Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Steven Fustolo purchased a rental investment unit in Boston, Massachusetts, in 2009, taking out a mortgage with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Union Capital Mortgage Business Trust. The mortgage was reassigned six times, and Fustolo defaulted on the loan. He sought a declaratory judgment that the current holders, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as Trustee of SCRT 2019-2 (the Trust) and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), had no right to foreclose because they did not validly hold the mortgage or the accompanying promissory note. Fustolo also claimed defamation, slander of title, unfair business practices, violation of Massachusetts's Debt Collection Act, and a violation of Regulation X of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by SPS.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Fustolo's claims, except for one count challenging the adequacy of a notice letter, which was later settled. The court found that the Trust validly held both the mortgage and the note, and that Fustolo's state law claims hinged on the incorrect assertion that the Trust did not have the right to foreclose. The court also dismissed the RESPA claim, stating that Fustolo failed to specify which provision of RESPA was violated and that SPS had responded to his notice of error.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the Trust validly held the mortgage and the note, as the note was indorsed in blank and in the Trust's possession. The court also found that MERS had the authority to assign the mortgage despite Union Capital's dissolution. Additionally, the court ruled that Fustolo's RESPA claim failed because challenges to the merits of a servicer's evaluation of a loss mitigation application do not relate to the servicing of the loan and are not covered errors under RESPA. View "Fustolo v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Fesnel Lafortune, a Haitian national, entered the U.S. on a B-2 visitor visa in 2008 and overstayed. In 2019, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, receiving a combined prison sentence of 31 months. Following his convictions, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removability due to his lack of lawful status and his conviction for an aggravated felony involving fraud exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lafortune removable and denied his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Lafortune, appearing pro se, requested continuances to find counsel, which were denied. He admitted to the allegations and expressed fear of returning to Haiti. The IJ ruled him ineligible for asylum and other protections, citing his conviction as a particularly serious crime. Lafortune appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remanded the case for him to secure counsel. On remand, the IJ again denied his requests for continuances and upheld the original decision. Lafortune, now with counsel, appealed again to the BIA, which dismissed his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the BIA's decision, agreeing that Lafortune's conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud constituted a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for withholding of removal. The court also found no error in the IJ's and BIA's handling of Lafortune's CAT claim, concluding that he failed to demonstrate a particularized risk of torture by or with the acquiescence of Haitian officials. The petition for review was denied. View "Lafortune v. Garland" on Justia Law

Nathan Reardon, who had been self-employed for 24 years, was convicted of bank fraud after submitting fraudulent applications for loans under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a financial assistance program enacted by Congress in response to the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Reardon used several of his businesses to submit the fraudulent applications and misused the funds from the approved loan. He was sentenced to twenty months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. As part of his sentence, the district court imposed a special condition prohibiting Reardon from all forms of self-employment during his supervised release term.Reardon appealed this special condition, arguing that it was overly restrictive and unnecessary. The government suggested a "middle ground" where the condition could be modified to avoid a total prohibition against self-employment, but the district court overruled Reardon's objection and imposed the self-employment ban without explaining why it was the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public, as required by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that while the district court was justified in imposing an occupational restriction, it did not provide sufficient explanation for why a total ban on self-employment was the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public. The court therefore vacated the self-employment ban and remanded the case for reconsideration of the scope of that restriction. View "United States v. Reardon" on Justia Law

In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the plaintiff-appellant, David Efron, filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim and various Puerto Rico law claims against UBS Financial Services and other defendants. Efron alleged that the defendants had illegally disclosed his private bank account information to his ex-wife, triggering litigation and a subsequent indemnification claim from UBS. The district court dismissed Efron's case after denying him leave to file a second amended complaint.On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the district court had not abused its discretion by limiting Efron to deposing only two UBS employees before filing his proposed second amended complaint. The court also agreed that permitting Efron to amend his complaint would be futile, affirming the dismissal of his RICO claim. The court declined to impose sanctions against Efron, despite arguments from UBS that the appeal was frivolous. The court concluded that while Efron's case was weak, it was not so squarely resolved in his prior appeal on a different RICO claim that it could be deemed frivolous. View "Efron v. UBS Financial Services Incorporated of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court appointing a receiver in an interlocutory appeal occurring during litigation between solar energy companies and the bank that funded the companies' development and expansion, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the bank's motion to appoint a receiver.The companies filed an amended complaint against the bank claiming that the bank breached certain contracts with the companies. The bank, in turn, initiated a federal action against the companies alleging breach of contract and other claims. The companies filed an answer and asserted several counterclaims, including claims based on the same allegations as in the other case. After consolidating the two cases the district court granted the bank's motion for the appointment of a receiver. