Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Dominican Republic citizen was operating a high-speed vessel in international waters off Puerto Rico with two others when a United States Coast Guard helicopter and cutter approached. After issuing warning shots that failed to stop the vessel, the Coast Guard fired live rounds at the engine, and two bullets struck the plaintiff’s left arm, causing serious, permanent injury. The plaintiff remained on deck for thirty minutes before receiving medical attention and was later airlifted to a hospital in San Juan.After his administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was denied, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. He initially brought constitutional claims against individual Coast Guard officers and a tort claim against the federal government under the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso, but later voluntarily dismissed the constitutional claims. The government moved to dismiss the FTCA claim, arguing the claim was subject to admiralty law and thus exclusively governed by the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA). The magistrate judge recommended dismissal, concluding the FTCA did not apply because the SIAA provided the exclusive remedy. The judge further recommended denying the plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint to add an SIAA claim because it would be time-barred. The district court adopted these recommendations and dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The court held that the plaintiff’s claim arose under maritime jurisdiction and was therefore governed exclusively by the SIAA, not the FTCA. Because the FTCA expressly excludes claims for which a remedy is provided by the SIAA, the plaintiff could not proceed under the FTCA, even if his SIAA claim was time-barred. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Lantigua-Nunez v. US Coast Guard" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a regional fishermen’s association and the federal government concerning changes to catch limits for several fish species in the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan. The association, representing commercial fishermen allegedly harmed by reduced catch limits, challenged the legality of the Framework Adjustment 65 Final Rule and its implementing regulations. At the core of the association’s argument was the claim that the involvement of the New England Fishery Management Council in the development of these rules violated the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The association argued that the Council exercised significant authority in the regulatory process but its members were not properly appointed as federal officers.The United States District Court for the District of Maine reviewed the case. It concluded that the association had standing due to the economic injury suffered by its members. The district court rejected the primary constitutional claim, holding that the Council’s role was advisory and final binding authority rested solely with the Secretary of Commerce, who promulgated the regulations. The court did, however, agree with the association in part, finding certain unrelated statutory provisions unconstitutional, but determined that this did not entitle the association to its requested relief. The district court severed those statutory provisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit heard the appeal. After reviewing the statutory framework and the specific facts, the court held that the Council’s role was advisory and did not amount to the exercise of significant federal authority under the Appointments Clause. The harm to the association’s members derived from the Secretary’s independent decision to promulgate the binding regulations, not from the Council’s recommendations. The First Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive and declaratory relief and reversed the district court’s severance of the unrelated statutory provisions. View "New England Fishermen's Stewardship Association v. Lutnick" on Justia Law

A man sought to contest the forfeiture of a boat, claiming he was its rightful owner. The boat had been seized and made subject to forfeiture following his brother’s guilty plea to a federal drug conspiracy that began in May 2019. The man submitted a pro se petition in federal district court, asserting under penalty of perjury that he was the sole and rightful owner of the boat at the time it was seized. He attached several documents, all in Spanish, which he described as evidence of ownership and title. Later, with counsel, he provided additional documents purporting to show that he acquired the boat in 2017.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico had issued a preliminary order of forfeiture following the brother’s plea. After the man’s petition, the government moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition failed to allege when and how the man acquired his interest in the boat, as required by statute. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss without a hearing and entered a final order of forfeiture. The man appealed, arguing that his submissions sufficed or, alternatively, that he should have been allowed to amend his petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the man’s petition did not satisfy the statutory requirement to state the time and circumstances of his acquisition of the boat, and that untranslated documents could not be considered. However, the appellate court found that the district court did not address the alternative request for leave to amend, and the reasons for denial were not apparent from the record. The First Circuit vacated the denial of the petition and remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to consider the request to amend in light of the liberal construction required by statute. View "US v. Calderin-Pascual" on Justia Law

