Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, hired in 1998, filed suit alleging sexual harassment (42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Puerto Rico Anti-Discrimination Act, P.R. Laws tit. 29, 146) by his supervisor in 2001. The case languished for several years before the district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit vacated. Plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination under a hostile work environment theory. He also established the elements of retaliation for his actions in reporting the supervisor's conduct and the company did not allege legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the conduct of its managers.

Customs and Border Patrol officers seized more than two kilograms of heroin and 96 kilograms of cocaine from defendant's vehicle during a border search conducted upon his return to Puerto Rico from the Dominican Republic. Convicted of intentionally possessing heroin and cocaine with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)) and intentionally importing heroin and cocaine to the U.S. heroin and cocaine (21 U.S.C. 952(a) and 960(b)(1)(A), (B)), defendant was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support conviction. The court properly denied a motion to suppress; probable cause was supported by evidence of alterations to the car, inconsistent answers to questions, a canine inspection, and abnormal scan results. The court properly instructed the jury on a willful blindness theory and properly denied a request for an offense-level reduction for playing a minor role in the criminal activity.

A six-year-old boy, with profound hearing impairment, was furnished with transportation to and from school as part of his individualized education program. The school district contracts with a private company for bus service. The boy alleged sexual abuse by a bus driver. The family sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681-1688. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The Section 1983 claim was properly rejected because transportation to and from school is not an exclusive state function; defendants did not act under color of state law. The Title IX claim failed because it is not clear that the "appropriate person," with the authority to take disciplinary action against the bus driver, actually knew about the alleged harassment and exhibited deliberate indifference toward it.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on claims of sexual harassment, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151(B) and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; retaliation, in violation of Title VII, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; and state common law claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent failure to provide a safe working environment, and breach of contract. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff failed to show that the defendant company controlled the manner and means of her work so that she was its employee.

In 2005, federal agents executed a search warrant on the residence of a fugitive felon, thought to be dangerous. That house was near the property of plaintiff's parents. The complaint alleges that unnamed agents assaulted plaintiff, pushed him to the ground, handcuffed him, and detained him for about four hours without explanation. Although defendant was in charge of the operation, he was not present during the operation and had no personal contact with plaintiff. The district court dismissed official capacity claims against defendant and unnamed agents, but it denied the motion as to personal capacity claims. The First Circuit reversed and directed entry of judgment for defendant, holding that the pleadings were insufficient under the Supreme Court's Iqbal decision. There were no facts to support that defendant participated in or directed plaintiff's detention

The executor paid estate taxes in October, 2003, and filed the estate tax return in September, 2004, but the IRS denied a second extension request and he did not file an amended return and refund request for overpaid estate taxes in the amount of $237,813.48 until September, 2007. The IRS denied the claim on the ground that the refund sought was outside the three-year look-back period set forth in 26 U.S.C. 6511(b)(2)(A). The district court dismissed and the First Circuit affirmed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The IRS correctly determined that it did not have the authority to and did not grant a second six-month extension. While the regulations do not explicitly say that there may be only one extension for executors who are not abroad, they provide for only one automatic extension. An equitable estoppel claim is not available and would have no merit.

After defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute narcotics, (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846), the district court sentenced him to 84 months in prison and four years of supervised release. Less than halfway through supervised release, he violated conditions. The district court revoked and sentenced him to an additional 11 months in prison, to be followed by a new two-year period of supervised release. He served the incarcerative portion of the sentence, but again violated release conditions. Defendant conceded the violations. The court revoked supervision, and imposed a sentence of 24 months in prison. In explaining its rationale for eschewing the GSR (five to eleven months), the court noted that the guidelines were merely advisory and defendant's "history of non-compliance." The First Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no claim of procedural error and that the district court was within its discretion, given its reasons.

The family owned property and lived in Newburyport, but enrolled their son in school in Stamford, Connecticut during the 2008-2009 school year. His mother rented an apartment in Connecticut and on weekends returned to a Newburyport. The family gave up the Newburyport residence and moved to Connecticut in fall, 2009. The First Circuit vacated rulings in favor of the school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400-1482, which requires an education authority to provide an Individualized Education Plan for the benefit of any child with a disability. The district court misread the claims as moot. The claims are fairly read as saying that a procedural inadequacy, untimeliness, compromised plaintiffs' son's right to a guaranteed education. Newburyport had no obligation to draft a 2009 IEP for a nonresident, but the parents sought tuition reimbursement for the 2008-09 school year.

Plaintiff worked for the authority for 22 years while receiving treatment for schizophrenia, a condition diagnosed more than 30 years earlier. He received excellent evaluations. He claims that, beginning in 2005, his supervisors made plaintiff's life difficult in retaliation for his union activities. In 2006, plaintiff was barred from working until evaluated by a psychiatrist and was not allowed to work, even after a satisfactory report was received. The district court dismissed all claims. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The complaint did not articulate due process violations to support claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court vacated dismissal of an Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 claim. Although the complaint did not allege that schizophrenia substantially limited any aspect of plaintiff's life, the allegations did support a claim that the employer regarded him as substantially impaired in either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, as compared with the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. Cases against the supervisors were properly dismissed; the Act reaches only the conduct of employers and does not impose liability on co-workers.

After pleading guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute significant amounts of cocaine, crack, and marijuana, defendant moved to withdraw his plea as involuntary due to his excessive consumption of prescription drugs, lack of sleep, familial coercion, and history of bipolar disorder. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him to 380 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, bypassing an argument that appeal was barred by a plea provision waiving his right to appeal. Defendant's sworn statement were so lacking in detail and corroboration, the district court was justified in relying on the change-of-plea colloquy and signed plea agreement to deny the motion, and in doing so without an evidentiary hearing. The court noted the "suspect" timing of the motion, after receipt of an unfavorable sentencing report.