Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought several claims against Defendant, her former employer. Several claims were dropped or dismissed, and only two discrimination claims went to trial. Plaintiff obtained a jury verdict in her favor on her state law claim. Plaintiff subsequently sought reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The district court reduced Plaintiff's fees to account for time counsel spent on Plaintiff's unsuccessful claims. The court then made a second reduction to account for Plaintiff's rejection of a settlement offer. The First Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the second reduction. On remand, Plaintiff filed two Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) motions to correct the judgment. The district court granted the second motion and proportionately reduced Plaintiff's lodestar only to the extent that fees were incurred when some or all of the unsuccessful claims remained pending. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) was not precluded from granting Plaintiff's Rule 60(a) motion by the mandate rule; (2) did not disobey the remand order; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees allegedly disproportionate to the damages that Plaintiff recovered. View "Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant entered the United States from Ghana and received permanent legal resident status pursuant to a diversity visa. Five years later, Defendant applied for a diversity visa under the false name Willberforce Appiah. A few months later, Defendant applied for citizenship under his own name. The Government issued a diversity visa to Appiah. In the midst of his activities to create a second identity as Appiah, Defendant became a citizen. Defendant was later charged with and convicted of unlawful procurement of naturalization. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) as to Defendant's most substantial claim of error, the district court did not clearly err in allowing the prosecutor's peremptory challenges to two Asian-American potential jurors; and (2) the remainder of Defendant's allegations of error, including claims of constitutional violations to the allegedly improper admission of propensity evidence, were unavailing. View "United States v. Mensah" on Justia Law

Appellant obtained a loan from a Bank for a home equity line of credit secured by a second mortgage on her home in Rowley, Massachusetts. Appellant later sold her home but did not notify the Bank of the sale. Appellant later took advantage of a mistake made on the part of the Bank and obtained $124,200, the exact limit on the home equity line. After Appellant failed to pay back the $124,200 drawn from the home equity account, the Bank commenced foreclosure proceedings on the Rowley property. The new owners were insured by Old Republic National Title Insurance Company, which paid the debt, took an assignment of all of the Bank's rights against Appellant, and sued Appellant in state court. A default judgment was entered against Appellant. Thereafter, Appellant filed for bankruptcy. Old Republic sought a determination that its pre-petition judgment was excepted from discharge as a debt. The bankruptcy court determined that Appellant's debt was not dischargeable in bankruptcy because it was for money Appellant obtained by false pretenses and because it was a debt arising from willful and malicious injury. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court was correct to find the debt to be non-dischargeable. View "Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Levasseur" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff retained a Maine law firm to represent him in a legal action, he signed an attorney-client engagement letter that contained an arbitration provision. Plaintiff later sued the law firm and individual defendants (collectively, Defendants) for malpractice and violations of Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act. Defendants moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the action. The district court granted the motion under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in enforcing the arbitration clause. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting the motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the action, as (1) Maine professional responsibility law for attorneys permits arbitration of legal malpractice claims so long as there is no prospective limitation on the law firm's liability; and (2) Maine law, like the FAA, is not hostile to the use of the arbitration forum, and Maine would enforce the arbitration of malpractice claims provision in this case. View "Bezio v. Draeger" on Justia Law

Joseph Travers worked as a skycap for Flight Services & Systems, Inc., a company that provides services to airlines, including JetBlue. Travers filed a putative class lawsuit against JetBlue and Flight Services, alleging that Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay the federal minimum wage. While a decision on Travers's motion to certify conditionally an opt-in class under the FLSA was pending, Flight Services fired Travers for allegedly violating company policy. Travers filed this action against Flight Services, asserting that he was fired in retaliation for his FLSA lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment to Flight Services. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Travers without relying on inferences or speculation. Remanded. View "Travers v. Flight Servs. & Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

To shield himself from the adverse effects of losses while speculating in high-risk securities, Joseph Caramdare exploited a perceived loophole in certain annuities issued by Appellant. Charles Buckman accepted a cash payment to identify himself as the annuitant on an application for one of these annuities, and Appellee, a Caramadre nominee and a stranger to Buckman, was designated as the prospective owner and beneficiary of the annuity. Appellant approved the application and issued an annuity (the Policy). Appellant later learned of Caramdre's scheme and sued Appellee in federal court, asserting certain tort claims and seeking rescission of the Policy and a declaration that the Policy was either void ab initio or had been properly rescinded. The court dismissed the claims. On appeal, the First Circuit Court certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the following questions of state law: (1) whether an annuity with a death benefit is infirm for want of an insurable interest if the owner and beneficiary of the annuity is a stranger to the annuitant; and (2) whether a clause in an annuity that purports to make the annuity incontestable from the date of its issuance precludes the maintenance of an action based on the lack of an insurable interest. View "W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. ADM Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law

For several years, Defendant was engaged in a fraudulent scheme to obtain computer parts from several computer companies. After obtaining the computer parts, Defendant sold the parts online for profit. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of wire fraud, possession of stolen property, and aggravated identity theft. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of a search warrant on the basis that it violated the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of aggravated burglary theft, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Kuc" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sending threats to injure another across state lines. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court gave incorrect jury instructions on the meaning of the term "threat," that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and that the district court had erred in denying his pre-trial motion to dismiss his indictment. Specifically, Defendant argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Virginia v. Black required that the jury use a subjective test of his intent and that it was insufficient to measure his intent by reference to an objectively reasonable person. On plain error review, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) absent further clarification from the Supreme Court, there was no basis to depart from this circuit's law that an objective test of a defendant's intent is used from the defendant's vantage point; and (2) even if a subjective specific intent instruction had been given, the jury would have, on these facts, found such intent. View "United States v. Clemens" on Justia Law

Appellant filed two amended qui tam actions against her employer, a pharmaceutical company and its subsidiary (collectively, Appellees), under the federal False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that Appellees failed adequately to disclose the risks associated with some of their drugs and that this failure resulted in the submission of false claims by third-party patients and physicians for government payment. The district court dismissed both of Appellant's actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) for failure to plead fraud with particularity and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Appellant subsequently sought to amend the second amended complaint, asserting more theories of FCA liability, but the district court refused to allow further amendment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rulings regarding the dismissal of Appellant's claim under Rule 9(b) and the denial of Appellant's proposed amendments, holding (1) Appellant's claims on all theories which were presented failed under Rule 9(b); and (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to amend. View "United States ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd." on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security instituted removal proceedings against Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, who had entered the United States without inspection. Petitioner applied for withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and, alternatively, post-hearing voluntary departure. The immigration judge denied Petitioner's requests for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal. Eight months later, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen to allow him to apply for pre-hearing voluntary departure, but because the motion was filed beyond the time allotted by the applicable regulation, the motion was addressed to the BIA's sua sponte authority to reopen. The BIA denied the motion and subsequently refused reconsideration. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's petition for judicial review of the denial of reconsideration, holding that it lacked the authority to review the BIA's denial of Petitioner's motion to reconsider the failure to grant relief where Petitioner's motion to reopen was untimely. View "Charuc v. Holder" on Justia Law