Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Immigration and Nationality Act establishes that an individual "who entered the United States as a crewman" after 1964 is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States in 1998 on a C-1/D visa. Petitioner remained in the United States and eventually married a United States citizen. Petitioner subsequently applied for an adjustment of status, which was denied. Petitioner was then placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had last entered the United States as a crewman. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that, even though Petitioner's visa was annotated "C-1" and he had not been employed as a crewman since his arrival, he had entered the United States as a crewman. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the record supported the BIA's finding that Petitioner entered the United States intending to work as a crewman and pursuing employment as such. View "Guerrero v. Holder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a corrections officer, was convicted of drug and weapons charges for providing security for a drug transaction orchestrated by the FBI as part of a sting operation. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed subject to a limited remand, holding (1) the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment, as the evidence was insufficient to raise a jury issue of entrapment; and (2) the sentence imposed by the district court was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable. Remanded for correction of a reference in the written judgment that caused no prejudice to Defendant. View "United States v. Diaz-Maldonado" on Justia Law

Defendants, Jimmy Carrasquillo-Rodriguez (Carrasquillo) and Jesus Pabellon Rodriguez (Pabellon), were convicted on drug and gun charges arising from a reverse sting operation set up by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents seeking to reduce the flow of illegal narcotics from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. With one exception, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed both Defendants' convictions and Carrasquillo's sentence, holding (1) Carrasquillo's conviction for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number was not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the remaining convictions challenged by Defendants; (3) the language in the verdict form did not constitute plain error sufficient to warrant a new trial; (4) the district court did not plainly err in its instructions to the jury; and (5) the district court did not err in sentencing Carrasquillo. View "United States v. Pabellon-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Appellant was placed on disability leave from work. Appellant was covered under a long term disability (LTD) policy that her employer obtained from Medical Group Insurance Services (MGIS). The policy was written by Sun Life Assurance Company (Sun Life). After leaving her job, Appellant filed a claim with MGIS seeing long term disability benefits. Sun Life denied Appellant's request for benefits. Appellant filed an action against Sun Life, asserting various state law claims. The federal district court dismissed the action based on ERISA preemption. Appellant then amended her complaint to add ERISA claims and asked the district court to apply de novo review in its evaluation of her ERISA claims. The court denied the motion and granted summary judgment for Sun Life, concluding that Sun Life's decision to deny benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, and thus complied with ERISA's requirements. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding (1) the safe harbor exception to ERISA did not apply to the policy covering Appellant, and therefore, Appellant's state law claims were preempted; but (2) the benefits denial was subject to a de novo review, rather than the highly deferential "arbitrary and capricious" review prescribed for certain ERISA benefits decisions. Remanded. View "Gross v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada" on Justia Law

Puerto Rico law operated to cause hundreds of thousands of motor vehicle owners to pay twice for liability insurance. Commonwealth law declared motor vehicle owners to be entitled to a refund of the excess premiums paid, but large amounts of unclaimed refunds accumulated. The Commonwealth subsequently placed the unclaimed refunds with its Treasury Secretary with the condition that, if not claimed within five years, the funds escheated to the Commonwealth without notice to the vehicle owners. In Garcia-Rubiera II, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Commonwealth's failure to notify vehicle owners of their reimbursement rights violated their procedural due process rights. On remand, the district court ordered the Commonwealth to notify vehicle owners of their reimbursement rights, to publish notices in two newspapers alerting the owners of their rights, and to give owners a 120-day grace period for them to claim reimbursement. The First Circuit again remanded for the district court to craft with "the benefit of further guidance" an injunction that more fittingly remedied the Commonwealth's constitutional violations and ordered no duplicate premiums to escheat to the Commonwealth until it established and complied with a reimbursement procedure meeting the requirements of due process. View "Garcia-Rubiera v. Fortuno" on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiffs refinanced their home by means of a loan from Downey Savings and Loan Association (Downey), a federal insured financial institution. In 2008, Plaintiffs' monthly loan payment doubled. Later that year, Downey was closed and the FDIC was appointed as its receiver. U.S. Bank subsequently assumed all of Downey's loans and mortgages. After Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage loan, U.S. Bank conducted a foreclosure sale and recorded a foreclosure deed. Plaintiffs, in turn, sued U.S. Bank, claiming that the loan made by Downey violated various state consumer protection laws and that the foreclosure was unlawful. U.S. Bank removed the case to federal district court, which granted summary judgment to U.S. Bank. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act's exhaustion requirement applied to Plaintiffs' consumer protection claims, and therefore, Plaintiffs' failure to file those claims with the FDIC divested the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (2) the transfer of a mortgage, authorized by federal law, obviates the need for a specific written assignment of the mortgage that state law would otherwise require, and thus, the foreclosure sale in this case was lawful. View "Demelo v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in 2000. Petitioner later admitted removability but sought cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), alleging that he was a child "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" by a parent who acquired lawful permanent resident status under the NACARA. An immigration judge found Petitioner was not "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" and therefore decided Petitioner was not eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Because Petitioner did not raise any legal or constitutional issue on appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Castro v. Holder" on Justia Law

For nearly twenty years, Plaintiff, Condominium Associations, and several IDC development entities disputed the ownership and use of certain property in Rhode Island. IDC Properties constructed and Defendant, IDC Clambakes, operated the Newport Regatta Club on the contested property after Plaintiff asserted that the rights of the IDC entities to own or develop the property had lapsed. The Rhode Island Supreme Court found in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant later declared bankruptcy. This case came to the First Circuit Court of Appeals from a bankruptcy court decision and concerned the question whether Defendant trespassed on Plaintiff's property or whether, through its actions during the pendency of the litigation, Plaintiff impliedly consented to operation of the Club by Defendant while title to the property was in dispute. The First Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that Plaintiff impliedly consented to Defendant's operation of the Club, holding that the bankruptcy court's decision was fully reasoned and supported by the evidence. Remanded for a determination whether compensation was owed for Defendant's authorized use and occupancy. View "Goat Island S. Condo., Inc. v. IDC Clambakes, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin, possessing with the intent to distribute heroin, conspiring to import heroin, and importing heroin into the United States. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-four months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing that her sentence was procedurally and substantively flawed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's request for a continuance of the sentencing hearing; (2) did not abuse its discretion in choosing to impose a term of imprisonment; and (3) afforded Defendant an adequate opportunity to allocute. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

A New Hampshire court issued a warrant to search Defendant's home after a state trooper submitted a supporting affidavit detailing the trooper's suspicion that Defendant's home contained a marijuana grow operation. Based on the items seized from Defendant's home, Defendant was charged with manufacturing marijuana, possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search warrant lacked probable cause. The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the trooper recklessly omitted from his affidavit information material to a probable cause determination. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the search warrant at issue contained reckless material omissions, and the omitted information, when included back into the affidavit, failed to establish probable cause. View "United States v. Gifford" on Justia Law