Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jonathan López-Díaz pleaded guilty in 2014 to bank robbery and illegal possession of a firearm, serving ninety-three months in prison. After release, he began supervised release but repeatedly violated its conditions, including multiple positive drug tests for cocaine and marijuana and admitted drug use. The United States Probation Office reported additional violations, such as failing to follow instructions, not reporting law enforcement contacts, and missing treatment appointments. After these repeated violations, the district court revoked his supervised release twice, ultimately sentencing him to twelve months’ imprisonment with no further supervised release following his second revocation.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico originally handled López’s supervised release and revocation proceedings. After López’s second revocation, his counsel argued at the revocation hearing that his violations should be classified as Grade C rather than Grade B under the Sentencing Guidelines, which would result in a lower advisory sentencing range. Counsel also argued for leniency and additional supervision with rehabilitative conditions rather than incarceration. The government contended that López’s conduct constituted a Grade B violation, given his admissions and repeated positive drug tests, and requested imprisonment without further supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed López’s appeal. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the court held that the district court correctly classified López’s violation as a Grade B violation based on his admissions and corroborating evidence. The First Circuit further found the district court’s sentencing rationale did not improperly rely on retributive factors barred by Esteras v. United States, and that the imposed sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court affirmed López’s twelve-month sentence with no term of supervision to follow. View "US v. Lopez-Diaz" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Thomas Marshall, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against federal officials after being denied the ability to purchase a firearm due to prior Massachusetts convictions for driving under the influence, an offense punishable by more than one year in prison. Marshall alleged that the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and related regulations violated his Second Amendment rights, as he wished to purchase and possess firearms for self-defense but feared prosecution under federal law.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire found that Marshall had Article III standing, since his requested relief would redress his inability to obtain a firearm. However, the District Court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that the First Circuit’s pre-Bruen precedent in United States v. Torres-Rosario remained binding and foreclosed as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1), except in cases involving particularly minor convictions. The court concluded that Marshall’s repeated DUI convictions did not fall within the exception and thus precluded his challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the District Court’s reliance on Torres-Rosario was no longer controlling in light of recent developments, including the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, which established a new framework for Second Amendment claims. The First Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the lower court to apply the Bruen framework to Marshall’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge, taking into account recent regulatory changes affecting restoration of firearm rights for prohibited persons. View "Marshall v. Blanche" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted in 2019 for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine within a protected location and sentenced to time served plus six years of supervised release. After admitting to supervised release violations in 2023, he received an eighteen-month prison term and a new four-year supervised release. Eight months into this second term, his probation officer alleged several violations, including positive drug tests, missed therapy appointments, failure to report an address change, aggressive conduct towards the probation officer, and being present during an arrest involving firearms.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico conducted a preliminary revocation hearing, where the defendant did not contest certain drug-related violations and missed treatment sessions. The magistrate judge found probable cause for these violations, as well as for constructive possession of firearms found in the vehicle, but not for other allegations such as a third firearm in the trunk or cash in the car. At the final revocation hearing, the defendant initially sought to contest all violations, but after a procedural exchange, he proceeded only with the violations he had contested at the preliminary hearing. The district court ultimately found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had committed drug-related violations and failed to attend therapy, but not that he possessed firearms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the revocation of supervised release, concluding the defendant had not established legal or constitutional error regarding his ability to contest the allegations. However, the court vacated the twenty-four-month sentence and remanded for resentencing. The appellate court held that the district court improperly relied on excluded factors such as “the seriousness of the offenses” and “lack of respect for the law” when imposing the revocation sentence, contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent guidance. View "US v. Bayron-Ramos" on Justia Law

