Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Plaintiff refinanced the mortgage on her single-family home in Massachusetts. Plaintiff's promissory note was delivered to one party (the lender) and then transferred. The mortgage itself was granted to a different entity, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and later assigned to the foreclosing entity (Aurora). Three days before the rescheduled foreclosure, Plaintiff sued in state court seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages. Aurora removed the case to the federal district court. At issue before the court was how MERS's involvement in the chain of title impacted Aurora's authority to foreclose. The district court resolved this question in favor of Aurora, which then foreclosed on Plaintiff property. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the foreclosure here was not unlawful, as (1) in the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff had standing to contest the validity of the mortgage assignment made by MERS to Aurora; but (2) the MERS framework is faithful to the tenants of mortgage law in Massachusetts and was therefore not unlawful. View "Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against two entities she claimed illegally foreclosed her home once she defaulted on her mortgage payments. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court then addressed Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding (1) the complaint stated plausible claims for relief, and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint in its entirety; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in deciding that it would be futile to allow an amendment to the complaint. View "Juarez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and sought to surrender their home. When Plaintiffs' mortgage lenders (collectively, Beneficial) refused to foreclose or otherwise take title to the residence, Plaintiffs demanded that the mortgage lien be released. After Beneficial also refused to release the mortgage lien, Plaintiffs began an adversary proceeding claiming a discharge injunction violation. The bankruptcy court found Beneficial did not violate the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that because the facts of this case so closely mirrored those in Pratt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the same result should follow. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment, holding that the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions were correct and that the court did not err in its judgment. View "Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc." on Justia Law

Taxpayer owned fifteen acres of land in Ludlow, Massachusetts. Taxpayer obtained a commitment from Bank to make a loan to fund development on the land. The commitment stipulated that the loan would be made to Taxpayer or "nominee" and that, if Taxpayer assigned the commitment to a nominee, he would be required to guarantee the loan personally. Taxpayer subsequently transferred title of the property to an LLC he formed. Later, the loan became delinquent, and Bank foreclosed on unsold lots in the development. After selling the lots at auction, Bank filed this interpleader action to determine who had the right to the surplus proceeds. The United States claimed an interest in the fund, as did the town of Ludlow. At issue was who was the "nominee" of Taxpayer for purposes of the federal tax lien that attached to Taxpayer's property. The district court held in favor of the United States, concluding that the LLC was Taxpayer's nominee. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the nature of the relationship between Taxpayer pointed to the fact that the LLC was a "legal fiction," and therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the LLC was Taxpayer's nominee. View "Berkshire Bank v. Town of Ludlow, Mass." on Justia Law

Appellant was among a number of homeowners in multiple states claiming that their mortgage companies wrongfully demanded an increase in flood insurance coverage to levels beyond the amounts required by their mortgages. In this case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the pertinent mortgage provision explicitly gave the lender discretion to prescribe the amount of flood insurance. However, the Court held that the district court dismissal of Appellant's complaint must be vacated, as (1) a supplemental document given to Appellant at her real estate closing entitled "Flood Insurance Notification" reasonably may be read to state that the mandatory amount of flood insurance imposed at that time would remain unchanged for the duration of the mortgage; and (2) given the ambiguity as to the Lender's authority to increase the coverage requirement, Appellant was entitled to proceed with her breach of contract and related claims. View "Lass v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

This putative class action was one of a number of breach-of-contract suits being brought against financial institutions nationwide by mortgagors who claimed that they were improperly forced to increase flood insurance coverage on their properties. The plaintiff in this case asserted that Bank of America's demand that he increase his flood coverage by $46,000 breached both the terms of his mortgage contract and the contract's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court concluded that the pertinent provision of the mortgage unambiguously permitted the lender to require the increased flood coverage and, hence, it granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of dismissal in favor of the Bank, holding that the mortgage was reasonably susceptible to an understanding that supported the plaintiff's breach of contract and implied covenant claims. Remanded. View "Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law

Defendant filed for bankruptcy. Defendant was later charged with bankruptcy fraud on the basis that she failed to include in the bankruptcy petition information related to her past fraudulent use of credit cards that she obtained under the names of two acquaintances, one of whom was Susan Blake. Defendant was subsequently convicted of two counts of bankruptcy fraud. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction as to Count One, which alleged that Debtor had knowingly and fraudulently failed and refused to disclose debts to three card issuers. The First Circuit held that Count One failed for lack of proof because the prosecution failed to establish that at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, there were still extant claims held by the issuers against Defendant for merchandise or services Defendant secured through her use of the cards she procured using Blake's name. View "United States v. Marston" on Justia Law

McKenna and his wife, Suzette, refinanced with Wells Fargo, to help pay for his children's college education and granted a mortgage on their residence. On the same day, Wells Fargo provided the McKennas with a disclosure form stating the loan amount and terms. The mortgage was recorded. McKenna died; Suzette fell behind on payments. Under Massachusetts law, if a mortgage contains a "power of sale" (the McKenna mortgage did), the mortgagee may foreclose, without a judgment ordering sale, after a "limited judicial procedure" to establish that the mortgagor is not a member of the armed forces. Wells Fargo successfully brought such a proceeding and sent Suzette a notice of foreclosure sale. Suzette countered by asserting a right to rescind and filing suit to preclude the sale. She claimed that Wells Fargo had provided only one Truth in Lending disclosure statement at the time of the loan rather than two copies, and had understated the finance charge in its Truth in Lending statement by "more than $35.00." The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. The suit was not timely under the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635(a), and the complaint did not state claims under the equivalent state law.View "McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Over seven days in 2009, Ocean Bank authorized six apparently fraudulent withdrawals, totaling $588,851.26, from an account held by Patco, after the perpetrators correctly supplied Patco's customized answers to security questions. Although the bank's security system flagged each transaction as unusually "high-risk" because they were inconsistent with the timing, value, and geographic location of Patco's regular orders, the system did not notify commercial customers of such information and allowed the payments to go through. Ocean Bank was able to block or recover $243,406.83. Patco sued, alleging that the bank should bear the loss because its security system was not commercially reasonable under Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, 4-1101) and that Patco had not consented to the procedures. The district court held that the bank's security system was commercially reasonable and entered judgment in favor of the bank. The First Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on commercial reasonableness and remanded for determination of what, if any, obligations or responsibilities Article 4A imposes on Patco. View "Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. People's United Bank" on Justia Law

During 2000-2002, defendant and co-defendant were associated in five instances of depositing large bad checks (one for $15,000,000) in three different bank accounts (the one at issue in the name of a defunct corporation), then writing checks against the resulting, ostensible account balances or requesting substantial wire transfers from them. They were indicted for conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. Defendant was charged both as a principal and as aiding and abetting co-defendant, who negotiated guilty pleas. Defendant was convicted. He appealed, claiming insufficiency of the evidence to show anything more than his mere (innocent) presence at some events in the sequence of the transactions charged, and abridgement of his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial when the trial judge closed the courtroom doors during jury instructions. The First Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Christi" on Justia Law