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the bank's motion to appoint a receiver. View "Green Earth Energy Photovoltaic Corp. v. Keybank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this bankruptcy action, the First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the bankruptcy court granting summary judgment against Oriental Bank on all of the claims asserted against it, holding that remand was required for further proceedings in which remaining issues could be addressed.Builders Holding Company filed for bankruptcy and then filed an adverse action against the Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority and Oriental Bank. Builders's surety intervened in the adverse action and filed claims against Oriental Bank. Oriental Bank, in turn, filed counterclaims. All claims in the adverse action pertained to funds that the Financing Authority had directly deposited in Builder's account with Oriental Bank that the bank had taken to set off a debt that Builders owed to it. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment against Oriental Bank on all claims against it, and the district court affirmed. The First Circuit vacated and remanded the summary judgment against Oriental Bank as to all claims, holding that the bankruptcy court was wrong to find that Article 1795 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code compelled the return of funds Oriental Bank set off against Builders's debt to it. View "Oriental Bank v. Builders Holding Co., Corp." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment and order of the district court granting summary judgment for Lender and denying Borrowers' motion for reconsideration in this lawsuit brought by Lender seeking repayment and foreclosure of a loan, holding that the district court did not err.Borrowers defaulted on a loan extended by Lender. The loan was subject to the Farm Credit Act, 12 U.S.C. 2001 et seq., which sometimes requires the lender to restructure the loan rather than foreclose. Borrowers applied to restructure the distressed loan, but Lender rejected the application. Lender eventually brought this action, and the district court ultimately granted summary judgment for Lender. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) a lender need not accept a plan of restructuring that the borrower cannot perform; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that Lender properly considered and rejected the requested restructuring. View "Puerto Rico Farm Credit, ACA v. Eco-Parque del Tanama Corp." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting JPMorgan Chase Bank's (Chase) motion to dismiss Mark and Beth Thompson's action for breach of contract and for violating the statutory power of sale Massachusetts affords mortgagees, holding that the foreclosure sale was not void.The Thompsons alleged that Chase failed to comply with the notice requirements in their mortgage before foreclosing on their property. The mortgage terms for which Massachusetts courts demand strict compliance include the provisions in paragraph 22 of the mortgage requiring and prescribing the pre-foreclosure default notice. The Thompsons argued that because paragraph 19 of the mortgage included conditions and time limitations on the Thompsons' post-acceleration reinstatement right, Chase failed to strictly comply with paragraph 22's notice requirement by failing to inform the Thompsons of those conditions and limitations. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit held that the paragraph 22 notice the Thompsons received was potentially deceptive and, therefore, the foreclosure sale was void. The Court then withdrew its decision and certified a question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). Because the SJC held that the paragraph 22 notice could not have been misleading for omitting paragraph 19's deadline, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court remanding this removed case to Puerto Rico's Court of First Instance, holding that the district court erred when it remanded to the local Puerto Rico court a suit asserting claims by Constructora Japimel, Inc. against Doral Bank under the circumstances of this case.Contrary to the text of 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B), the district court remanded this case to the local Puerto Rico court Japimel's lawsuit against Doral, a failed bank, after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had become Doral's receiver, had filed a notice of substitution in state court to become a party to the suit, and had timely removed the suit to federal court. The FDIC timely appealed the remand order. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred by ignoring section 1819(b)(2)(B)'s clear language and remanding the case to the Court of First Instance. View "Federal Deposit Insurance Co. v. Constructora Japimel, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court granting Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB a declaratory judgment declaring invalid a home equity line of credit (HELOC) that had previously been granted to Nina Collart's father, Lucien, on property in Massachusetts and granting Wilmington an equitable lien in the property, holding that the court abused its discretion in granting Wilmington an equitable lien.Wilmington sued Nina in her individual capacity as trustee of the Lucien R. Collart, Jr. Nominee Trust and the Anne B. Collart Nominee Trust and also named as a defendant Thomas Mann, Jr., named in his capacity of the Nina B. Collart Trust. Wilmington sought a declaratory judgment that the HELOC was a valid encumbrance on the property and further sought an equitable lien on the property. The district court held that the HELOC was invalid and that Wilmington was entitled to an equitable lien against the property. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the lien was based on an error of law and that the defendants should have had judgment entered in their favor. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Collart" on Justia Law