Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, born in El Salvador, entered the U.S. illegally in 2006. The Department of Homeland Security brought removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). He conceded removability and filed an application for withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture protection, claiming that he would be harmed by criminal gangs, prevalent in El Salvador, whose attempts to recruit him he had resisted and that the gangs would perceive him as wealthy because of his time in the U.S. and therefore subject him to further threats and violence. The IJ held that his fear was genuine, but that there was neither a sufficient likelihood of harm nor was the feared harm directed at a statutorily protected social group. The Board affirmed. The First Circuit denied review.

Defendant pled guilty to two counts involving unlawful possession of ammunition and a firearm, a Glock Model 27, which is .40 caliber handgun capable of operating as a fully automatic machine gun (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 922(o); 18 U.S.C. 921(23)). The parties recommended a sentence of 33 months of incarceration. After considering the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the court imposed a 60-month sentence, 19 months beyond the top of the guidelines sentencing range of 33-41 months, and three years of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed. finding no substantive or procedural error.

The Massachusetts Delivery Association claimed that a state law is preempted as to motor carriers under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1569, which expressly preempts state attempts to regulate "a price, route, or service of any motor carrier," The challenged state law, part of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sect. 148B(a)(2), which requires that an individual performing a service for another be classified as an employee unless "the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the employer." The MDA also claimed that the state statute imposes an undue burden which violates the Commerce Clause. The district court found that Younger abstention was appropriate because, while the Association is not itself a party to relevant state litigation, three of its members are defendants in state civil proceedings brought not by the Attorney General (defendant in this case) but by private parties. The First Circuit remanded for the court to exercise jurisdiction, concluding that any decision will not interfere with pending state cases.

Defendants were convicted conspiracy to distribute narcotics and possession with intent to distribute narcotics as a result of their participation in a drug point that operated within a public housing project in Guayama, Puerto Rico. The First Circuit vacated two counts of conviction, but otherwise affirmed. The district court lacked jurisdiction over a defendant who was a juvenile during much of the conspiracy, with respect to two of the substantive drug counts of which he was convicted. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and sentences, which were within guidelines.

In the early 1980s, two women were murdered, apparently for domestic reasons. Their bodies were found in 2000 and Flemmi, a member of a Boston gang, confessed. The families filed claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2401(b), 2671, 2675, alleging that the government was negligent in using and protecting Flemmi and his criminal associate, Bulger, as informants. The court awarded damages and sanctions against the government for misconduct. The First Circuit affirmed the finding of liability and award of damages, upholding a finding of causation under the Massachusetts' Wrongful Death Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, sect. 2. The court remanded with respect to sanctions.

In the 1970s, the decedent worked as a bookmaker in Boston and was involved with Bulger's Winter Hill gang. In 1979, decedent was charged with murder. While out on bail, he offered to cooperate with police in the investigation of an drug conspiracy involving Bulger. His attorney met with Boston Police and FBI agent Connolly to discuss this offer. Unbeknownst to decedent and his attorney, Bulger was a top echelon FBI informant and Connolly was his primary handler. Connolly and others were protecting Bulger from prosecution so that he could continue supplying information. Roughly three weeks later, decedent was murdered. Several years later, after a series of investigations disclosed leaks to Bulger, his estate filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2401(b), 2671, 2675. The court awarded $1.15 million. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the administrative claim was filed after the statute of limitations had run and that there was insufficient admissible proof that the leak occurred and that Bulger killed decedent; and that the estate failed to meet its burden for liability based on conscious pain and suffering. Whatever they suspected, the family did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the claim until 1999.

Defendant and companions were found to be carrying large amounts of cash while passing through customs and were later connected to a mailed package containing cocaine. Defendant was convicted of attempting to possess with an intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a controlled substance, but acquitted of conspiracy to possess with an intent to distribute the same substance, 18 U.S.C. 2; 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II), 846. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erroneously admitted evidence of the amount of money that he and his companions were carrying. The First Circuit affirmed. The evidence was not unfairly prejudicial and permitted the jury to infer that defendant had the means and intent to send drugs and knew he was, in fact, mailing drugs

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and one kilogram or more of heroin within 1,000 feet of a public housing project, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and 860, and conspiring to unlawfully possess, use, or brandish a firearm in furtherance of or during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(o) and was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment and 8 years supervised release. After the conviction was affirmed, defendant challenged the district court's denial of a petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice.

Defendants were convicted of failure to pay federal income tax. Neither attended sentencing. They did not respond to demands to surrender and remained holed up in their secluded home for about nine months. Marshals had information that defendants were armed and making threats, but eventually arrested the couple and found explosives, firearms, and ammunition, including rifles, armor piercing bullets, pipe bombs, and bombs nailed to trees. Convicted of conspiring to prevent federal officers from discharging their duties, 18 U.S.C. 372; conspiring to assault, resist or impede federal officers, 18 U.S.C. 111(a) and (b) and 371; using or carrying a firearm or destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence; possessing a firearm or destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (B); being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1503; and failing to appear at sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3146. They were sentenced to 35 and 37 years. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments relating to competency, defendants' beliefs that they were not obligated to pay taxes, evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions.

Plaintiff, a homosexual man, was employed by the city. He claims that he was taunted by unidentified coworkers and that, after he had a romantic relationship with a coworker, he was afraid for his safety and requested that they not work together. Plaintiff claims that his work assignments deteriorated after that request. He was transferred and claims that his work caused him to become nervous and depressed and require hospitalization. The district court rejected claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and alleging violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff appealed only with respect to an equal protection claim. The First Circuit affirmed. The transfer was not an adverse employment action and plaintiff did not establish that similarly situated heterosexuals were treated differently. The court rejected a "continuing violation" claim alleging hostile work environment.