Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, having participated in a string of robberies, was convicted of using force and intimidation to rob a bank insured by the FDIC (18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d)), and knowingly brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)). The district court sentenced defendant, as a career offender, to life in prison. The First Circuit held that the record did not support imposition of a life sentence under the federal "three strikes" provision, 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(1). Nor did the record support sentencing under the career offender provision, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The second "strike" (or predicate offense) on defendant's criminal record actually occurred after the charge bank robbery. Because of the quantities as issue, previous drug convictions could not serve as the second "strike."

Defendant was apprehended on a boat in the Caribbean by a Coast Guard counter-narcotics patrol and charged under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70501-70508. The boat, carrying cocaine, did not display a flag or numbers. Columbian and Venezuelan authorities could not confirm its registration. A vessel without nationality is subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the Act. The district court denied a motion to dismiss based on the Confrontation Clause. Defendant argued that use of State Department certifications memorializing the inability of Columbia and Venezuela to confirm or refute the boat's master's claim of national registry, without an opportunity to cross-examine their author, constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment. The First Circuit affirmed, noting that defendant did not claim that the boat was registered in another country or otherwise outside U.S. jurisdiction.

Petitioner, a citizen of Ukraine, now married to a U.S. citizen, entered the U.S. on a visitor's visa in 1999 and overstayed. An IJ granted voluntary departure by March 8, 2006. A motion to reopen was denied. Petitioner, who claims to have been unaware of the denial, remained in the U.S. and was arrested in 2010. Another motion to reopen was denied and, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(1)(B)3 the IJ imposed an absolute 10-year bar on any adjustment of status. A new attorney filed a third motion to reopen, based on petitioner's reliance on his previous attorney, who was incompetent. The IJ rejected the motion and the BIA affirmed. The First Circuit remanded for consideration of whether the time-bar on motions to reopen may have tolled, based on equitable considerations, and whether petitioner "voluntarily" remained in the U.S. so as to be subject to the 10-year bar.

In 1981 defendant, a habitual sex offender, was sentenced to a term of perpetual imprisonment for rehabilitation, to last a minimum of 12 years. He was not released from prison until 2008. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. The defendants, high-level government officials, enjoyed immunity. Defendant's general claims of failure to supervise did not state a claim; there was no evidence that specific defendants were even aware of his continuing incarceration.

Defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). Calculation of his criminal history, with upward adjustments because of use of a computer, the number of images, images depicting violence, and images of pre-pubescent children, resulted in a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months. The district court rejected an argument that the guidelines were too punitive and imposed a sentence of 90 months. The First Circuit affirmed, noting that the district court examined all the relevant factors and that the sentence was reasonable.

After attempting to stop defendant for driving with illegal tinted windows, police gave chase and stopped his truck. Inspecting the interior of the abandoned truck, police found two wrapped blocks of what was later found to be cocaine. The chemist who tested the blocks was not available for trial, due to mental illness, and the officers had not observed the testing. Testimony was supplied by another chemist. Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841). The First Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial, citing the Confrontation Clause. There were several questions about the reliability of the testing that the witness was unable to answer; the error was not harmless.

In 2002 defendant was convicted under the Massachusetts aggravated rape statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 22(a). He exhausted state appeals. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the statute was void for vagueness as applied to the case, for failure to define "resulting in serious bodily injury." It was reasonable for the state court to conclude that the phrase was not a technical term and could be understood by non-lawyers.

After several failed attempts to establish a voluntary interconnection agreement, the two telecommunications companies went into arbitration with defendant, the Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico. Following a remand, the Board approved a final interconnection agreement pursuant to its authority under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 251. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Board. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that various provisions were arbitrary.

Plaintiff, an RN, stopped working at the hospital and went on disability only a few months after starting work. Her symptoms were attributed to chronic pancreatitis, chronic pain syndrome or fibromyalgia; she took "impressive amounts of narcotics" to manage her pain, which caused negative side effects. After about five years, the company terminated benefits, finding that she was not totally disabled, as defined by the policy. The district court upheld the termination in a suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The First Circuit remanded for further review, reasoning that plaintiff's activities, shown on surveillance tapes, and the lack of clinical documentation were overstated.

Following a carjacking that resulted in a shooting death, defendant executed a plea agreement without having been informed that the maximum penalty for the crime was life imprisonment. He ultimately received a sentence of 360 months, though his plea agreement recommended 120 months. The First Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the appeal provision in his plea agreement is unenforceable because the district court violated FRCP Rule 11 by failing to inform him of the maximum penalty at his hearing.