Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants, Jose Cabezudo-Kuilan (Cabezudo) and Heriberto Millan-Isaac (Millan), pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting a robbery and possessing a firearm during a crime of violence. The district court first sentenced Millan to 180 months in prison and then sentenced Cabezudo to 114 months in prison. After sentencing Cabezudo, however, the sentencing judge sua sponte decreased Millan’s sentence to 120 months in prison. Defendants challenged their sentences on appeal. The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing, holding that the district court plainly erred in sentencing both Appellants, where (1) the district court sentenced Cabezudo without calculating the applicable Guidelines Sentencing Range; and (2) the district court sentenced Millan without providing him with notice and an opportunity to rebut the facts that formed the basis of his sentence. View "United States v. Millan-Isaac" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs found engineering jobs through Advanced Technology Innovation Corporation (“the company”), a recruiting firm. Plaintiffs were paid by the company. In 2012, Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the company violated 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1)-(2) by failing to pay the required overtime rate of at least one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that the company wrongly labeled part of their regular hourly wage a “per diem” and excluded the per diem when it calculated the rate for overtime. After examining the company’s formula for calculating the per diem, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the company. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the company’s formula was impermissibly based upon and thus varied with the number of hours worked per week, depriving Plaintiffs of overtime pay. Remanded for entry of partial summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor as to liability. View "Newman v. Advanced Tech. Innovation Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Colombian national, obtained a tourist visa to enter the United States. Petitioner overstayed her visa, after which federal authorities initiated removal proceedings against her. Petitioner conceded removability but cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection pursuant to the United National Convention Against Torture, claiming that she had been persecuted, and would face future persecution, on account of her status as the expatriate widow of a slain narco-trafficker. An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s application for asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) entered a final order denying Petitioner asylum and ordering her removed to her homeland. The First Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the final order of removal and denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the BIA did not err in invoking the REAL ID Act’s corroboration requirements to her asylum application; and (2) the BIA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to carry her burden of proving either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Moreno v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2002, Appellant was convicted in Massachusetts state court on charges of forcibly raping his nephew, J.B., and J.B.’s friend when both boys were fifteen years old. Appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek to have admitted evidence that Appellant’s sister had accused J.B. of sexually assaulting three of Appellant’s nieces. The Massachusetts appeals court affirmed. Appellant later filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his state court trial. The district court denied relief. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Massachusetts appeals court reasonably applied federal law in rejecting Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Collins v. Roden" on Justia Law

In 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in New Hampshire arrested six aliens who had prior criminal convictions or arrests. The arrests were part of a nationwide enforcement program. The Union Leader, a New Hampshire newspaper, requested the names and addresses of the six individuals arrested in New Hampshire. The ICE provided the Union Leader with I-213 forms from which the aliens’ names, addresses, and other personal information had been redacted. The Union Leader subsequently filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint to compel disclosure of the arrestees’ names and addresses. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ICE, concluding that FOIA exempted the requested information from disclosure as an unwarranted invasion of the arrestees’ privacy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the arrestees’ privacy interests, and therefore, the withheld information subject to this appeal was not exempt from disclosure. Remanded. View "Union Leader Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. " on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiff, then fifty-eight years old, applied for a job with Defendant. Defendant extended a written offer of employment, which Plaintiff accepted, but before Plaintiff started on the job, Defendant rescinded the offer. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging, among other claims, that the rescission of the employment offer was a by-product of age discrimination. Defendant removed the case to the federal district court. Thereafter, Plaintiff’s attorneys blundered time and again, which led to the district court issuing an order for Plaintiff to show cause why his case should not be dismissed. After the district court received no response from Plaintiff, it dismissed the case. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) asking the court to set aside the judgment due to the neglect of one of Plaintiff’s attorneys. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, given Plaintiff’s persistent pattern of noncompliance, the district court’s refusal to set aside the order of dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. View "Rivera-Velazquez v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired by Employer in 1983. Plaintiff was covered by a short-term disability plan, and the Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”) had the authority to decide questions of eligibility for coverage or benefits under the plan. After Plaintiff underwent back surgery in 2009, LINA at first granted but then denied Plaintiff disability benefits. In 2010, Plaintiff sued LINA, Employer, and others in Puerto Rico court, seeking review of the benefits denial. LINA later removed the action to the District of Puerto Rico. Ultimately, the district court (1) found LINA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious because Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient medical evidence of disability, and (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Employer for failure to plead it with specificity. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal on procedural grounds because Plaintiff committed numerous procedural errors, which precluded intelligent review. View "Gonzalez-Rios v. Hewlett Packard PR Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, the then-Governor of Puerto Rico appointed Plaintiff to the position of Advocate for Persons with Disabilities. In 2013, new legislation established an Office of the Ombudsman for Personal with Disabilities. Plaintiff was subsequently informed that an Ombudsman had been appointed and that his position had been abolished by legislative act. Plaintiff sued the Governor and other officials for attempting to oust him from his job as Advocate, claiming that it was unconstitutional for Puerto Rico to abolish the Advocate position without an individualized hearing. The district court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order, concluding that the court erred in finding that Plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits where there was no viable claim that the abolition of the Advocate Office independently violated some constitutional proscription. View "Diaz-Carrasquillo v. Garcia-Padilla" on Justia Law

Marilyn Davidson, an intellectually disabled individual, was in the care of the Massachusetts Department of Developmental Services (DDS) most of her life. In 1985, Marilyn was transferred to the Fernald Developmental Center, an intermediate care facility (ICF). In 2003, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts decided to close Fernald. DDS planned to transfer Marilyn to the Wrentham Developmental Center, another ICF. Plaintiffs, Marilyn’s guardians, filed a complaint in the federal district court, alleging that Marilyn’s transfer violated the federal Medicaid statute and various implementing regulations. Plaintiffs also sought a motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the injunction and held that the statutory and regulatory provisions cited in the complaint did not create a private right of action. Marilyn was subsequently transferred to Wrentham, and Fernald was closed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claim for damages was barred by the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for damages in federal court; and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. View "Davidson v. Howe" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a heavily contested Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. After the bankruptcy court determined a secured creditor’s entitlement to post-petition interest under 11 U.S.C. 506(b) and confirmed the debtors’ Chapter 11 plan, the secured creditor appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (“BAP”). The BAP reversed in part, vacating and remanding the confirmation order and significantly increasing the secured creditor’s entitlement to post-petition interest under section 506(b). The City of Boston, as a junior creditor, and the debtors appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the BAP’s section 506(b) order, holding that the BAP erred in reversing the bankruptcy court’s post-petition interest determination; and (2) vacated the BAP’s confirmation order because it was based solely on the BAP's erroneous interest determination. View "SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co." on Justia Law