A company operating an online shopping platform entered into settlement agreements with two other companies that had previously brought legal claims against it. An intellectual property lawyer, representing these companies, negotiated and personally signed two provisions in each agreement. The lawyer represented that neither he nor his firm had clients intending to sue the shopping platform, but reserved the right to represent future clients. Shortly after the agreements were effective, the lawyer allegedly advertised for new clients to sue the shopping platform and threatened new litigation on behalf of additional clients.Following these events, the shopping platform filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging claims such as intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The defendants, including the lawyer and his clients, moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, with some also moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, dismissing the complaint on the merits, and awarded attorney fees to some defendants. The court explicitly chose not to address the personal jurisdiction challenges raised by certain defendants.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a federal court may not reach the merits of a case without first determining that it has personal jurisdiction over the parties. Because the district court dismissed the case on the merits without resolving the personal jurisdiction issues, the First Circuit vacated the orders and judgment below and remanded the case. The district court was instructed to first resolve the motions challenging personal jurisdiction before considering the merits or other remedies. Each party was ordered to bear its own appellate costs. View "Whaleco Inc. v. Gluck" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident on May 23, 2020, when a compulsory marine pilot, Sean Bogus, was dispatched by Northeast Marine Pilots, Inc. to guide the vessel KOMMANDOR SUSAN, owned by Hays Ships Ltd., out of the Port of New Bedford, Massachusetts. During the departure, the vessel, under Bogus’s navigation, struck a hurricane barrier, causing substantial damage to both the vessel and the barrier. Codan Forsikring, as insurer and subrogee for Hays Ships Ltd., paid to resolve claims and repair the vessel and then brought suit against Bogus and Northeast Marine Pilots, Inc., alleging negligence, indemnity, and contribution, among other claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted in part Northeast Marine Pilots’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding that Codan’s complaint did not plausibly allege that Northeast Marine Pilots was vicariously liable for the pilot’s actions under federal maritime law. The court found that the inability of the association to control a pilot's navigation precluded vicarious liability. The district court dismissed the negligence, indemnity, and contribution claims but allowed contract-based claims to proceed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that under federal maritime law, a pilot association is not vicariously liable for a member pilot’s navigational actions unless the association exercises control over the pilot’s performance of those duties. The court found that the complaint did not allege facts supporting such control. It further explained that Massachusetts's regulatory scheme places control and liability for navigation on the pilot, not the association, and that mere allegations of employment or membership are insufficient without plausible allegations of control over navigation. Thus, the dismissal of the negligence, indemnity, and contribution claims was affirmed. View "Codan Forsikring A/S v. Bogus" on Justia Law

Three former employees of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico alleged they were terminated from their positions—Protocol Officer and Liaison Technician—because of their political affiliations, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The suit was brought against Senate officials in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for alleged unconstitutional patronage dismissals.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially heard the case, which involved numerous plaintiffs and claims, including due process, equal protection, and Puerto Rico law claims. Many claims were dismissed at earlier procedural stages. The claims relevant to this appeal survived summary judgment and concerned only the First Amendment-based damages actions brought by the three former employees. The District Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which was based on qualified immunity, finding there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the plaintiffs’ job duties and whether defendants had considered the nature of those duties before termination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the interlocutory appeal, which focused on the denial of qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The appellate court held that the District Court erred in considering whether the officials had subjectively inquired into the plaintiffs’ job duties, as qualified immunity is an objective standard. However, the First Circuit found no error in the District Court’s other reasoning, ruling that unresolved factual disputes about the nature of the plaintiffs’ job responsibilities precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity. The court also determined that claims against the officials in their personal capacities were not discharged by the Commonwealth’s bankruptcy proceedings under PROMESA. Thus, the District Court’s denial of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Ortiz-Resto v. Rivera-Schatz" on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked remotely as a Senior Data Architect for a health savings account provider beginning in May 2023. She identified security vulnerabilities in a company database and reported these issues to her supervisor, who dismissed her concerns and instructed her to drop the matter. The plaintiff continued to raise these issues with other employees. She also alleged that a project manager made gendered remarks toward her and that other male colleagues used similar language. Over the course of her employment, she was placed on two performance improvement plans (PIPs), received a lower-than-expected bonus, and was eventually excluded from meetings. In April 2024, believing she was being set up for failure and anticipating potential legal claims, she forwarded company documents to her personal email. The company discovered this, placed her on administrative leave, and terminated her for violating internal policy.The plaintiff filed suit in Massachusetts state court, alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and interference with future employment under Title VII and Massachusetts law. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that her allegations did not plausibly show discrimination or retaliation, nor did they identify a well-defined public policy that protected her internal reporting of HIPAA concerns. The plaintiff appealed, abandoning her interference claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed. The court held that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly support claims of sex discrimination or retaliation, as she did not connect the adverse actions to discriminatory motive or show that the employer knew she was engaging in protected conduct. The court also found her wrongful termination claim insufficient, as Massachusetts law does not protect employees from termination for raising general compliance concerns. