Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Debtor had unsecured liabilities of almost $15,000 and anticipated disposable income of about $100 per month. He visited an attorney, who indicated that he would not file a Chapter 7 proceeding until the debtor paid the anticipated legal fee ($2,300). If debtor chose the Chapter 13 alternative, he could pay over time as part of the Chapter 13 plan. The attorney estimated that fees associated with a Chapter 13 proceeding would total $4,100. Not having fees for a Chapter 7 filing, the debtor opted for Chapter 13 and paid $500 on account. The attorney submitted a “fee only” Chapter 13 plan that called for payment of $100 per month for 36 months to the bankruptcy estate. Of the total $3,600, only about $300 would be available to general creditors. The bankruptcy court rejected the plan as not submitted in good faith. The debtor opted to convert to Chapter 7; the attorney moved for an award of $2,872. The bankruptcy court awarded $299, which required him to disgorge more than $200. The district court affirmed. Noting a division in the circuits, the First Circuit reversed, holding that fee-only plans are not per se in bad faith.View "Berliner v. Pappalardo" on Justia Law

Debtors engaged the attorney to represent them in bankruptcy proceedings. They owed more than $115,000 in unsecured debt with no realistic prospect of payment. In a retainer agreement, he estimated that legal fees plus court costs would total around $4,000. Debtors paid $3,684 on account. Their Chapter 13 plan, 11 U.S.C. 1321-1322, was approved by the bankruptcy court and the lawyer filed an application requesting an additional $8,173.36 in attorneys' fees and expenses. The trustee objected. The bankruptcy court set the total fee and expense figure at $3,684, finding that the case was relatively uncomplicated. The district court and First Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the attorney billed an excessive number of hours. View "Sullivan v. Pappalardo" on Justia Law

Mortgage deeds executed by the debtors three years earlier were still pending recordation when they filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Debtors sought to avoid the mortgages and to prevent any post-petition actions that would perfect them 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(5), 544(a), 547(b). The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the lender. The district court and First Circuit affirmed. Debtors failed to establish the necessary elements of a preferential transfer.

In 2005 the debtor business purchased a business and signed a promissory note. The business failed, allegedly because the seller continued to compete, in violation of the contract. The debtor listed a breach of contract claim as an asset. The trustee was unable to retain an attorney to pursue the claim and, with the limitations period running out, the court approved abandonment of the claim. The seller then offered to buy the claim and stock in the debtor company. The First Circuit affirmed the district court holdings that the claim had been abandoned (11 U.S.C. 554(c)), but that the stock had not been abandoned. Although the debtor did not identify eery possible theory of recovery in listing the claim as an asset, the trustee was on notice of tort theories. The transfer of the claim was not a violation of the automatic stay.

Debtor, a waste disposal firm, borrowed from FFC, giving FFC a security interest before filing a Chapter 11 petition in 2003. In 2005 a trustee, appointed to run the business, moved to convert to a Chapter 7 proceeding and assented to having Allied service debtor's customers. The court granted the motion and lifted the equitable stay to allow FFC to sell secured equipment. FFC later foreclosed against additional property, which it sold to City Sanitation. A consultant who had been retained by the trustee to assist in operating the business went to work for Allied. In 2007 City Sanitation sued Allied and the consultant, purportedly as the debtor's successor in interest, alleging conversion. The bankruptcy court reopened the bankruptcy case to allow the trustee to take over the case against Allied. The district court and First Circuit affirmed. The right to pursue commercial tort claims cannot be passed to a secured creditor as proceeds of original collateral. The court rejected an argument that FFC's security interest conferred the right to prosecute claims arising from interference with the collateral. The alleged wrongdoing occurred while the consultant was in debtor's employ; any harm was to debtor and belongs to the estate.

Following a remand from the First Circuit, the bankruptcy court approved the Chapter 7 trustee's decision to give priority to holders of senior unsecured debt with respect to principal and pre-petition interest. The priority did not extend to payment of post-petition interest ahead of junior unsecured debt. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed. The Code provides that a subordination agreement is enforceable to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, (11 U.S.C. 510(a)). The bankruptcy court findings as to the intent of the parties were sufficient to support the conclusion, under New York law, that the parties did not intend to subordinate the junior noteholders to post-petition interest.

In 2003 the owner executed a second mortgage with a stated term of four months, in favor of defendant to secure performance of a guaranty. The owner later executed a separate mortgage and defaulted. The lender foreclosed and took possession subject to senior mortgages. In 2007 defendant published notice of foreclosure. The then-owner filed bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. 362(a), triggering a stay before the deadline under the Massachusetts Obsolete Mortgages Statute, which requires the holder of a mortgage to take action to enforce it within five years after the end of its stated term (September 9, 2008). The bankruptcy court held that defendant's failure to record an extension rendered the mortgage void. The district court reversed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy statute tolls the limitations period of the state law. Defendant was not required to choose between filing an extension and foreclosure and still had the right to foreclose at the time the stay became effective.

While the recording of the deed to mortgaged property was in "limbo" because of a defect, the borrowers declared bankruptcy, resulting in a stay under 11 U.S.C. 362. The lender nonetheless presented a corrected deed for registration. The borrowers filed suit and the court ordered that the deed be withdrawn, but denied damages and fees. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. The First Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that there was no justification for disregarding the statutory language concerning awards of damages and fees for willful violation of a stay.

Homeowners fell behind on their mortgage and the bank initiated foreclosure. The homeowners filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The judge denied their motion for rescission of the mortgage and for damages, based on noncompliance with state laws. The district court and First Circuit affirmed. The homeowners signed right-to-cancel forms required under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, modeled after the federal Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1635); technical flaws in the form cannot serve as a basis for invalidating a transaction five years later. Similarly, a slight delay in receipt of a required high-cost loan disclosure did not justify rescission five years later.

In 2009 the bankruptcy court revoked a 2000 Chapter 7 discharge, finding fraud with respect to a 1997 divorce settlement. The district court and First Circuit affirmed. While the debtor "largely avoided explicit false statements," the debtor allowed the trustee and the court to believe that he was turning over whatever he received to secured creditors, which was not true, and he withheld information about accelerated payments under the divorce settlement.