Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A grand jury in the District of Maine indicted a noncitizen for knowingly possessing a firearm while being “illegally or unlawfully” in the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). The statute prohibits firearm possession by noncitizens who are not lawfully present in the country. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated his Second Amendment rights both on its face and as applied to him.The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted the motion to dismiss. It held that the defendant was among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, relying in part on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. The court then found that the government failed to demonstrate, under the test established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, that the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation as applied to the defendant. The court concluded that the government had not met its burden because it did not provide direct historical analogues and relied on secondary sources. As a result, the indictment was dismissed, and the government appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s application of the Bruen framework de novo. The First Circuit determined that, even assuming the defendant was protected by the Second Amendment, the government had shown that § 922(g)(5)(A) fits within the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on English common-law practices, colonial and founding-era laws, and analogues disarming groups considered outside the political community. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the statute is constitutional as applied in this case. View "US v. Rebollar Osorio" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico for possessing a firearm while being an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that, as applied to him, the statute violated his Second Amendment rights. The District Court denied his motion, finding that, even assuming the Second Amendment protected him, the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The appellant then pleaded guilty, was sentenced, and timely appealed his conviction, preserving his constitutional challenge.The appeal was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The government argued that the statute did not violate the Second Amendment, both because the appellant was not among “the people” whom the Amendment protects, and because, even if he was, the statute was consistent with historical tradition. The First Circuit, like the District Court, did not resolve whether the Second Amendment’s text covered the appellant, relying instead on the second step of the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.Applying the Bruen framework, as clarified by United States v. Rahimi, the First Circuit held that § 922(g)(5)(A) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court found that historical analogues, including laws disarming those without allegiance to the sovereign, supported the regulation. The court concluded that the government met its burden to show that the statute is relevantly similar to such historical regulations. Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment and rejected the appellant’s Second Amendment challenge. View "US v. Vizcaino-Peguero" on Justia Law

