Articles Posted in Civil Procedure

The district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (FAC) for failure to state a claim or in denying Plaintiffs leave to file their proposed second amended complaint (PSAC) in this litigation in which Plaintiffs brought securities fraud claims against Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc. (Sarepta), Sarepta’s chief executive officer and Sarepta’s chief scientific officer (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of purchasers of securities that Sarepta issued between April 21, 2014 and October 27, 2014. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants knowingly or recklessly misled investors about their target date for submitting an application to the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for approval of the drug eteplirsen. The district court dismissed the FAC and denied Plaintiffs leave to file the PSAC. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in dismissing the FAC for failure to state a claim because Plaintiffs did not adequately plead scienter in the FAC; and (2) and even assuming that the PSAC was not futile, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the PSAC on undue delay grounds. View "Kader v. Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc." on Justia Law

A trial court that wishes to us the McDonnell Douglas framework, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973), as part of its jury instructions should translate it into everyday parlance and fit it to the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this case alleging violations of federal and state law, including the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering a take-nothing verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred in employing the McDonnell Douglas framework in its jury instructions. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court’s jury instructions as a whole were satisfactory. View "Teixeira v. Town of Coventry" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the fifth in a case stemming from Plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempts to enforce a $23 million judgment against Defendants, Defendants challenged the district court’s denial of their Rule 60 motion. Defendants, who repeatedly refused to comply with court orders, were sanctioned for contempt. In their Rule 60 motion, Defendants argued that the contempt sanctions should be vacated. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Defendants had waived their argument, that Defendants’ position was contrary to the civil rules, and that Defendants’ claim lacked substantive merit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants waived their Rule 60 argument, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion for relief, and that the relief Defendants sought would be inequitable. View "AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint after certain court proceedings, holding that the district court was not required to allow leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed suit against a group of healthcare entities alleging that Defendants’ compensation practices violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, including a request to amend should the court grant the motion. The district court ultimately granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims and noted that Plaintiffs’ counsel had voiced the possibility that Plaintiffs might seek leave to amend but never followed through with a proper motion to amend. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint. View "Hamilton v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8002(d)(1)(B) for failing to show excusable neglect. Appellant filed her motion one business day late as a result of her attorney’s preoccupation with his second job as a church’s music director. The district court concluded that counsel’s explanation for the delay amounted to mere inadvertence and did not constitute excusable neglect. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant’s counsel’s inadvertence did not constitute excusable neglect and that Appellant was bound by counsel's carelessness. View "Sheedy v. Bankowski" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to amend on the ground that the First Circuit’s earlier decision was law of the case. Plaintiff, acting on behalf of her daughter, brought suit against the Falmouth School Department (Falmouth) alleging that it failed to provide O.M. with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed in Falmouth I, holding that Falmouth did not violate O.M.’s right to a FAPE. After the First Circuit’s decision in Falmouth I, Plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to include a claim that she had not included in her district court complaint. The district court denied the motion to amend. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend under the law of the case doctrine. View "Ms. M. v. Falmouth School Department" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to vacate and order dismissing his lawsuit against Defendants in which Plaintiff alleged a variety of state law violations in connection with a foreclosure action against a property he owned in Nantucket, Massachusetts. The district court, sua sponte, dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for failure to prosecute after Plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear at a motion hearing. Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently filed a motion for relief from the district court order dismissing the case, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and claiming “mistake, inadvertence, carelessness or excusable neglect.” The district court denied the motion without prejudice. Plaintiff then refiled the motion, but the district court denied it without any further explanation. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the prior order dismissing his case and vacated the order dismissing his case, holding that, where Plaintiff provided the district court with an innocent and undisputed reason for counsel’s absence, dismissal with prejudice was too harsh given the circumstances. View "Keane v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Insurance Brokers West, Inc.’s (IBW) complaint alleging breach of contract against Liquid Outcome, LLC, f/k/a Astonish Results, LLC (Astonish) for failure to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. In its amended complaint, IBW estimated its damages as exceeding $140,000. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that IBW’s claims did not exceed $75,000, and therefore, IBW failed to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that it was certain as a matter of law that IBW could not recover more than $75,000. View "Insurance Brokers West, Inc. v. Liquid Outcome, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s complaint brought under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148B for employee misclassification. A Georgia state court concluded that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant under Massachusetts law. The Georgia court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff was not an employee of Defendant for purposes of Section 148B. At the same time the case was making its way through the Georgia state-court system, a separate Massachusetts case was being litigated in the federal district court involving the same facts and the same parties. Ultimately, the district court judge granted preclusive effect to the Georgia decision and granted summary judgment for Defendant as to the Section 148B claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the federal courts were bound by the Georgia court judgment under the doctrine of res judicata. View "Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to intervene in an adversary proceeding arising within the Commonwealth’s debt adjustment case under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. 2161-2177, holding that 11 U.S.C. 1109(b) provides an “unconditional right to intervene” within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). Appellant, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (UCC), intervened in an adversary proceeding initiated by Plaintiffs within a larger case brought by the Financial Oversight and Management Board on behalf of the Commonwealth. The Board had commenced quasi-bankruptcy proceedings to restructure the Commonwealth’s debt under a part of PROMESA referred to as Title III. The district court denied the UCC’s motion to intervene with respect both to intervention as of right and to permissive intervention. The First Circuit reversed, holding that section 1109(b) provided the UCC with an unconditional right to intervene in the adversary proceeding. View "Assured Guaranty Corp. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors" on Justia Law