Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The company is being sued for sending commercial fax messages without consent from the recipients in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b). Its insurers deny that coverage for "making known to any person or organization covered material that violates a personâs right of privacy" extends to liability under the Act. The First Circuit applied Massachusetts law and reversed the district court's declaratory judgment in favor of the insured company. The policy covers disclosure, not intrusion into privacy described by the Act.

In 2000, the petitioner attempted to enter the United States on a false passport, refused to reveal her true identity, and stated that she had no fear of returning to Cambodia. In 2002 she entered on a six-month visitor visa. In 2003 she filed a petition for asylum; in 2004 a notice of removability issued. An immigration judge denied the petition. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the First Circuit rejected appeals. The petitioner did not corroborate her testimony; there was no evidence that family members remaining in Cambodia suffered persecution. Even accepting testimony that she was raped by police officers, there was no evidence that the rapes were politically motivated or amounted to persecution.

After a tip led them to a website containing the male defendant's phone number and pornographic pictures of the female defendant's eight-year-old daughter, the police obtained a warrant and searched the woman's home. They seized electronics containing pornographic images; the woman admitted to abuse of the girl. The district court denied a motion to suppress. The male defendant was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment; the mother was sentenced to 27 years. Each was ordered to pay $67,600 in restitution. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The defendants had an expectation of privacy on their password-protected website, which was searched without a warrant. It is not clear whether they shared the password with others and risked loss of privacy; whether the police search exceeded the tipster's private search; whether the tipster was assisted by authorities; whether the police expected to find something significant beyond pornography described by the tipster; whether the police had a reasonable belief that harm was imminent; or whether the evidence would have inevitably been discovered independently. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a "Franks" hearing, based on its finding that the tipster's affidavit established a link between the pornography and the female defendant's home.

The defendant pled guilty to being a felon-in-possession, (18 U.S.C. 922), and was sentenced on April 14, 2010, to 110 months imprisonment. On April 7, 2010, the U.S. Sentencing Commission had voted to eliminate the use of "recency" points in calculating sentences; the amendment became effective on November 1, 2010 and is not listed as retroactive. Had the amendment applied, the defendant's criminal history category would have been CHC V, instead of CHC VI, and his guideline sentencing range would have been 100-120 months, rather than 110-120 months. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court acted within its discretion and did not find that the defendant's criminal history was overstated, referring to his persistent and unrelenting criminal violence. The defendant already "got a break;" he could have been charged with a drug offense and as a career criminal.

The defendant was convicted under the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. 228. The First Circuit upheld a jury instruction that he could be found guilty if the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he was able to pay at least a portion of his support obligation but failed to do so, rejecting an argument that the Act only imposes criminal liability where the defendant is able to pay the entire amount due but fails to do so. The court also upheld a jury instruction explaining the requirement that the outstanding child support debt be greater than $10,000 or remain unpaid for longer than two years.

The employee claimed sex and disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the employer's motion to compel arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed. The company established the existence of a valid agreement. The court rejected an argument that the Spanish translation differed from the English version and held that the mutual obligation to arbitrate is supported by consideration. Claims under Title VII and the ADA are subject to arbitration; a contract reference to remedies available under the employer's rules is ambiguous and could be interpreted as allowing all of the remedies provided by the statutes. The employee, having signed a receipt, had adequate notice of the obligation to arbitrate.

The contractor first obtained a certificate required to bid on public construction projects in 1994. In 2008, after the company was declared the lowest bidder on a school project, the state agency received information that the company had included false information on its 2007 renewal application. The agency decertified the company and it lost the bid. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit vacated for lack of jurisdiction. The company had failed to amend its complaint to name individual defendants and the state agency, the only defendant in the case, is shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court noted the complexity of the Fourteenth Amendment property interest issue.

Defendants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), a law that prohibits individuals convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" from possessing, shipping, or receiving firearms, based on prior misdemeanor offense under Maine's simple assault statute. The First Circuit affirmed. The federal statute does not include a mens rea requirement, so a predicate crime of domestic violence based on reckless behavior satisfies the statute. The statute is not ambiguous so as to require lenient interpretation. Rejecting a Second Amendment argument, the court analogized the federal felon disqualification. The prohibition has a substantial relationship to an important government interest.