Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff faced foreclosure on her home mortgage after having fallen behind on her payments. The notice of foreclosure that Plaintiff received did not come from her lending institution but from a bank that had purchased her mortgage through a series of assignments facilitated by the Mortgage Electronic Recording System (MERS). Plaintiff brought this complaint against the receiving institution that sought foreclosure, (1) contending that MERS could not validly assign her mortgage, and therefore asserting that the receiving institution had no legal interest upon which to foreclose; and (2) bringing state law claims for fraud and unfair business practices. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims did not present legally cognizable claims for relief. View "Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant was insured under three homeowners' policies issued to his parents (the Zamskys) by Plaintiff. Each policy covered a separate parcel of residential real estate owned by the Zamskys and required Plaintiff to defend and indemnify the insureds against claims stemming from bodily injury caused by a covered occurrence. One exclusion to the policy, the UL exclusion, pretermitted coverage for injuries arising out of a premises owned by an insured but not itself an "insured location." This case involved an fire that occurred on a piece of real estate owned by the Zamskys that was not insured by Plaintiff. An individual injured in the fire sued Defendant for bodily injuries. Plaintiff subsequently brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the UL exclusions pretermitted its obligation to defend Defendant in the negligence suit or to indemnify him against any damage award. The district court held that the UL exclusion did not apply and that Plaintiff owed Defendant a duty to defend. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the occurrence at issue here did not arise out of a condition of the premises, the district court did not err in determining that the UL exclusion did not apply. View "Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zamsky" on Justia Law

Appellant was a former teacher in the town of Dracut, Massachusetts public schools. During the beginning of the 2009-2010 school year, Appellant failed to appear at school. Appellant subsequently applied for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave but did not notify the Dracut superintendent in writing of his request for FMLA leave, nor did he return a completed medical certification in accordance with Dracut's FMLA leave policy. On September 28, 2009, Appellant was terminated for abandoning his position. Appellant filed this suit in 2011 against individual decision-makers in the Dracut schools, alleging (1) violations of his rights under the FMLA; and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress and intentional interference with advantageous business relations in violation of Massachusetts state law. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Appellant had not worked enough to be eligible for FMLA leave and otherwise finding Appellant's claims meritless. The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not eligible for FMLA leave; (2) Appellant did not establish that Dracut's handling of his FMLA leave application caused him any harm; (3) Dracut did not unlawfully retaliate against Appellant; and (4) Appellant's state law claims against Defendants were without merit. View "McArdle v. Town of Dracut, Mass." on Justia Law

On August 6, Appellant was arrested in Maine and charged by the State for firearm-related crimes. On August 26, the United States ("government") charged Appellant with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On August 29, the State dismissed the related State charges. Appellant remained incarcerated by the State for the next month despite the fact the State had dismissed all charges against him. Finally, on October 3, Appellant was arrested by U.S. Marshals and brought before a federal judge. On October 26, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Appellant, and Appellant waived his right to contest the government's motion to detain him pending trial. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the federal indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant did not enter federal custody until October 3, his October 26 indictment occurred within thirty days of his arrest on federal charges and, therefore, did not violate the Speedy Trial Act; and (2) the district court did not err by failing to impose sanctions against the government for its purported failure to notify Appellant that it had lodged a federal detainer against him. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Brazilian citizen, entered the United States illegally. Petitioner then began working with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents to identify sellers of fraudulent immigration documents. Due to her work as an informant, Petitioner faced harassment and threats from people in the United States and in Brazil. Eventually, Petitioner stopped assisting the ICE because of the harassment, after which the government reinstated a prior removal order against her. Petitioner sought withholding of removal and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, claiming that she feared returning to Brazil due to threats she had received for her work with the ICE. The immigration judge denied Petitioner's applications. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, holding that the persecution Petitioner faced was "on account of a personal vendetta and not on account of her membership in a particular social group." The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that it could not overturn the determination that the risk Petitioner faced was personal and not due to her membership in a social group. View "Costa v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant sold home theater systems manufactured by Plaintiff, Bose Corporation, for use in the U.S. to customers abroad. Defendant, who was not an authorized reseller or distributor of Bose products, sold the systems across international markets to take advantage of high retail prices in other countries. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for breach of contract and trademark infringement, asserting that Defendant sold its American products in Australia without Plaintiff's consent even though he had signed a settlement agreement promising not to make such sales after he had made similar sales in Europe. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the settlement agreement was a valid contract; and (2) summary judgment on the trademark infringement claim was appropriate. View "Bose Corp. v. Ejaz" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court determined that Petitioner had two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence and a controlled substance offense and accordingly sentenced him under a higher Guidelines range. Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his sentence but did not challenge the district court's reliance on Defendant's previous Massachusetts assault-and-battery conviction as a crime of violence. Two years later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. Holloway that a Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery is not categorically a crime of violence. Petitioner subsequently moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court denied the petition, finding that Holloway did not apply retoactively to cases on collateral review and that Petitioner's claim was procedurally defaulted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner's claim was procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to object to the crime-of-violence determination either at sentencing or on direct appeal. View "Damon v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff refinanced his home mortgage and entered into a refinancing loan and mortgage agreement with IndyMac Bank, which assigned the mortgage to OneWest Bank. The mortgage was serviced by IndyMac Mortgage Services (all three services are referred to as "OneWest"). After Plaintiff fell behind on his payments, Harmon Law Offices, counsel to OneWest, informed Plaintiff that his home would be foreclosed. Fannie Mae purchased Plaintiff's house at a subsequent foreclosure sale. Eleven days later, Harmon served Plaintiff with an eviction notice. Plaintiff sued OneWest, Fannie Mae, and Harmon, asserting negligence and negligent misrepresentation and seeking an injunction against the pending eviction, an order nullifying the foreclosure, and monetary damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the economic loss doctrine barred Plaintiff's tort claims and that the tort claims failed because Defendants had not breached any duties owed to Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's claims. View "Schaefer v. IndyMac Mort. Servs." on Justia Law

Mother, an Egyptian citizen, acted in violation of a court order when she, together with her two children, boarded an EgyptAir Airlines Company flight to Cairo, Egypt. The father of the children and Mother's former husband (Father) brought this lawsuit against Mother and EgyptAir. Father claimed EgyptAir was negligent in allowing Mother to board the flight despite "red flags" suggesting she was abducting the children. The district court granted summary judgment for EgyptAir, concluding that the airline did not know of Mother's plan to abduct the children and did not owe Defendant or the children a duty to investigate the red flags. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Father's claims, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction over the claims; and (2) the claims, which challenged airline ticketing, check-in, and boarding procedures, were preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act. View "Bower v. El-Nady Bower" on Justia Law