Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Bankruptcy
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After an Attorney’s representation of the Debtor in this current action ended, the Debtor was left owing the Attorney $62,000. The Debtor later filed petition for bankruptcy protection and listed the amount owing to the attorney among her scheduled debts. The Attorney filed an adversary proceeding asserting that the debt was nondischargeable because it had been incurred through false pretenses and a false representation. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding, concluding that the Attorney had not carried her burden of proving her claims. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel upheld the dismissal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court did not err in determining that the Attorney failed to carry her burden of proving that the debt was nondischargeable.View "deBenedictis v. Brady-Zell" on Justia Law

Posted in: Bankruptcy
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John Zullo paid David Lombardo to perform work in Zullo’s house. Lombardo, however, had misrepresented his credentials, and Zullo incurred additional expense to have the inadequate work fixed. Zullo subsequently obtained a Massachusetts state court judgment against Lombardo, which Lombardo never paid. After Lombardo later filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Zullo began an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, alleging that Lombardo’s debt to him was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 532(a)(6), which excepts from bankruptcy discharge “any debt…for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to…to the property of another entity.” The bankruptcy court ultimately granted summary judgment for Lombardo on the 11 U.S.C. 532(a)(6) claim, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. At issue before the First Circuit was whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying Zullo’s request for leave to amend his complaint. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Zullo’s request where Zullo provided no explanation for the seventeen-month delay between filing his complaint and seeking leave to amend. View "Zullo v. Lombardo" on Justia Law

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In 2005, Debtor secured a loan with a mortgage on her home and stayed current on all mortgage payments on the property. Debtor’s bank, however, failed to record the mortgage with the appropriate registry. In 2011, Debtor filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Although Debtor’s home was subject to a homestead exemption, the Trustee of Debtor’s bankruptcy estate sought to sell the home as property of the bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, Trustee filed a complaint to avoid the unrecorded mortgage and to preserve it for the benefit of the estate. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the Trustee, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the Trustee’s lien avoidance and preservation powers did not justify him in selling Debtor’s home as property of the bankruptcy estate. View "Degiacomo v. Traverse" on Justia Law

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Appellant-property owner filed a Chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy and subsequently filed a third amended reorganization plan proposing to bifurcate Appellee-mortgagee’s claim into secured and unsecured portions. The bankruptcy court denied confirmation of the plan and ordered Appellant to file an amended plan. Appellant appealed and also filed a motion for leave to appeal the bankruptcy court’s interlocutory order. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) granted the motion and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s denial of confirmation. Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal and motion for certification of the appeal, which the BAP denied. The First Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the BAP’s order affirming the denial of the confirmation did not appear to be a final order. The First Circuit dismissed Appellant’s appeal, holding (1) an intermediate appellate court’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court’s denial of confirmation of a reorganization plan is not a final order if the debtor may still propose an amended plan; and (2) therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal. View "Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank" on Justia Law

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This appeal concerned a heavily contested Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. After the bankruptcy court determined a secured creditor’s entitlement to post-petition interest under 11 U.S.C. 506(b) and confirmed the debtors’ Chapter 11 plan, the secured creditor appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (“BAP”). The BAP reversed in part, vacating and remanding the confirmation order and significantly increasing the secured creditor’s entitlement to post-petition interest under section 506(b). The City of Boston, as a junior creditor, and the debtors appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the BAP’s section 506(b) order, holding that the BAP erred in reversing the bankruptcy court’s post-petition interest determination; and (2) vacated the BAP’s confirmation order because it was based solely on the BAP's erroneous interest determination. View "SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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In 2002, the developer of a timeshare real estate venture (Developer) and Ernesto Brito and Marigloria Del Valle (together, Appellees) entered into a purchase agreement pursuant to which the Developer transferred a “period of ownership” of seven days to a unit of the timeshare regime to Appellees. In 2009, the Developer filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and listed Appellees as secured creditors in its bankruptcy schedules. Appellees filed a proof of claim asserting a security interest over the real property. Appellant-bank, the holder of a mortgage over the timeshare property, filed an adversary proceeding against Appellees seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellees did not possess a valid lien over the timeshare property. Appellant moved for summary judgment, contending that Appellees did not have a real property interest because the applicable formalities of the Puerto Rico Timeshare and Vacation Club Act had not been satisfied. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that Appellees held property rights in the real property. View "Scotiabank de P.R. v. Burgos" on Justia Law