A man originally from Colombia lived in the United States for nearly thirty years under an assumed identity after fleeing his home country in the 1990s. He married a U.S. citizen, raised a family, and applied for naturalization in 2020. During the application process, a fingerprint check revealed that he had been living under an alias. He was, in fact, a person convicted in absentia in Colombia for the aggravated murder of his first wife and the attempted murder of his daughter, crimes committed before he entered the United States. Following this discovery, U.S. authorities initiated removal proceedings, charging him with procuring immigration status by fraud and willful misrepresentation, including using a false identity and failing to disclose prior marriages.An Immigration Judge found him removable based on clear and convincing evidence, including his admissions and documentary proof. The judge denied all forms of relief from removal, such as asylum, statutory withholding, protection under the Convention Against Torture, waiver of inadmissibility, and cancellation of removal. The judge found that serious reasons existed to believe he had committed a serious nonpolitical crime abroad, precluding several forms of relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, also rejecting his claims of judicial bias and his motion to reopen based on new evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petition as to most claims, holding that the findings of removability were supported by substantial evidence, the adverse credibility determinations were reasonable, and the denial of relief was proper given the serious nonpolitical crime bar. The court dismissed the challenges to discretionary relief for lack of jurisdiction and found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to reopen. Thus, his removal to Colombia was upheld. View "Usma Acosta v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Dominican Republic citizen was operating a high-speed vessel in international waters off Puerto Rico with two others when a United States Coast Guard helicopter and cutter approached. After issuing warning shots that failed to stop the vessel, the Coast Guard fired live rounds at the engine, and two bullets struck the plaintiff’s left arm, causing serious, permanent injury. The plaintiff remained on deck for thirty minutes before receiving medical attention and was later airlifted to a hospital in San Juan.After his administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was denied, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. He initially brought constitutional claims against individual Coast Guard officers and a tort claim against the federal government under the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso, but later voluntarily dismissed the constitutional claims. The government moved to dismiss the FTCA claim, arguing the claim was subject to admiralty law and thus exclusively governed by the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA). The magistrate judge recommended dismissal, concluding the FTCA did not apply because the SIAA provided the exclusive remedy. The judge further recommended denying the plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint to add an SIAA claim because it would be time-barred. The district court adopted these recommendations and dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The court held that the plaintiff’s claim arose under maritime jurisdiction and was therefore governed exclusively by the SIAA, not the FTCA. Because the FTCA expressly excludes claims for which a remedy is provided by the SIAA, the plaintiff could not proceed under the FTCA, even if his SIAA claim was time-barred. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Lantigua-Nunez v. US Coast Guard" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant completed a federal prison sentence for a prior firearm conviction and then began supervised release. During this supervised period, he was found in possession of a firearm and ammunition, which led to the initiation of revocation proceedings for violating the terms of his supervised release. Shortly thereafter, a search of his residence yielded additional ammunition. These events resulted in new criminal charges for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The defendant pleaded guilty to the new charge pursuant to a plea agreement and also faced sentencing for the supervised release violations.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced the defendant both for the new § 922(g)(1) offense and for the supervised release violations. The defendant appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (in United States v. Rosa-Borges, 101 F.4th 66 (1st Cir. 2024)) vacated both sentences, finding that the district court had improperly relied on unreliable hearsay from the presentence report. On remand, the district court refused to strike the problematic information from the presentence report but stated it would not rely on it, then reimposed an upwardly variant sentence for the new firearm offense, in part based on the amount and nature of the ammunition. For the supervised release violation, the court imposed a consecutive sentence, finding a Grade A violation.Upon the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the revocation sentence, concluding that the defendant had waived his challenges to that sentence. However, the appellate court vacated the sentence for the § 922(g)(1) conviction, holding that the district court relied on a legally invalid rationale—namely, treating 31 rounds of ammunition as an aggravating factor and referencing unsupported facts about the ammunition’s nature. The case was remanded for resentencing before a different judge. View "United States v. Rosa-Borges" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a regional fishermen’s association and the federal government concerning changes to catch limits for several fish species in the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan. The association, representing commercial fishermen allegedly harmed by reduced catch limits, challenged the legality of the Framework Adjustment 65 Final Rule and its implementing regulations. At the core of the association’s argument was the claim that the involvement of the New England Fishery Management Council in the development of these rules violated the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The association argued that the Council exercised significant authority in the regulatory process but its members were not properly appointed as federal officers.The United States District Court for the District of Maine reviewed the case. It concluded that the association had standing due to the economic injury suffered by its members. The district court rejected the primary constitutional claim, holding that the Council’s role was advisory and final binding authority rested solely with the Secretary of Commerce, who promulgated the regulations. The court did, however, agree with the association in part, finding certain unrelated statutory provisions unconstitutional, but determined that this did not entitle the association to its requested relief. The district court severed those statutory provisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit heard the appeal. After reviewing the statutory framework and the specific facts, the court held that the Council’s role was advisory and did not amount to the exercise of significant federal authority under the Appointments Clause. The harm to the association’s members derived from the Secretary’s independent decision to promulgate the binding regulations, not from the Council’s recommendations. The First Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive and declaratory relief and reversed the district court’s severance of the unrelated statutory provisions. View "New England Fishermen's Stewardship Association v. Lutnick" on Justia Law

A Maine resident who suffers from a rare and incurable form of blood cancer was a long-time customer of an electric utility that uses smart meters emitting radiofrequency signals to track electricity usage. After the utility received regulatory approval, it allowed customers to keep analog meters for an additional fee, citing health and safety concerns that had been raised but not resolved by the state public utilities commission. The resident, concerned that radiofrequency radiation might worsen his cancer symptoms, requested a waiver of the opt-out fee, supported by a letter from his oncologist. The utility denied the waiver, and after the resident refused to pay the fee, his electric service was disconnected.The resident sued in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fair Housing Act. He also claimed the fee constituted an unlawful surcharge under the ADA. The district court denied the utility’s initial motion to dismiss but, after discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of the utility. The district court limited the resident’s expert witnesses to general, not specific, causation testimony, and excluded the opinions of his treating physicians as untimely disclosed expert testimony. The court found a lack of admissible evidence connecting smart meter radiation to the resident’s health, and held the opt-out fee was not an unlawful surcharge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. It held that, without timely, admissible expert evidence of specific causation linking the smart meter’s radiation to a non-speculative risk of harm to the resident’s health, the resident’s claims could not survive summary judgment. The court also held that the opt-out fee was not a discriminatory surcharge because waiver of the fee was not required under the ADA. View "Friedman v. Central Maine Power Company" on Justia Law

