Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a permit issued by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), the developer built 26 of 79 planned homes and installed infrastructure between 1992 and 2007. The Rhode Island Historic Preservation and Heritage Commission (HPHC) became interested in the site and recommended withdrawal of the permit or requiring a complete archaeological data recovery project. In 2009, after informal negotiations, the developer notified the HPHC that it would resume construction absent some response from the agencies. The developer resumed construction and a stop-work order issued. CRMC hearings are ongoing. The district court dismissed the developer's takings claims as unripe, rejecting an argument that the state litigation requirement was excused; that argument was foreclosed by a binding First Circuit holding that Rhode Island's procedures were available and adequate. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the developer did not prove that state remedies were unavailable or inadequate.

The doctor administered a standard withdrawal protocol for the plaintiff, a heroin addict, while he was in pre-trial detention. The district court rejected plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on his suffering during withdrawal. The First Circuit affirmed. The doctor's misjudgment, even neglect, during the course of treatment, did not amount to "deliberate indifference." The plaintiff's allegations concerning about "pervasive filth" in his cell because of his vomiting and diarrhea during withdrawal did not establish deliberate indifference by the doctor.

Upon release from incarceration, the defendant was notified of the requirement that he register as a sex offender. Although he initially complied, he was twice convicted of failure to register under Rhode Island law. In 2007 the defendant moved to Maine and failed to notify authorities of his address change and failed to register. He was convicted under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16913, and sentenced to 85 months incarceration. The First Circuit affirmed. The Act requires that the government prove only general intent, that the defendant was aware of his failure to register; the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

In 2005 American Airlines began charging passengers a fee of $2 for each bag checked with porters providing curbside service (skycaps) at Logan Airport. Gratuities fell significantly, despite the posting of signs intended to clarify that the fee was not a tip. Skycaps sued and a jury awarded damages for tortious interference with economic advantage and for violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 152A, which provides that no employer may demand or accept from any service employee any payment or deduction from a tip or service charge given to a service employee by a patron. The First Circuit reversed, noting that violation of the tips statute was the basis of damages itself and served as the improper conduct on which the jury based its tortious interference verdict. That statute is preempted by federal law; it is "related to" both price and service and it favors Massachusetts working for the national operation.

In 1983 defendant was convicted of rape of a child, robbery, and kidnapping. After release from prison, he was involuntarily committed in 2003 in a civil proceeding, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, 14, to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons, where such persons are held without limit until adjudged safe for release. Defendant is anatomically male but suffers from gender identity disorder(GID), a psychological condition involving strong identification with the other gender. The Center has resisted demands for female hormones and clothing and defendant recently sought to castrate herself with a razor blade. The district court ordered the Center to begin hormone therapy, The Center concedes that defendant needs treatment and that hormone therapy has been recommended as medically necessary, but says that security concerns reasonably underpin its refusal. The First Circuit affirmed, noting that those under civil commitment are entitled to an extra margin of protection and that punishment of the defendant's behavior and the defendant's risky behavior are not determinative. Regardless of motives, the Center failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment; the court noted its history of delays, poor explanations, missteps, changes in position, and rigidities.

Three providers of wireless service filed suit under the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c), after the town denied one provider a variance for a telecommunications tower. The suit is still pending, but the town entered into a consent decree to allow the proposed 100-foot tower without further hearings. Over objections by neighboring owners, the district court approved the agreement. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the neighbors cannot prevent the town from abandoning its defense and settling, but did have standing to oppose the entry of the consent order, based on their interest in enforcement of zoning laws.

In the defendant's trial for second-degree child molestation, the state trial court admitted evidence that the defendant had molested two other young men. The court found that the prior bad acts were sufficiently similar to the crime charged to show a scheme, modus operandi, or common plan to molest young boys in the defendant's home and that the probative worth of this evidence outweighed any unfairly prejudicial effect. The state supreme court affirmed defendant's conviction. The federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed. The defendant did not exhaust state remedies; in his state appeal he cited no specific constitutional provision, tendered no substantive federal claim, and relied on no federal constitutional precedent. Rejecting the merits of the claim, the court noted that the Supreme Court has not laid down a governing rule concerning the admission of prior bad acts evidence and held that admitting the evidence was not so arbitrary as to deny defendant a fair trial.

Defendant, convicted of knowingly possessing firearms after having been committed to a mental institution (18 U.S.C. 922(g)) and knowingly possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number (18 U.S.C. 922(k)), was sentenced to two years imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in finding the defendant competent; it relied on an unobjected-to forensic evaluation by treating professionals and defendant's own assertions and those of her attorney. Defendant's strange and ill-advised conduct and behavior did not mandate a finding of incompetence. The court properly denied a motion to suppress; it reasonably concluded that defendant's gesture to the headboard in which the guns were located, while answering "yes" to whether she had weapons demonstrated that she understood the officer intended not only to learn of the existence of the weapons, but also to find them. Her consent to the search and her waiver of a jury trial were voluntary.

After a 2003 oil spill, Massachusetts enacted an Oil Spill Prevention Act (MOSPA), which the federal government challenged as preempted by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1221-1232 and parts of 46 U.S.C.) and Coast Guard regulations. While the case was pending on remand, the Coast Guard enacted a regulation pertaining to navigation on Buzzards Bay, which is claimed to expressly preempt MOSPA. The district court entered an injunction prohibiting enforcement of certain provisions of MOSPA. The First Circuit again reversed and remanded. The Coast Guard's reliance on a categorical exclusion and failure to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4332; its finding that the rule was not likely to be highly controversial was arbitrary. The error was not harmless. Because the rule is invalid, the court did not address preemption.

The defendants, arrested in a reverse sting operation after they drove to a sham drug deal in a vehicle containing $100,000 in cash, were each convicted of a single drug conspiracy count. The First Circuit vacated and remanded. The court first acknowledged that, taking into account only unchallenged evidence, the record was sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was more than an innocent bystander to the transaction. However, tainted evidence was central to the prosecution's case and potentially disastrous to the defense. The court erred in allowing "overview" testimony by the lead officer, announcing the defendants' roles in the conspiracy, although the officer was not a witness to many of the events; the witness was no better suited than the jury to put the pieces together. The testimony also implicitly "vouched" for later testimony. The officer's testimony about the post-arrest interview statements of a third defendant, who offered to cooperate, violated the Confrontation Clause, even though the cooperating defendant was not directly quoted.