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Appellant obtained a loan from a Bank for a home equity line of credit secured by a second mortgage on her home in Rowley, Massachusetts. Appellant later sold her home but did not notify the Bank of the sale. Appellant later took advantage of a mistake made on the part of the Bank and obtained $124,200, the exact limit on the home equity line. After Appellant failed to pay back the $124,200 drawn from the home equity account, the Bank commenced foreclosure proceedings on the Rowley property. The new owners were insured by Old Republic National Title Insurance Company, which paid the debt, took an assignment of all of the Bank's rights against Appellant, and sued Appellant in state court. A default judgment was entered against Appellant. Thereafter, Appellant filed for bankruptcy. Old Republic sought a determination that its pre-petition judgment was excepted from discharge as a debt. The bankruptcy court determined that Appellant's debt was not dischargeable in bankruptcy because it was for money Appellant obtained by false pretenses and because it was a debt arising from willful and malicious injury. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court was correct to find the debt to be non-dischargeable. View "Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Levasseur" on Justia Law

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In this bankruptcy proceeding involving a turnover action and a revocation action, the bankruptcy court ruled (1) Debtor failed to maintain his profit-sharing plan in substantial compliance with applicable tax laws, which meant that assets in the profit-sharing plan and two IRAs funded with the plan assets were part of the bankruptcy estate; and (2) Debtor intentionally failed to disclose the existence of the two IRAs into which he had transferred assets from his profit-sharing plan, which ruling provided alternative grounds for treating the IRAs as nonexempt and provided the basis for the bankruptcy court to revoke Debtor's discharge. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings, holding (1) the plan assets were not exempt from the bankruptcy estate; (2) Debtor indisputably demonstrated a reckless indifference to the truth of material information during his bankruptcy proceedings; (3) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Debtor's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief on the turnover judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence and excusable neglect; and (4) the bankruptcy court did not err in granting summary judgment to the U.S. Trustee in the revocation action. View "Daniels v. Agin" on Justia Law

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Because Munce's Superior Petroleum Products, Inc. (MSPP) failed to comply with a state court order compelling it to bring its facilities into compliance with New Hampshire environmental law, $194,220 in contempt fines was levied against MSPP. The state court orders were issued after MSPP filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, although the violations of New Hampshire law began before MSPP filed its Chapter 11 petition. The New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services filed a motion to give the fines administrative expense priority, which the bankruptcy court granted. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the post-petition contempt fine assessed by the New Hampshire state court against MSPP, a debtor-in-possession, was entitled to administrative expense priority. View "Munce's Superior Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. N.H. Dep't of Envtl. Servs." on Justia Law

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Appellant, an experienced real estate developer, defaulted on his personal-guaraty obligations after obtaining a loan for his limited liability company with a "materially false" personal financial statement (PFS). Appellee, the lendor, successfully sued O'Donnell in state court on the personal guaranty. Thereafter, Appellant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Appellee responded by initiating this adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, alleging that Appellant's debt to him was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(B), which makes debts for money procured by use of a written statement nondischargeble if the statement was "materially false" related to the debtor's "financial condition" and the debtor made it with "intent to deceive." The bankruptcy judge refused to discharge Appellant's debt to Appellee, and the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the BAP did not clearly err in its finding that Appellant's act of willfully turning "a blind eye" to the accuracy of the PFS proved his intent to deceive. View "Toye v. O'Donnell " on Justia Law