Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Until 2005, when the Puerto Rico Board of Medical Examiners promulgated a first-in-the-nation regulation that limited the practice of cosmetic medicine to particular classes of medical specialists, all licensed physicians in Puerto Rico could perform cosmetic surgery. The Board enforced the regulation against a physician who did not possess the required specialty board certification. The district court disposed of challenges on the ground that the defendants enjoyed various kinds of immunity and did not reach constitutional issues. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the suspension of plaintiff's license amounted to a substantive due process violation and was retaliation for past testimony. The Board afforded due process protections in its hearing process.

Recording companies sought statutory damages and injunctive relief under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101, claiming willful infringement of copyrights of music recordings by using file-sharing software to download and distribute recordings without authorization. The jury found that the infringement was willful and awarded statutory damages of $22,500 for each infringed recording, an award within the statutory range of $750 to $150,000 per infringement. The judge reduced the damages by a factor of ten, reasoning that the award was excessive in violation of defendant's due process rights. The First Circuit affirmed the finding of liability, but reinstated the original damage award. The district court erred in considering the constitutional issue without first addressing defendant's motion for remittitur. The court noted a number of issues concerning application of the Copyright Act that "Congress may wish to examine."

Plaintiff, a small, family-owned firm, with Puerto Rican owners, does construction and related work on electrical utility lines, and had contracts with defendant. Plaintiff's employee was severely electrocuted and burned in accident that occurred while working on an project for defendant and defendant's manager ordered a work stoppage pending investigation, during which the contract expired. OSHA fined plaintiff. When defendant next put contracts out to bid, another company got the primary contract and plaintiff got the secondary contract, which it declined. When re-bidding became necessary, plaintiff did not participate, but filed suit, alleging discrimination in the early termination of the earlier contract and in the award and hostile work environment as well as unfair practices under state law (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 9, 11). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, noting the lack of evidence of racial animus.

The district court declined to enter judgment on on the pleadings, in favor of defendants, in a case under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The complaint alleged that defendants failed to provide medical services to an inmate, who had threatened suicide and engaged in self-destructive behavior, while in custody following a single-car accident.The inmate committed suicide 14 hours after release. The First Circuit reversed. The allegations went beyond the requirements of due process; there was no claim of state-created or augmented risk, and 14 hours at liberty is not reasonably compatible with any claim that normal sources of support were effectively blocked.

In 1979, plaintiff began developing proprietary aircraft maintenance tracking software; it has continually modified the source code for the software. Source code is the original version of a computer program that is written in human-readable words and symbols and must be compiled into machine-readable object code before a computer can read and execute the software. A program in source code format can be modified by a programmer, whereas a program in object code format cannot be easily modified. Plaintiff began licensing the software to defendant in 1986, limited to use in object code format, and registered four versions of the source code with the U.S. Copyright Office in 2003. After discovering unlicensed versions on defendant's computers, plaintiff brought an infringement action. The district court entered summary judgment for defendant. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff, by comparing what was found on defendant's computers to the 2009 version of its source code, did not produce sufficient evidence of "substantial similarity" between the copyrighted material and the allegedly infringing material.

In 1996, when their company (LS&H) was bought out, defendants signed confidentiality and non-competition agreements for a term of "12 months after termination of my employment with LS&H;" each was paid $2,500 for signing the agreements, which were assignable and contemplated the sale. Each defendant accepted employment with the buyer, but refused to sign a new noncompetition agreement. They continued to work, even after the buyer merged with OfficeMax, until they were terminated in 2009 and 2010. Each found work doing essentially what they had done in the past. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting defendants from selling office supplies. The First Circuit vacated. The contract is unambiguous; the triggering date for the noncompetition provision is termination of employment from LS&H. OfficeMax has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

In 2000 defendant and others robbed a warehouse. In an ensuing gunfight, one robber was killed and defendant was wounded. Defendant was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); aiding and abetting unlawful carrying and use of a firearm during and in relation to the robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and aiding and abetting the death of an accomplice in commission of an armed robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(j). The First Circuit vacated the sentence. On remand, the district court rejected defendant's lesser included offense argument, request for a mitigating role adjustment, and request for a reduced sentence based on post-offense rehabilitation, but granted reduction of the base offense level (from 43 to 38), noting the lack of evidence that defendant intended to kill his accomplice. It imposed a 240-month sentence on count 3, a concurrent 50-month sentence on count 1, and a consecutive five-year sentence on count 2, stating that it had evaluated the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The First Circuit affirmed convictions on counts 1 and 3, but vacated on count 2 and remanded. Conviction under section 924(j) necessarily includes a finding that the defendant violated section 924(c) and there was no evidence that Congress intended cumulative punishments.

A company that provides employee training filed suit against a client, claiming breach of contract based both on alleged failure to pay a gain sharing fee and breach of confidentiality provisions.It sought an accounting for disclosures or uses of its materials inconsistent with the copyright license provided by the agreement. The court granted summary judgment for the client. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the training company did not support its figures with respect to the fee or the breach of confidentiality.

Plaintiff, a sales representative for the company and member of the National Guard was deployed to Iraq. When he returned, the company told him there were no positions available. The company eventually offered, and plaintiff accepted, a much lower position, but later terminated plaintiff for absenteeism. The district court awarded damages against the company for violating the Uniform Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4311; Massachusetts anti-discrimination law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(1)(D); and the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148 and awarded attorney's fees. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the company. had waived a preemption claim. There wass ample evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the company acted willfully in refusing to reinstate plaintiff in his pre-service position and that its claim of absenteeism was pretextual.

Petitioner was prosecuted and convicted 13 years after the murder of his wife. The evidence suggested that the motive was to obtain control of a small inheritance for drugs and prostitutes. The highest court of Massachusetts denied his petition in accordance with the special procedure for dealing with post-conviction petitions in Section 33E cases (the provision deals with a narrow class of capital cases): a single judge acts as gatekeeper to bar access to the full court on any issue that could have been raised at the time of direct appeal, unless (as a general rule) the relief is sought on a basis that is both new (in the sense of having been unavailable at the time of direct appeal) and substantial. The federal district court denied habeas corpus on the ground that the denial of relief on collateral review by the state court rested on a procedural basis in state law (the gatekeeper’s finding of failure to raise the claim on direct appeal) that was independent of the federal right and adequate to bar further relief: the gatekeeper had acted in accordance with a state rule or practice that was "firmly established and regularly followed." The First Circuit affirmed.