Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After customs officials discovered $543,801 concealed in doors defendant was transporting on a ferry between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, he was charged under 31 U.S.C. 5316(a)(1)(A) & (b); 5322(a); and 5332. He was sentenced to 41 months in prison; the court imposed a forfeiture order. A third party filed a petition claiming to be the rightful owner of $343,000. The district court rejected the petition, reasoning that the forfeiture order was in the form of a money judgment. The First Circuit affirmed entry of the money judgment order of forfeiture with respect to defendant, but vacated the portion of the final order that the attached $543,731 in cash be used to satisfy the judgment. The court noted that there was confusion because of the government's actions and that the government did not object to remand and remanded to give the third party an opportunity to challenge the attachment.

A business entity sued an investment fund manager for fraud in Massachusetts state court. Defendant removed to federal court, which dismissed based on the statute of limitations. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit noted that the allegations were insufficient to establish diversity jurisdiction and instructed plaintiff to identify the citizenship of all of its members. Plaintiff did not comply, but simply asserted that none of its members shared defendant's Rhode Island citizenship. The court stated that it could not proceed to judgment with the information it had and ordered plaintiff to provide the necessary information, under seal.

Defendant failed to close on a real estate contract. The seller retained his $25,000 earnest money, resold the property, and assigned his claim for the $400,000 price differential to plaintiff. The district court rejected a claim that the contract showed an intent that the earnest money serve as liquidated damages. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the contract unambiguous.

In May 2006, defendant was charged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, with identity theft and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7) and 1028A(a)(1)). A warrant issued, but was not executed, as defendant was in federal custody in New York on charges that he had knowingly and unlawfully escaped from a halfway house. The Maine prosecutor obtained a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and defendant was transported to Maine in October 2006, where he remained in custody until February 2007. He was returned to New York, where he was tried and sentenced. Returned to Maine in 2008, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act's 30-day, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), arrest to indictment clock. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit affirmed. There was no injustice; defendant chose to prolong detention in Maine under the writ in order to attempt to negotiate plea agreements favorable to him in both Maine and New York. The prosecution and defense had filed, in the Maine action, joint motions to exclude time under the STA, because of defendant's desire to negotiate agreements.

Plaintiff brought suit under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, claiming that her employer violated the collective bargaining agreement when it reclassified a position for which she was hired, resulting in her subsequent removal from that position, and that the union violated its duty of fair representation in colluding with the employer to reclassify her position and in refusing to take her filed grievance to arbitration. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and the union. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not produce evidence that her employer breached the CBA when it reclassified her position from permanent to temporary before her actual start date and, therefore, did not establish that her termination amounted to a breach.

On Monday afternoon, a sentencing hearing scheduled for Wednesday afternoon was rescheduled to Wednesday morning. The court sent electronic notice; prior notices and filings had been electronic. The attorney failed to appear and, on the same day, the court imposed a fine of $1,500. The First Circuit reduced the fine to $500, noting that the attorney was unwise in his criticism of the lower court when he requested reconsideration and rejecting the attorney's characterization of the fine as criminal contempt. The court noted that it would be better policy to hear from the attorney before imposing the sanction.

In 1991, petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, was taken into custody by immigration officials while crossing the Rio Grande. He applied for asylum, but did not appear at a hearing. A deportation order issued. In 2001 petitioner sought to reopen and an immigration judge held hearings and found that the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, 111 Stat. 2193, 2644 did not apply because petitioner was apprehended "at the time of entry." With respect to asylum, the IJ found that petitioner had a well founded fear of future persecution if he returned to Guatemala as "a member of a particular social group composed of family returning to Guatemala after lengthy residence in the United States perceived as wealthy and, therefore, particularly susceptible to extortionate and/or kidnapping demands." The BIA reversed with respect to asylum. The First Circuit denied review.

A TSA worker developed a diabetic ulcer on his foot, was unable to work, and, after missing several months of work, was terminated from his position. The district court dismissed claims under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 115 Stat. 597, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791. The First Circuit affirmed, concluding that the ATSA clearly eliminates any cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act for TSA screeners.

Plaintiff, an employee of the VA, was accused of committing fraud with respect to a work-related injury. Her employment was terminated. When mediation failed, plaintiff was notified that she had 15 days to file a complaint with the EEOC. Her attorney failed to comply with the deadline and the EEOC dismissed her complaint. The district court dismissed a complaint of disability discrimination. The First Circuit affirmed. Both the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, require exhaustion of administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not establish the factors required to toll the time limit: she and her attorney were aware of the limitation period; no motion for appointment of counsel was pending; the court did not lead plaintiff to believe she had done everything required; and no affirmative misconduct by the VA had lulled her into inaction.

In 2005, plaintiffs, residents of Puerto Rico, contracted with defendants, Florida corporations, to purchase condominiums to be built in Florida, and submitted earnest money. Because of the financial crisis, the units were not completed and defendant terminated the agreements. Plaintiffs sued for return of the earnest money. The district court dismissed, finding the defendants did not have minimum contacts with Puerto Rico necessary to establish jurisdiction. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that there certain contacts that could establish jurisdiction that were not adequately addressed at trial.