A group of Maine lobstermen challenged a state rule requiring all federally permitted lobster fishers to install electronic tracking devices on their vessels, which transmit GPS location data whenever the vessels are in the water. This rule was adopted by the Maine Department of Marine Resources (MDMR) to comply with an addendum to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s American Lobster Fishery Management Plan. The addendum aimed to reduce risks to North Atlantic right whales, improve fishery data, and support regulatory enforcement. The tracking devices must remain powered and transmit data at all times, including when vessels are docked or used for personal purposes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that the MDMR Rule violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as equal protection and state administrative law. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment because the lobster fishery is a closely regulated industry and the rule was not unreasonably invasive. The court noted several concessions by the parties, including that the GPS tracking constituted a search, that the lobster industry is closely regulated, and that the search was administrative in nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the lobster industry is a closely regulated industry and that the administrative search exception, as articulated in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), applied. The court found that the MDMR Rule satisfied the Burger test: it served a substantial government interest, warrantless searches were necessary to the regulatory scheme, and the rule provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Thompson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In April 2006, an oil tanker owned or operated by Ernst Jacob GmbH & Co. KG and insured by Shipowners Insurance & Guaranty Company, Ltd. ran aground off the coast of Puerto Rico. Although no oil was spilled, the response efforts to free the vessel and prevent a potential spill caused significant damage to coral reefs. The United States, acting through NOAA and in coordination with Puerto Rico’s Department of Natural and Environmental Resources, undertook restoration and assessment of the damaged natural resources. After unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from the responsible parties and their insurers, NOAA sought compensation from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which paid out restoration and assessment costs. Subsequently, the United States filed suit against the vessel’s owner and insurer to recover both compensated and uncompensated damages for injury to natural resources under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico bifurcated the case into liability and damages phases. Without allowing discovery, the District Court granted partial summary judgment to the United States on liability, finding that the Coast Guard’s Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) had determined the grounding posed a “substantial threat of a discharge of oil,” and that this determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The court applied a deferential standard of review to the FOSC’s decision and did not address whether the damaged natural resources were “managed or controlled” by the United States, as required by OPA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) due to the presence of admiralty claims. The court vacated and reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that liability under OPA requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, not merely deference to the FOSC’s determination, and remanded for further proceedings, including resolution of whether the United States “manages or controls” the natural resources at issue. View "US v. Ernst Jacob GmbH & Co. KG" on Justia Law

A coastal town in Maine, known for its small population and proximity to a national park, experienced a significant increase in cruise ship tourism, with large vessels bringing thousands of passengers daily. In response to concerns about congestion, public safety, and the impact on local amenities, residents approved an ordinance capping the number of cruise ship passengers who could disembark in the town to 1,000 per day. The ordinance imposed fines for violations and was intended to address issues primarily at the waterfront and, to a lesser extent, in the downtown area.Several local businesses, a business association, and a pilots’ association challenged the ordinance in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. They argued that the ordinance was preempted by federal and state law, violated the Commerce Clause (including its dormant aspect), and infringed on due process rights. After a bench trial, the District Court largely ruled in favor of the town and an intervening resident, rejecting most claims but finding that the ordinance was preempted by federal regulations only to the extent it restricted crew members’ shore access. The court declined to enjoin the ordinance, noting the town’s intent to address this issue through further rulemaking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rejection of the state law preemption, federal preemption (except for the now-moot crew access issue), and due process claims. The First Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of discrimination-based Dormant Commerce Clause claims, finding no similarly situated in-state and out-of-state competitors. However, the court vacated and remanded the District Court’s dismissal of the Pike balancing Dormant Commerce Clause claim, instructing further analysis of whether the ordinance’s burdens on interstate commerce are clearly excessive in relation to its local benefits. The court dismissed as moot the appeals related to the crew access issue. View "Ass'n to Preserve and Protect Local Livelihoods v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