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Grygiel v. HealthEquity, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of immigration attorneys, a law firm, and a legal services organization challenged practices by the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies involved in immigration enforcement and adjudication. They alleged that the agencies routinely require noncitizens and their counsel to obtain key records through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), rather than providing them directly during immigration proceedings. The plaintiffs claimed this so-called “Nondisclosure Policy” causes delays, omissions, and additional burdens that impede their ability to represent clients effectively and limit their capacity to take on more cases.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case in multiple stages. Initially, the court dismissed claims related to removal proceedings and due process violations, but allowed the APA claim regarding asylum proceedings to proceed. After the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add allegations about ICE’s practices following Dent v. Holder, the court again dismissed the removal-related claims, finding no disclosure obligation in those proceedings. The surviving claim then proceeded to summary judgment, where the district court found insufficient evidence of a formal agency-wide policy and ruled that the government’s use of FOIA did not violate relevant regulations or the APA, granting summary judgment for the government.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their claims. The court determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a uniform, agency-wide Nondisclosure Policy, and concluded their alleged injuries were too speculative and were not sufficiently concrete to confer standing. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman and Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, holding that voluntary expenditures and increased burdens do not, by themselves, amount to an injury in fact. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for the government on the basis of lack of standing. View "Greater Boston Legal Services v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in connection with a large-scale health care fraud scheme involving Arbor Homecare Services LLC, a company she controlled. Over several years, Arbor fraudulently billed Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, MassHealth, for more than $99 million. The government alleged that the defendant orchestrated the scheme, laundered proceeds through domestic and Kenyan financial accounts, and used the funds to acquire properties and businesses. After an initial mistrial, the defendant was retried and convicted by a jury on charges of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, health care fraud, and money laundering. She was sentenced to 144 months in prison, fined $250,000, and ordered to pay restitution.Prior to the retrial, the defendant cycled through numerous attorneys, at times expressing a desire to proceed without counsel and at other times seeking to hire new counsel if her assets were released from civil forfeiture. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted multiple Faretta colloquies, warning her of the risks of self-representation. Ultimately, the court found her waiver of counsel to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and permitted her to proceed pro se with standby counsel. The court also denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained from her cell phone during a border search, finding the search supported by reasonable suspicion.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant argued that her conviction should be reversed due to alleged violations of her right to counsel and due process, and that the cell phone evidence should have been suppressed. She also challenged the calculation of her sentence, disputing the loss amount and the application of a sophisticated-means enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that her waiver of counsel was constitutionally valid, her suppression argument was waived, and her sentencing challenges were either waived or without merit. View "US v. Newton" on Justia Law

A group of current and former policyholders brought a lawsuit in federal court against their automobile insurance companies, alleging that the insurers’ rate-setting practices violated Massachusetts law. The insurers, who serve present and former U.S. military members, determine eligibility for insurance with each affiliate based on the policyholders’ highest military pay grade. The plaintiffs claimed that, by using “income” and “occupation” in this way, the insurers violated state regulations prohibiting such criteria in setting insurance rates. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as restitution for alleged overcharges.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the insurers’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court then certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether the filed rate doctrine bars the relief that the plaintiffs seek. The district court reasoned that some of the requested remedies might not be barred by the doctrine and clarified that the controlling question raised several distinct sub-questions about the application of the doctrine under Massachusetts and federal law. The parties did not seek administrative review of the insurance rates in question, and the Massachusetts Attorney General did not intervene in the administrative or judicial proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Massachusetts law, not the federal filed rate doctrine, governs whether private parties can bring suit under Chapter 93A for alleged violations involving insurance rates approved by the state Commissioner of Insurance. The First Circuit found that there is no controlling precedent under Massachusetts law and certified two questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court regarding whether such private suits are authorized and whether the answer differs by the type of relief sought. The First Circuit retained jurisdiction pending the SJC’s response. View "Wright v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law