Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, defendant had the used boat inspected. Although he could not test the engine, a certified marine surveyor concluded that the boat was good for cruising around Puerto Rico and coastal waters. Plaintiff, a first-time boat owner, purchased the boat "as is" for $38,000. During the next few years there were a number of problems; all repairs were done by defendant. Plaintiff paid $16,139.34 for repairs, $3,195.20 for towage and $2,990.00 for wharfage and insurance. During a period of 32 months, the boat was undergoing service or was otherwise unuseable for about nine months. Plaintiff filed claims under admiralty law and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code. The district court found that defendant breached its duty to a workmanlike performance upon which plaintiffs had a right to rely. The First Circuit reversed. Defendant was not liable; there was no evidence that its acts or omissions were the cause of the chronic problems. The court also vacated the award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress and pain and suffering under state law.

Alleging violations of the First Amendment, Equal Protection (42 U.S.C. 1983), and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, an Orthodox Jewish former inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison, challenged a rule requiring inmates to be clean-shaven, unless they obtain a waiver based on medical condition or religious beliefs. With a waiver, an inmate may maintain a 1/4-inch neatly-trimmed beard. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison. The First Circuit affirmed. Although the plaintiff has been released, the claims are not moot. The rule is related to the prison's substantial interests in hygiene, easy identification of prisoners, and preventing concealment of weapons and contraband and those goals cannot be readily achieved by other means. The rule meets the RLUIPA "least restrictive means" test. The prison provides alternative means of expressing religious beliefs. While inmates in some high-security units go one-two weeks without shaving, the different treatment is justified.

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against a hospital network and senior executives, claiming to represent more than 12,000 employees deprived of compensation for work performed during their meal break, for work performed before and after shifts, and for time spent attending training sessions, based on the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148; the Massachusetts Minimum Fair Wages Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, 1A and 15--or breach of contract or implied contract; money had and received; quantum meruit/unjust enrichment; fraud; negligent misrepresentation; conversion; equitable and promissory estoppel. Defendants claimed that the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, precluded state law claims. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, stating that the district court. It is not clear that either named plaintiff is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.

Plaintiff, a resident of Nevada, negotiated an oral contract with defendant, a citizen and resident of Israel. Defendant worked for one of plaintiff's companies, a Delaware corporation with offices in Massachusetts and Israel, from 1996-2000 and claimed that the agreement entitled him to a 12 percent investment in plaintiff's casino venture. Plaintiff claimed that defendant was entitled to 12 percent of net from high-tech sector investments recommended by defendant and filed a declaratory judgment action. On remand after reversal of dismissal for forum non conveniens, the district court ruled in favor of plaintiff. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that defendant's contacts with Massachusetts were sufficient for jurisdiction. The district court properly placed the burden of proof on defendant, the natural plaintiff who would have had the burden of proving his affirmative claim to the 12 percent option in a damages action; the burden of proof was, nonetheless, not dispositive. The record supported the finding that there was no meeting of minds on the option.

Former employees of defendants participated in the Capital Accumulation Plan, under which they received portions of their earned commissions in the form of Citigroup stock, received at a 25% discount and on a tax-deferred basis. The stock was subject to a two-year vesting period during which transfer was restricted and rights would be forfeited if the employee resigned. Plaintiffs alleged that the CAP forfeiture provision violated the Colorado Wage Claim Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. 8-4-103 and Louisiana's labor statute, La. Rev. Stat. 23:631(A)(1)(a), 23:634(A) and breach of employment contracts, breach of the CAP contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed, based on a previous decision involving similarly-situated plaintiffs. The First Circuit affirmed. The Colorado law applies only to compensation that is "earned, vested, and determinable." The Louisiana law does not apply because the stock was not "then due" when the plaintiffs resigned. There was no breach of contract, hence no conversion; the claims of unjust enrichment failed because of the existence of a contract.

The FAA issued permits for modernization of the mixed-use Hanscom airport near the historic towns of Lexington and Concord. Opponents raised challenges under the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 303(c), the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470f, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. The First Circuit rejected the challenges. The FAA adequately examined alternatives; the determination that none would be prudent was reasonable. The agency went beyond considering reasonably foreseeable impacts and considered worst case scenarios.

A commercial fisherman was convicted on multiple drug trafficking counts and sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment based on three shipments of drugs, two of cocaine and a third of cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy, by boat from the Dominican Republic into Puerto Rico. The prosecution rested almost exclusively on testimony by three cooperating witnesses, two of whom identified defendant as the individual who facilitated the delivery of the drugs from boat to shore. The First Circuit remanded for a new trial because of a number of evidentiary errors. Applying the "cumulative error" doctrine, the court noted that there was no physical evidence linking defendant to the drugs or delivery boats and no video or photographic surveillance or audio recordings. The erroneous ruling substantially interfered with the defenses' ability to impeach the cooperating witnesses and establish mistaken identity.

The former governor and former financial director of the Tribe were convicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. 371), and of violations of 18 U.S.C. 287, 666 and 669, involving misuse of federal grant and tribal monies at the Passamaquoddy Tribe Indian Township Reservation in Maine. The First Circuit vacated the conviction of the financial director for making material misstatements about how grant money intended for HIV and substance abuse prevention was spent, but otherwise affirmed. The evidence that the director knew that his statements were false was insufficient. The district court had jurisdiction; several counts involved mismanagement of federal grants and contracts, which are subject to regulations that the Tribe is not free to ignore, and do not constitute internal tribal matters.

The former (2001-2006) Assistant Secretary of State for Protocol Affairs at the Puerto Rico State Department sued the Secretary of State under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the official fired him due to his political affiliation. The district court dismissed, holding that plaintiff could be terminated without cause because he held a trust position for which party affiliation was an appropriate qualification, and fined plaintiff's attorneys $1000 each, concluding that the pleadings and responses that they submitted violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). The First Circuit affirmed; plaintiff's position was not federally protected against political discrimination. The pleadings at issue consisted, in large part, of speculation and conclusory allegations lacking evidentiary support.

Plaintiff claimed that her employer since 1990, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, when it failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations (flexible schedule) for her chronic fatigue syndrome disabilities and retaliated against her, including by terminating her employment, for engaging in protected activities. The district court granted the Ports Authority's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that a reasonable jury could have found facts supporting plaintiff's claims. The district court erred finding that plaintiff was not "qualified" under the ADA without considering that the accommodation she requested was a flexible schedule.