Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs had a longstanding feud with neighbors, based on plaintiffs' "botanical menagerie" that served as a sanctuary for wild parrots. A marker tree spanned the boundary between the plaintiffs' and the neighbors' properties. Claiming that the tree threatened power lines, the neighbors obtained a permit to remove the tree from the Natural Resources Department. The Electric Power Authority temporarily shut off power to the lines and municipal employees removed all of the branches, so that the tree eventually died. Plaintiffs claim that the operation caused extensive damage to other plantings. Plaintiffs sued the municipality, the individual employees, and the neighbors under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming failure to provide pre-deprivation notice or opportunity to be heard, taking without just compensation, and intense pain and suffering. After a maze of cross-claims and counterclaims were filed, so that the electric authority became a party, the district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that, even if destruction of the vegetation was improper, plaintiffs did not state any constitutional cause of action.View "Elena v. Mun. of San Juan" on Justia Law

Castaneda, a Peruvian officer, was accused of participation in a massacre during Peru's conflict with the Shining Path guerrilla movement. He was acquitted of charges in Peru, but his name was associated with the massacre. He and his family received death threats. Shining Path repeatedly attacked, killing innocent bystanders. They fled to the U.S. in 1991. An Immigration Judge denied an application for asylum. The BIA affirmed in 2005. While appeals were pending, Castaneda was in custody; he was released on bail in 2010. The First Circuit remanded for consideration of whether Castaneda was credible in testimony that he did not know of the massacre until after it happened. The IJ denied the application. The BIA held that Castaneda was ineligible for asylum, reasoning that Shining Path attacked not because he was a member of a specific group, military officers linked to the massacre, but as revenge. The First Circuit remanded for consideration of whether that comprised a social group. The BIA answered in the affirmative; in 2012, the IJ granted asylum. The government has not appealed, but claimed that the court lacked authority to issue final judgment. The First Circuit disagreed, noting that it explicitly retained jurisdiction to ensure a speedy final resolution. View "Castaneda-Castillo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered the U.S. in 1988 as a visitor, overstayed, and, in 1990, married María, a fellow Colombian. The couple had two children before separating in 1995. In 1996, petitioner's father sought an immigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2)(B), which permits unmarried children of an alien who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence to obtain a visa. The petition was approved. Petitioner and Maria finalized their divorce one month later and María immediately married a U.S. citizen and attained lawful permanent resident status as his spouse. In 1999, María and petitioner ostensibly reconciled and had a third child. They remarried after Maria’s divorce. DHS denied petitioner’s request for adjustment of status and revoked his immigrant visa and began removal proceedings. An IJ denied his application for cancellation of removal finding that petitioner had failed to show that he was a "person of good moral character" while living in the U.S. Meanwhile, Maria filed a visa petition on his behalf as a permanent resident applying for naturalization. USCIS denied María's application when it determined that María's second marriage was a sham. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review. Findings concerning false testimony were reasonable. View "Restrepo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant, then 19, was arrested on an outstanding warrant. Upon searching him, police found bags containing small amounts of cocaine base and marijuana. He was charged with possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and with aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. 2, and pled guilty to the first count. At a hearing, the AUSA stated that defendant qualified as a career offender based on two prior convictions for crimes of violence, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Defendant did not object. The presentence report described juvenile adjudications for resisting arrest and assault and battery and adult convictions, for assault and battery and for resisting arrest. The government argued for a sentence of 96 months, rather than the guidelines recommendation of 151-188 months for a career offender, due to defendant’s youth and the relatively non-serious nature of the predicate offenses. Defendant still made no objection to his classification as a career offender He was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed. Despite decisions clarifying which types of Massachusetts convictions could be considered predicates for career offender status under 4B1.1, defendant could not meet the prejudice prong of the plain error test. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

UPRLS hired plaintiff as an assistant professor, with possibility of tenure after five years. During her probation, plaintiff, with a male professor, worked in the school's Legal Aid Clinic. Plaintiff's co-teacher had a sexual relationship with a student, who became pregnant as a result. Near the end of her probation, plaintiff requested a one-year extension. The dean questioned plaintiff about her knowledge of the relationship between her co-teacher and the pregnant student and chastised her for failing to report. There was no internal regulation prohibiting student-teacher relationships or mandating reporting. The Dean recommended the extension, but added comments questioning her judgment and maturity. When plaintiff learned of these comments, she wrote to the Chancellor and others, denouncing the comments. The dean reversed his position. A committee was formed and voted to deny the extension. After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, plaintiff sued UPRLS and individuals, alleging gender-based discrimination and retaliation under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. The allegations did support a reasonable inference that plaintiff was engaging in protected conduct when she opposed the dean’s remarks or that defendants’ actions were based on gender. View "Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of PR" on Justia Law

GMG contracted with Amicas to develop and license computer programs to accept information from a radiology patient management system established by Sage and send information to a billing system established by Sage. The warranty excluded any failure resulting from databases of GMG or third parties and warned that Amicas did not warrant that the software would meet GMG’s requirements. Amicas worked with Sage on the interfaces. GMG began using the programs and reported problems, eventually returning to its old method of manual processing, but did not inform Amicas of that decision or of persistent problems with the interface. GMG began negotiating with Sage to develop substitute software. When Amicas became aware of problems with the interface, it worked with Sage to resolve the concerns, but GMG sent Amicas a termination notice, citing failure to deliver a functional product. The district court found for Amicas on its breach of contract claim, rejected counterclaims, and awarded $778,889 in damages, $324,805 in attorneys’ fees, plus costs and interest. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Amicas satisfied its burden of proving performance and that GMG offered only conclusory allegations of noncompliance. View "Amicas, Inc. v. GMG Health Sys., LTD." on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to stealing firearms and possessing stolen firearms, defendant received a sentence of 54 months' imprisonment, based, in part, on a finding that he qualified as a "prohibited person" who, because of his history of substance abuse, was barred from possessing firearms. The First Circuit affirmed. The court first held that defendant had waived an argument that an interview with the Pretrial Services Office during which defendant disclosed information about his drug use, involved a promise of confidentiality, and that inclusion of the information in the sentencing report violated his due process rights and FRCP 32. The court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his attorney allowing him to disclose the information. View "United States v. Caparotta" on Justia Law

Former Massachusetts state senator Wilkerson, pleaded guilty to attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951) based on her acceptance of money in exchange for favorable influence in her official capacity on issuance of a liquor license and sale and development of publicly-owned land. The district court received a lengthy presentence report, conducted a thorough hearing, and stated reasons for imposing a sentence of 42 months, near the middle of the guidelines. The First Circuit affirmed. The court’s statement that "tax violation by a public official is not a personal matter" is most plausibly interpreted as a segue to make a "larger point" about the public implications of an over-engaged official's failure to attend to her own legal responsibilities. Its statement that Wilkerson "was simply inattentive and inattentive in a way that permitted her to have access to money that she should not have had" was fair comment on the implications of non-compliance with campaign-finance requirements. Its statement that Wilkerson's engagement as a college "consultant" was one of "a series of very embarrassing things" she did in response to her financial troubles was specific to the circumstances of the arrangement. The district court's skeptical appraisal of the arrangement was reasonable. View "United States v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law