Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in October, 2014
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After Plaintiff retired from his employment with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) he filed an administrative claim for employment discrimination, alleging that he was constructively discharged on the basis of his age or national origin. Plaintiff’s claim was denied. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action claiming liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and Puerto Rico law. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding the action time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) to the extent Plaintiff’s complaint asserted an FTCA claim, it must be dismissed on the grounds that Plaintiff did not present an FTCA claim in his administrative complaint; and (2) Plaintiff’s remaining claims were time-barred. View "Acevedo-Perez v. United States" on Justia Law

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Alasko Foods, Inc. (“Alasko”), a Canadian corporation that sells frozen produce to retail outlets, and Foodmark, Inc. (“Foodmark”), a Massachusetts corporation that assists food manufacturers in marketing branded-label and private-label products to retailers, entered into a “U.S. Representation Agreement [and] Sales Management Agreement” wherein Alasko retained Foodmark to market Alasko’s products in the United States. Five years later, Alasko terminated the Agreement. Foodmark filed a complaint against Alasko, alleging that Alasko’s refusal to pay the “Non-Renewal Termination Fee” contemplated by the Agreement constituted a breach of the Agreement and of its covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A federal district court entered summary judgment for Foodmark and awarded $1.1 million in damages. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there were no genuine issues of fact, and Foodmark was entitled to a termination fee in the amount calculated by the district court. View "Foodmark, Inc. v. Alasko Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was a popular restaurant in Puerto Rico owned by Lorraine Enterprises, Inc. The corporation was owned by Defendant Lorraine Lago and her husband. The Secretary of Labor sued the restaurant, Lago, and the restaurant’s general manager, alleging that Defendants were liable for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping requirements. Specifically, the Secretary alleged that the restaurant took advantage of the reduced federal minimum wage established by the FLSA for the restaurant industry without complying with the concomitant requirements. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary and, thereafter, denied Defendants’ motion to alter or amend the judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that no infringement of Defendants’ due process rights had occurred; (2) did not err in granting summary judgment on the minimum wage claim; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment as to the individual defendants. View "Solis v. Lorraine Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

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Appellant pled guilty to one count of distributing oxycodone. In sentencing Appellant, the district court found that other uncharged drug sales were relevant to determining Appellant’s guideline sentencing range. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court applied both the wrong legal standard and the incorrect method of comparison in determining what uncharged drug sales were relevant to his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed on plain error review, holding that the district court did not commit plain error in its method of finding that the uncharged conduct was part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction. View "United States v. St. Hill" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex offender. The plea agreement contained a waiver of appeal provision, which provided that if the court accepted the agreement and sentenced Defendant according to its terms, Defendant would be waiving and permanently surrendering his right to appeal the judgment and sentence. The court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea, and the district court judge sentenced Defendant to twelve months in prison and ten years supervised release. The judge imposed a number of special sex offender conditions as terms of Defendant’s supervised release. Defendant appealed, seeking to vacate the special sex offender conditions. The First Circuit dismissed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, holding that Defendant waived his right to appeal all of the special sex offender conditions of supervised release save the condition providing that Defendant could not use or possess sexually explicit material or frequent any establishments providing pornography or sexual services, as the condition was not announced at sentencing.View "United States v. Santiago" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, two limited partnerships, each owned an apartment building in Puerto Rico that qualified for low-income housing tax credits. Defendant was the agency responsible for allocating the credits. Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into agreements setting the applicable percentage for their covered projects at 8.12 percent. Thereafter, Congress passed legislation providing that the applicable percentage for developments such as those owned by Plaintiffs should not be less than nine percent. Defendant, however, allocated to Plaintiffs the exact amount of credits specified in the agreements. Plaintiffs sued Defendant in federal court, alleging that Defendant had unlawfully seized the additional tax credits to which they were apparently entitled. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting, among other things, that Plaintiffs’ action was time-barred. The district court granted the motion, identifying three justifications supporting for the entry of judgment on the pleadings: waiver, untimeliness, and the absence of any cognizable property interest in the additional tax credits. The First Circuit affirmed on the basis that Plaintiffs’ action was brought outside the applicable limitations period, and equitable tolling did not apply. View "Jardin de las Catalinas Ltd. P’ship v. Joyner" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs were inmates in the Massachusetts state prison system who suffer from HIV. Plaintiffs sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections after the Department decided, rather than to provide the inmates with monthly or bimonthly supplies of their HIV medications, to dispense the medication only in single doses at the dispensing window. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department on each of Plaintiffs’ claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to produce adequate evidence of any statutory or constitutional violation. View "Nunes v. Umass Corr. Health" on Justia Law

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Officers from the Puerto Rico Police Department stopped a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger for a traffic infraction. Suspecting that the car may have been stolen, the officers asked the driver to exit the vehicle and open the hood for purposes of inspecting the vehicle identification number on the car’s engine. The driver’s resulting movement revealed a gun tucked into his waistband. Thereafter, the officers ordered Defendant to exit the vehicle and submit to a pat-frisk, which revealed a firearm hidden in Defendant’s waistband. Defendant was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to frisk Defendant.View "United States v. Tiru-Plaza" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was physically removed from the United States to the Dominican Republic in 2002 after he received two state convictions with immigration consequences. In 2006, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection or admission. Petitioner subsequently filed an untimely motion with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to reopen his proceedings. The BIA denied the motion to reopen. In 2008, Petitioner filed an untimely motion to reconsider the BIA’s decision. The BIA decided to sua sponte reopen the proceedings in 2008 and remanded the record back to the Immigration Judge (IJ). The IJ denied relief and ordered Petitioner’s deportation. Petitioner appealed. In 2012, the BIA determined that its 2008 order sua sponte reopening proceedings was issued in error and ultimately denied Petitioner’s 2008 motion to reconsider. Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA’s 1012 order effectively denying sua sponte reopening proceedings. The First Circuit dismissed the petition for judicial review, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to deny reopening removal proceedings sua sponte. View "Guerrero v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff’s property was subject to a mortgage. Plaintiff discussed refinancing with a predecessor in interest to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as well as a mortgage broker and his firm, whom Plaintiff referred to as “agents” of Wells Fargo. Based on these discussions, Plaintiff began making improvements to increase the property’s appraised value. Ultimately, Plaintiff was unable to refinance her mortgage. Plaintiff brought suit against Wells Fargo, alleging, among other claims, a violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 397-A:2(VI) (count one) and promissory estoppel (count five). The district court dismissed counts one and five of Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding both claims were inadequately pleaded. Plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that although she could not claim a private right of action under section 397-A:2(VI), she did state a claim for common law fraud. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed any state law fraud claim that Plaintiff belatedly attempted to advance and correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim.View "Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law