike notified Appellant that it was terminating the parties’ business relationship. Appellant sued Nike in Massachusetts state court, alleging contractual claims and a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Nike removed the suit to federal court and then moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), alleging that its invoices included a forum selection clause requiring Appellant to file its claims in Oregon, not Massachusetts. The district court agreed and dismissed Appellant’s complaint. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable, and the district court properly dismissed the present action. View "Carter's of New Bedford, Inc. v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Maine limited liability company, sought a preliminary injunction in state court that would forbid Defendant, one of Plaintiff’s former independent contractors, from publishing any company-owned content on her new website. The Maine superior court granted Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion and denied Defendant’s motion to reconsider. Defendant then removed the case to federal court. Defendant filed a notice of interlocutory appeal before the district court ruled on the merits of the state court injunction or issued any order enforcing, dissolving, or modifying the injunction. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that because the state court entered the preliminary injunction before the case was removed to federal court, and the federal court did not then adopt or otherwise rule on the state court’s order before Defendant filed this appeal, the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Concordia Partners LLC v. Pick" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twenty graduates from medical schools outside of the United States, failed the Puerto Rico Medical Licensing Examination (the PRMLE), which made them ineligible to receive a medical license in Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action requesting injunctive relief and damages, arguing that the Puerto Rico Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline and eight of its officers (collectively, Defendants), in their official and individual capacities, violated Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights by imposing an arbitrary passing score in the PRMLE. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no plausible basis for a claim of relief in Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Mulero-Carrillo v. Roman-Hernandez" on Justia Law

In May 2006, Sparkle Hill, Inc. and its vice president and owner (collectively, Sparkle Hill), received an unsolicited advertisement on Sparkle Hill’s fax machine from Interstate Mat Corporation (Interstate). Nearly five years later, Sparkle Hill filed suit in federal district court individually and on behalf of others who also received an identical fax from Interstate in May 2006 alleging that Interstate violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Interstate moved for summary judgment on the ground that a four-year statute of limitations barred Sparkle Hill’s claim. Sparkle Hill did not oppose the merits of Interstate’s limitations defense. The district court entered summary judgment dismissing the case, concluding that Sparkle Hill’s silence constituted a concession and that, on the merits, Sparkle Hill’s claim was time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant waived its arguments for finding error in the district court’s decision to hold it accountable for its lack of opposition to Interstate’s limitations defense. View "Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant to search Appellant’s home, vehicle, and workplace, the police seized a computer, hard drive, and compact disc that were found to contain sexually explicit images and videos depicting minors. Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of possession of child pornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, asserting that the officer who applied for the search warrant had deliberately or recklessly omitted material information from her affidavit. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that an officer seeking to obtain a search warrant has no duty as a matter of law to inquire further in order to dispel serious doubts about either the credibility of an informant upon whom the officer relies or the veracity of the allegations underlying the attempted showing of probable cause. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that an affiant never has a duty to make further inquiry before presenting a warrant application to a magistrate. View "United States v. Tanguay" on Justia Law

In 2008, the decedent was killed in a helicopter crash. The decedent’s widow and children (collectively, Appellants) filed a products liability action against the helicopter’s manufacturer and repair company. The jury returned a unanimous verdict finding that the defendants were not negligent. Approximately eighteen months after the jury returned its verdict, Appellants were allegedly told that the verdict was influenced by the jurors’ improper knowledge of a confidential settlement offer. Appellants filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) seeking an evidentiary hearing to explore the jury taint. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that the filing of the motion was untimely and that the materials filed in support of the motion were insufficient. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion for 60(b) relief without holding such a hearing. View "Bouret-Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was charged with multiple crimes arising out of the bombings at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. After jury selection commenced, Petitioner filed his third motion to change venue, asserting that pretrial publicity and public attitudes were so hostile and inflammatory that he would be unable to receive a trial before a fair and impartial jury in Boston. Petitioner then filed a second petition for mandamus, which largely made the same claims and relied on the same types of data as the third motion for change of venue. The district court denied the third motion for change of venue. The First Circuit denied the second mandamus petition after noting that knowledge of a high-profile case does not equate to disqualifying prejudice, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to mandamus relief because (1) it was not clear and indisputable that pretrial publicity required a change of venue; (2) the ongoing jury selection process did not suggest pervasive prejudice; (3) Petitioner failed to demonstrate irreparable harm; and (4) the balance of equities did not favor granting mandamus relief. View "In re Tsarnaev" on Justia Law