Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff obtained a mortgage in 1999 and refinanced four times over six years, each time pulling out more equity. The last refinancing and a mortgage obtained for a new house, (the first house was for sale), were based on documents inaccurately describing plaintiff's income and position. Plaintiff, who claimed to be unaware of the inaccurate information, defaulted on payments. The district court rejected his suit, alleging a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (unfair or deceptive practices), unjust enrichment, a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and entitlement to rescission of the loan and an injunction ordering the removal of the loan from his credit history. The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the covenant claim relating to one loan, the negligence claim, and the rescission/equitable relief claim, but vacated dismissal of the other claims. Whether plaintiff or the loan officer deliberately falsified the loan application and whether default was foreseeable are questions of fact suitable for trial.

The hospital engaged a contractor for renovations and expansion. Before occupancy the hospital noted problems with the flooring in operating rooms; the contractor completed some repairs. After the project was complete, new problems continued to appear and the contractor repeatedly repaired the floors. All of the problems documented by January 2005, the expiration of a one-year warranty period, were repaired. The contractor continued to perform repairs through early 2006, when the hospital conducted its own investigation and replaced the floors at a cost of $398,070, without involving the contractor. The cost was higher than the original installation because of the need for containment systems so that the facility could continue to operate. A jury awarded $331,835 in damages on the warranty plus pre-judgment interest. The First Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that the problems were due to faulty workmanship or materials for which the contractor was responsible under the warranty, that the hospital properly invoked the warranty, and that the hospital was not required to give the contractor the option of doing the job.

In 2005, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to six months in prison and 36 months of supervised release, subject to conditions. In 2008, the district court tightened the conditions, which, in 2010, defendant was found to have violated by lying to his probation officer about his activities and by failing to take part in a course of therapy for sex offenders, after being suspended for lying to those conducting the course. Acting under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the district court revoked supervised release and resentenced the defendant to 22 months followed by further supervised release. Federal advisory sentencing guidelines recommended imprisonment of three to nine months after such a violation, but the district court imposed the longer prison sentence so that defendant would have time to take part in a course of sex therapy at a nearby federal prison and in light of defendant's behavior. The First Circuit vacated, holding that rehabilitation is not a consideration in resentencing.

Defendant was sentenced to 360 months in prison and five years supervised release following conviction for involvement in a scheme to import large quantities of cocaine into Puerto Rico. The First Circuit affirmed. Although defendant's attempt at flight was brief and did not involve high speeds, it did create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, justifying section 3C1.2 sentence enhancement. The record was adequate to support a finder that defendant was leader or organizer for purposes of enhancement under section 3B1.1(a).

In a suit under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 106, described by the court as the equivalent of hand-to-hand combat, the plaintiff settled with some defendants for $30,000. After trial plaintiff obtained injunctive relief and statutory damages in the amount of $40,000 against others, offset by the $30,000 settlement. The court awarded $98,745 in attorney fees; a motion for costs, initially denied, remained pending. The First Circuit affirmed, first noting that the district court had cured a jurisdictional defect by awarding $3,413.05 in costs. The district court correctly applied the lodestar method. Although the fees exceed the award, the violation was willful and the injunctive relief may be worth more that the award of damages. While a rejected Rule 68 offer, not improved upon at trial, obligates the plaintiff to pay the defense costs incurred subsequent to the rejection the offer plaintiff made before trial was not a Rule 68 offer.