Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in March, 2012
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Petitioner, a citizen of Morocco, entered the U.S. in 2001 on a nonimmigrant visa. He overstayed and married a citizen in 2004. In 2006 the two had an argument that involved a physical altercation. Wife had to have brain surgery for her injuries and petitioner was convicted of reckless conduct. He served 11 months. Wife nonetheless filed an I-130 petition to establish that they were married. DHS approved the petition, but charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). He sought a waiver and adjustment of status. Petitioner and his wife presented different versions of the fight that led to his arrest. The immigration judge ordered removal, finding that petitioner committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit denied appeal, finding that reckless conduct under New Hampshire law is inherently a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Idy v. Holder" on Justia Law

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A disabled child, born in 1996, was a student in the Sutton public school system from 1999 until 2005, when his parent were dissatisfied with the individualized education program developed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400-1491, and the services he was receiving. They removed him from the school and enrolled him in a private learning center. The Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals determined that the 2005 IEP complied with the IDEA. The district court upheld the decision on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court could not determine compliance without first determining the child's potential for learning and self-sufficiency. The district court properly concluded that the child's potential was unknowable and that the IEP was reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits. The parents did not raise triable claims under the First Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Titles II and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act, or 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985; plaintiffs “cannot disguise an IDEA claim in other garb.” View "D.B., a minor v. Esposito" on Justia Law

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Husband established two "multi-level marketing" companies (pyramid schemes) that supposedly sold health and dietary supplements, but actually sold very little. Wife recruited new members, primarily from an immigrant community. New members would make an initial investment and then receive part of the investments paid in by new recruits. Wife urged potential investors to borrow to invest at the highest possible level, promised that there was no need to sell merchandise, and promised lifetime payments. The couple lived lavishly until they could find no more new investors. By the time the scam imploded, roughly 500 investors had lost about $20,000,000. Both were convicted of numerous counts of mail-fraud, money-laundering, and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1957, 371). Having affirmed husband's convictions in an earlier opinion, the First Circuit affirmed wife's convictions. The court rejected arguments concerning sufficiency of the evidence, wife's knowledge, the elements of money-laundering, and variance from the indictment. View "United States v. Tan" on Justia Law

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A three-mile public recreational trail runs through 32 acres owned by the state and is used, in part, to access the state-managed Scarborough Marsh Wildlife Management Area. In 1961 Maine purchased the land with federal funds under the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. 669-669k for the approved purpose of “waterfowl habitat, waterfowl management, and access to waterfowl hunting.” The state subsequently granted easements for sanitary pipelines and a town road and to private parties for access to adjoining property. An easement granted in 2005 allowed construction of a road over 766 feet of previously-restricted trail for access to a planned subdivision. Objectors sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of the Wildlife Restoration Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, and state law. The district court dismissed federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the federal agency’s decision to not enforce the funding provisions of the WRA is within its discretion. The federal government did not grant the easements, so NEPA did not apply. View "Scarborough Citizens Protecting Res. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv." on Justia Law

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Debtor had unsecured liabilities of almost $15,000 and anticipated disposable income of about $100 per month. He visited an attorney, who indicated that he would not file a Chapter 7 proceeding until the debtor paid the anticipated legal fee ($2,300). If debtor chose the Chapter 13 alternative, he could pay over time as part of the Chapter 13 plan. The attorney estimated that fees associated with a Chapter 13 proceeding would total $4,100. Not having fees for a Chapter 7 filing, the debtor opted for Chapter 13 and paid $500 on account. The attorney submitted a “fee only” Chapter 13 plan that called for payment of $100 per month for 36 months to the bankruptcy estate. Of the total $3,600, only about $300 would be available to general creditors. The bankruptcy court rejected the plan as not submitted in good faith. The debtor opted to convert to Chapter 7; the attorney moved for an award of $2,872. The bankruptcy court awarded $299, which required him to disgorge more than $200. The district court affirmed. Noting a division in the circuits, the First Circuit reversed, holding that fee-only plans are not per se in bad faith.View "Berliner v. Pappalardo" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base and ecstasy, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 846. Due to prior state drug possession convictions, he was sentenced to life in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the prosecutor's entreaty to the jury that it “speak the truth” and convict defendant, to an instruction concerning reasonable doubt, and to the sentence. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

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Defendant, a 60-year-old pro se plaintiff, received notice that his three appeals would be dismissed unless he paid fees or filed a request to proceed in forma pauperis. He called the clerk's office and stated that he had filed a motion with the district court. A clerk stated that he had called the court of appeals in Boston, not the district court in Springfield. His response: "Go to fucking Springfield and get it." The clerk asked if he was serious. Defendant answered: "What's so fucking funny, you fucking [offensive name]?" The clerk hung up and went to her supervisor, who spoke to defendant and attempted to locate the motion. Defendant responded: "What kind of douche bags do you hire? I'll come down there with my shotgun and show you who means business." When defendant said: "You're lucky I'm only talking on the phone and not driving down there with my shotgun," the supervisor told him to stop making threats. Defendant muttered vulgarities and hung up. After investigation by U.S. Marshals and the FBI, he was convicted of threatening a U.S. official, 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B). The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and jury instructions.View "United States v. Stefanik" on Justia Law

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Debtors engaged the attorney to represent them in bankruptcy proceedings. They owed more than $115,000 in unsecured debt with no realistic prospect of payment. In a retainer agreement, he estimated that legal fees plus court costs would total around $4,000. Debtors paid $3,684 on account. Their Chapter 13 plan, 11 U.S.C. 1321-1322, was approved by the bankruptcy court and the lawyer filed an application requesting an additional $8,173.36 in attorneys' fees and expenses. The trustee objected. The bankruptcy court set the total fee and expense figure at $3,684, finding that the case was relatively uncomplicated. The district court and First Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the attorney billed an excessive number of hours. View "Sullivan v. Pappalardo" on Justia Law

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In 2008, MDS purchased a vessel and executed a note in favor of FirstBank, secured by a preferred ship mortgage, under an agreement that required that they maintain insurance. In 2009, Customs and Border Protection seized the vessel as part of a drug enforcement action. The search and seizure damaged the vessel, significantly decreasing its value. Customs notified FirstBank, which initiated an administrative forfeiture proceeding, intervened in the criminal case, obtained voluntary dismissal of the indictment against the vessel, then submitted an insurance claim for "loss of the vessel including, without limitation, the value of the Bank's collateral, legal fees incurred in attempting to secure its release, as well as any applicable costs and interests." The insurer denied the claim. The district court granted FirstBank partial summary judgment and awarded $74,512.50 in attorneys' fees for costs and expenses incurred in securing release of the vessel and defending the validity of the policy. The First Circuit affirmed, finding no genuine issues of material fact.View "Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Diaz-Santiago" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native of Jordan, entered the U.S. with his family in 1997, when he was eight years old. In 2009, removal proceedings were initiated and petitioner conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, arguing that because of his claimed conversion from Islam to Christianity in 2008, he will be persecuted if returned to Jordan. There was evidence that the Jordanian constitution stipulates that Muslims' personal status is governed by Islamic law, according to which apostasy may be punished by an inability to own property, find employment, marry, or maintain custody of one's children. Because the conversion occurred while petitioner was the subject of a criminal investigation, it was regarded as suspect. The IJ denied petitioner's applications on grounds that he and his father were not credible witnesses. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit vacated, finding the overall negative credibility finding suspect.View "Jabri v. Holder" on Justia Law