In this case, a seaman, Magnus Aadland, filed a lawsuit in 2017 against Boat Santa Rita II, Inc. (BSR II) and related parties, alleging that he fell ill while working offshore in 2014 and was owed maintenance and cure, which were not provided. Aadland sought compensatory damages for unpaid maintenance and cure, emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially ruled in favor of BSR II, finding that Aadland had reached maximum medical recovery (MMR) by the time of the trial in September 2020 and that BSR II had satisfied its duty of cure. The court also denied Aadland's claims for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, finding that the District Court had erred in its application of the law, particularly regarding the duty of cure and the applicability of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Service, Inc. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.On remand, the District Court ruled that Aadland had not reached MMR as of September 2020 and that BSR II owed cure in the amount of $605,338.07, which was the amount paid by Aadland's private insurer, Tufts. The court credited BSR II's $400,000 payment to Tufts and $238,374 in advances to Aadland against this amount, resulting in a credit for BSR II. The court again denied Aadland's claims for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.On further appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment regarding emotional distress damages but vacated the judgment regarding punitive damages and attorney's fees, finding that BSR II's breach of its duty of cure was willful. The case was remanded for the District Court to determine whether punitive damages and attorney's fees should be awarded. The First Circuit also affirmed the District Court's finding that Aadland had not reached MMR as of September 2020 and the setoff amount for BSR II's payment to Tufts. View "Aadland v. Boat Santa Rita II, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association, Inc. (MALA) challenging a final rule issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) that seasonally bans vertical buoy lines used in lobster and Jonah crab trap fishing in certain federal waters off Massachusetts from February 1 to April 30 each year. The NMFS issued this rule to protect the endangered North Atlantic right whales from entanglement in these buoy lines during their foraging period.Previously, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of MALA, holding that the final rule conflicted with a temporary statutory authorization for lobster and Jonah crab fishing contained in a rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. The district court found that the final rule did not fall within the exception provided in the rider, which allowed for actions to extend or make final an emergency rule that was in place on the date of the rider's enactment, December 29, 2022. The court concluded that the 2022 emergency rule was not "in place" on that date because it was not actively preventing fishing in the Wedge area at that time.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the 2022 emergency rule was indeed "in place" on December 29, 2022, for the purposes of the rider's exception. The court reasoned that the emergency rule's findings and authority were still relevant and could serve as a basis for future regulatory actions, such as the final rule. Therefore, the final rule was lawful and enforceable under the exception provided in the rider. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv." on Justia Law

Three foreign nationals, crewmembers aboard the vessel MARGUERITA, were detained in the United States after the vessel was held in port in Maine due to alleged improper disposal of bilge water and inaccurate record-keeping. The plaintiffs were ordered to remain in the U.S. as potential material witnesses. They were later allowed to leave but returned for trial and were awarded for their contributions to the conviction of the vessel's operator.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against various U.S. government entities and officials, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and various tort claims. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the Bivens claim and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the FTCA claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' detention and the revocation of their landing permits were authorized and that the plaintiffs did not show that the actions taken by the government officials were unlawful or unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the requirement for ships to maintain an Oil Record Book under 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 is valid and that the plaintiffs' detention was justified under the circumstances. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish their claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. Additionally, the court concluded that the Bivens claim presented a new context and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending a Bivens remedy, particularly given the availability of alternative remedies and the implications for government policy and international relations. View "Hornof v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC ("Fast Ferries") and Mr. Cade, LLC and SeaTran Marine, LLC ("SeaTran") (collectively, "defendants-appellees"). Fast Ferries had entered into a Master Time Charter Agreement with Mr. Cade, LLC to charter the motor vessel Mr. Cade and procure a licensed crew. The agreement contained mediation and forum-selection clauses. When the final Short Form expired, Fast Ferries returned the vessel to its home port in Louisiana. A year later, Fast Ferries filed a complaint against Mr. Cade, LLC and SeaTran alleging breach of contract and liability pursuant to culpa in contrahendo. The defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Master Agreement was still in effect and required a written agreement for the charter of M/V Mr. Cade.The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part, concluding that the Master Agreement did not contain a termination date and remained in effect. Therefore, the contract's mediation and forum-selection clauses were binding on the parties. However, the district court did not address Fast Ferries' argument that SeaTran was not a signatory of the agreement and, therefore, could not invoke the mediation and forum-selection clauses contained therein.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order on the defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss. The court held that the Master Agreement was still in effect and that SeaTran, despite being a non-signatory, could enforce the Master Agreement's mediation and forum-selection clauses. The court reasoned that Fast Ferries' claims against SeaTran were necessarily intertwined with the Master Agreement, and thus, Fast Ferries was equitably estopped from avoiding the mediation and forum-selection clauses with respect to SeaTran. View "Puerto Rico Fast Ferries LLC v. SeaTran Marine, LLC" on Justia Law