Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A proposed consent order from an FTC investigation indicated that U-Haul attempted to implement a scheme to collude with competitors, Budget and Penske, to raise prices for truck rentals. The FTC concluded that U-Haul's conduct violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). The proposed consent order was designed to prevent collusion. U-Haul consented to the relief, but did not admit the conduct or violation. A consumer filed a complaint charging U-Haul with violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A by engaging in an attempted price-fixing scheme and seeking damages on behalf of a large class. The suit, a follow-on action after a proposed government consent decree, is common in antitrust cases. Because the FTC Act contains no private right of action and the Sherman Act is of doubtful application to price-fixing, the suit rested chapter 93A, which prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices," and permits consumer class actions. The complaint alleged that U-Haul's actions caused plaintiff to pay at least 10 percent more for truck rentals than she would have absent the unlawful action. The district court dismissed, stating that the complaint failed plausibly to allege injury. The First Circuit vacated, finding the claim plausible. View "Liu v. Amerco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's doctor prescribed, for shoulder pain, sulindac, a non-steroid anti-inflammatory, under the brand-name Clinoril; her pharmacist dispensed generic sulindac. She developed a hypersensitivity reaction, toxic epidermal necrolysis, with which the outer skin layer on a patient's body has deteriorated, been burned off or turned into an open wound. Plaintiff spent 70 days at Massachusetts General Hospital, more than 50 in its burn unit, with 60-65 percent of her skin affected. Her "truly horrific" injuries include permanent near-blindness. Her claims against the manufacturer included breach of warranty, fraud, and negligence, and products liability claims: design defect, failure to warn, and manufacturing defect. By trial, the remaining theory of design defect was narrowed to a claim that sulindac's risks outweighed its benefits making it unreasonably dangerous to consumers, despite the FDA having never withdrawn its statutory "safe and effective" designation. A jury awarded $21.06 million in compensatory damages. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims including that the district court misunderstood New Hampshire law on design defect claims; that such claims as to generic drugs are preempted under federal law; that causation was not proved; and that damages were excessive and required a new trial. .View "Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Hong Kong, came to the U.S. in 1999 and overstayed his visa. In 2010, an immigration judge ordered him removed after determining that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had not maintained 10 years of continuous physical presence as required by section 240A(b)(1)(A)-(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act . He was five days short. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied his appeal, rejecting an argument that the notice to appear was defective and "stopped time" for purposes of the 10-year calculation.View "Cheung v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1982, Jimenez was convicted of the parolable offense of second degree murder for killing a police officer and simultaneously acquitted of murder in the first degree, conviction of which would have carried no possibility of parole. The Massachusetts Parole Board denied his parole applications in 1999, 2004, and 2009. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of due process and equal protection and infringements of guarantees under the Commonwealth's constitution. The defendants are the six members of the Board, named in their official capacities, each of whom voted to deny parole. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim for constitutional violations, finding specific relief barred by the section 1983 prohibition of injunctions against judicial officers. The First Circuit affirmed. There is nothing shocking or arbitrary about the parole board’s discretion. A state may rationally take the position that a law enforcement officer’s constant exposure to violence calls for a more powerful deterrent to homicidal behavior than the general laws of homicide provide.View "Jimenez v. Conrad" on Justia Law

PRTC and T-Mobile entered into an interconnection agreement under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in 1999 and into a second agreement in 2001. The agreements provided that certain intrastate access services provided by PRTC, an incumbent local exchange carrier, would be billed at a rate contained in PRTC's federal tariff filed with the FCC. T-Mobile was billed at this rate until 2002, when PRTC announced its view that this billing rate was in error, the disputed services were not covered under the agreement, and the applicable billing rate was a higher rate found in PRTC's local tariff. Roughly $2 million is at issue. The Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico ruled in favor of T-Mobile as a matter of contract law, holding that the FCC tariff rate applied. The district court granted summary judgment for PRTC and vacated the order as discriminating against third-party carriers, in violation of federal law. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the agreement was neither discriminatory nor violative of any other provision of federal law. View "PR Tel. Co., Inc. v. T-Mobile PR, LLC" on Justia Law