In 2010, the petitioner was convicted in a Massachusetts Superior Court of several offenses, including burglary and mayhem, after being identified as the assailant in an attack involving hot cooking oil. The trial was conducted without a jury, and the court sentenced her to ten to eleven years in prison. Her conviction was affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court denied further review. While serving her sentence, federal immigration authorities revoked her permanent resident status and ordered her removal from the United States. After her release from state custody in December 2021, she was detained by federal authorities and deported to Trinidad and Tobago in January 2024.Following her deportation, the petitioner exhausted her state remedies, including a motion for a new trial based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied by the Superior Court and affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court. In March 2024, she filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, naming the Massachusetts Attorney General as the respondent. She claimed her convictions resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged the state court’s handling of new evidence. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that she was not in custody, as required by federal habeas law, at the time of filing.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The First Circuit held that because the petitioner was not in the custody of any Massachusetts official when she filed her habeas petition—and did not name as respondent any official with actual custody—the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear her petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court did not reach other arguments and concluded that dismissal was required. View "St. John v. Campbell" on Justia Law

From December 2019 through May 2021, an individual incarcerated at the Buckingham Correctional Center in Virginia conspired with others, including two Massachusetts-based drug traffickers and a correctional officer, to distribute controlled substances—specifically MDMA and buprenorphine—inside the facility. The proceeds from these transactions were then collected and managed by the group. A federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts indicted the defendant on charges of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The defendant pled guilty to both charges.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts received a presentence investigation report that classified the defendant as a “career offender” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior Virginia felony convictions: use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery and attempted murder. The report also found that the instant conviction for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances qualified as a “controlled substance offense.” The defendant objected, arguing that the firearm conviction was not a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines and that conspiracy to distribute drugs was not a “controlled substance offense.” The district court rejected both arguments and imposed a 121-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the classification of the prior Virginia firearm conviction and the instant drug conspiracy conviction. The court held that the Virginia conviction for use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” under both the enumerated offenses clause and the force clause of the Guidelines. It also held that conspiracy to distribute controlled substances is a “controlled substance offense” under binding First Circuit precedent, finding no basis to depart from this view despite arguments regarding inter-circuit disagreement and recent Supreme Court decisions. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "US v. Mao" on Justia Law

Elizabeth and Cale Putnam, residents of Massachusetts, traveled to the Hotel Valcartier in Québec, Canada, with their five-year-old son, Anthony. While staying at the hotel, an unsecured Murphy bed fell on Anthony, causing fatal injuries. The Putnams had booked their stay at the hotel and its associated Ice Hotel through the hotel’s website, received receipts and marketing communications at their Massachusetts address, and noticed other Massachusetts vehicles at the hotel during their visit.Following Anthony’s death, the Putnams filed a wrongful death lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Premier Parks, LLC, which they believed operated the hotel, and EPR Properties, which they believed owned it. Both Premier and EPR moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, submitting affidavits asserting they neither owned nor operated the hotel, nor marketed or contracted with Massachusetts residents regarding the hotel. The Putnams submitted documentary evidence suggesting connections between Premier, EPR, and the hotel, but the district court dismissed the case with prejudice and denied their request for jurisdictional discovery.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court found that, as to Premier Parks, the Putnams presented enough documentary evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding Premier’s involvement in the hotel’s operations, marketing, and staffing. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying jurisdictional discovery with respect to Premier and reversed the dismissal as to Premier, remanding for discovery. Regarding EPR, the court concluded that the Putnams failed to contradict EPR’s affidavit that it did not own or operate the hotel or market it to Massachusetts residents. The court affirmed the dismissal as to EPR but modified the judgment to be without prejudice. View "Putnam v. EPR Properties" on Justia Law