Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, a married couple from Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in the mid-1990s. In 2008, Petitioners applied for asylum. Their application was denied, and removal proceedings subsequently began. Petitioners conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal, asserting that their departure would cause hardship to their twelve-year-old son, Brian, who was born in the United States and would, Petitioners claimed, face several formidable obstacles in Guatemala. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioners’ application and ordered them removed to Guatemala, finding that Petitioners failed to meet the hardship eligibility requirement for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the IJ’s judgment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied in part and otherwise dismissed Petitioners’ petition for review, holding that the IJ correctly found that the evidence presented by Petitioners was not capable of supporting an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” finding. View "Alvarado v. Holder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, two former San Jan municipal police officers, Raquel Delgado-Marrero (“Delgado”) and Angel Rivera-Claudio (“Rivera”), were convicted on drug and gun charges arising from an FBI reverse sting operation. Both defendants received a fifteen-year sentence. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated Delgado’s convictions and remanded her case for a new trial, holding that the district court committed reversible error by excluding the testimony of a defense witness; and (2) withheld judgment on Rivera’s convictions for thirty days, holding that Rivera’s sentence could not stand in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, where the district court plainly erred in articulating the jury instructions imparted in connection with a post-verdict special jury form. View "United States v. Delgado-Marrero" on Justia Law

Michael Mahon sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after falling from a second-story portico during a wedding reception at the Commandant’s House at the Charlestown Navy Yard in Massachusetts. Mahon later amended his complaint to add claims against Eastern National and Amelia Occasions, which contracted with the interior Department’s National Park Service to manage the House and handle the events. The district judge granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA applied. The district judge subsequently granted Mahon’s motion for reconsideration and allowed discovery to go forward on the issue of whether the government’s relationship with Eastern National and Amelia Occasions was governed by a “concession contract,” which could have led the government to learn about the portico’s “impermissibly low railing,” thus placing the case beyond the discretionary-function exception’s reach. After discovery, the district judge dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that, ultimately, Mahon’s case was within the ambit of the discretionary-function exception. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception barred Mahon’s claims against the government. View "Mahon v. United States" on Justia Law

HSBC Realty Credit Corporation loaned Brandywine Partners, LLC $15.9 million pursuant to a property-loan agreement for the purchase and development of industrial property in Delaware. J. Brian O’Neill, a principal of Brandywine, signed an absolute personal guaranty for the loan. O’Neill’s liability was capped at $8.1 million. After Brandywine defaulted on its repayment obligations, HSB filed suit on the guaranty agreement. O’Neill filed several defenses and counterclaims essentially asserting that HSBC must first recover any amount owed by Brandywine by proceeding against the Delaware property before turning to O’Neill’s personal guaranty. The district judge struck O’Neill’s defenses and counterclaims, granted HSBC judgment on the pleadings, and denied O’Neill’s request to replead. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court judge did not commit reversible error in granting HSBC judgment on the pleadings or in denying O’Neill leave to replead, as O’Neill did not provide any additional facts which, if repled, would permit him to make out a plausible claim for relief when matched up against the guaranty’s express language. View "HSBC Realty Credit Corp. v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of possessing with intent to defraud counterfeit United States currency. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not err in (1) admitting evidence seized by police during and after Appellant’s arrest ensuing from the officers’ investigative stop, as the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify their actions; (2) denying Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, as sufficient evidence supported Appellant’s intent to defraud; and (3) issuing a jury instruction on the statutory element of fraudulent intent, as the instructions issued in this case were neither incorrect on the law nor unfairly prejudicial in favor of the government. View "United States v. Silva" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for two counts of distribution of heroin. The indictment alleged that “death and serious bodily injury resulted from the use of such substance.” In federal prosecutions, under Alleyne v. United States, if the distribution of drugs is proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury to have been “death resulting,” a defendant will face a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence. In this case, Defendant admitted all of the facts relevant to each count other than the “death resulting” allegations. Although the government did not prove to a jury that Defendant’s distribution of drugs resulted in death, the district court imposed the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence, in violation of Alleyne. However, Alleyne was decided after sentencing and while the case was on appeal. The government asked the First Circuit Court of Appeals to depart from the usual practice of remanding for resentencing and instead to permit the prosecution on remand to empanel a sentencing jury to allow the government to prove that a death resulted from Defendant’s drug dealing. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s sentencing order and remanded for resentencing in the customary manner, holding that the government’s proposed course of action was foreclosed on the facts of this case. View "United States v. Herrerra Pena" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a computer that held child pornography. The presentence investigation report (PSI Report) suggested a guideline sentencing range (GSR) of fifty-seven to seventy-one months. The district court disagreed with the PSI Report, determined that Defendant was subject to a GSR of seventy-eight to ninety-seven months, and varied downward and imposed a seventy-two-month sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the reasons that supported the imposition of Defendant’s sentence were fully sufficient to justify the sentence imposed. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against her former employer (Employer) for violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, alleging that she was subject to sexual harassment while working for Employer and that she was terminated in retaliation for reporting the harassment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that no reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff was subjected to sexual harassment while an employee for Employer; and (2) even if Plaintiff had made a prima facie case of retaliation, which she did not, Plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing that Employer’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the termination was mere pretext. View "Ponte v. Steelcase Inc." on Justia Law