Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, a noncitizen born in Venezuela who later overstayed a travel visa in the United States, became involved in a drug conspiracy led by her abusive husband. She was charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. Her primary concern throughout the criminal proceedings was remaining in the United States, as she had two children who were U.S. citizens. Her court-appointed counsel assured her that accepting a plea agreement would allow her to "work out" any immigration issues after serving her sentence, despite warnings in the plea agreement and at the plea hearing that she "may" be deported. Relying on this advice, she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release.After completing her sentence, the petitioner received a removal notice, prompting her to seek legal assistance. Upon learning that her conviction rendered her mandatorily removable and permanently inadmissible to the United States, she filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that she had adequately explained her delay in seeking relief, the counsel's advice was constitutionally deficient under Padilla v. Kentucky, and she suffered prejudice because she would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised. The court granted the writ and vacated her conviction, concluding that equitable considerations favored relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of coram nobis relief. Applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error to factual findings, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that the petitioner met all requirements for coram nobis relief: timely explanation for delay, ongoing collateral consequences, fundamental error due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and equitable grounds justifying relief. View "Morillo v. US" on Justia Law

The defendant participated as a street-level drug distributor in a Massachusetts-based organization led by another individual. The organization’s operations involved receiving orders through a leader, who then relayed instructions to distributors such as the defendant. These distributors were provided with cars stocked daily with drugs, which they delivered in user-level quantities to customers. The defendant worked in this role for approximately two months, during which intercepted phone calls and a subsequent police stop resulted in the government attributing responsibility to him for distributing over 300 grams of fentanyl and additional amounts of cocaine. Upon arrest, drugs were found hidden in his car.After pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute forty grams or more of fentanyl, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts calculated a Guidelines Sentencing Range of forty-six to fifty-seven months. Probation recommended a two-level minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), but the court denied this adjustment, reasoning that the defendant did not qualify as substantially less culpable than the average participant and that a recent guideline amendment did not apply to his circumstances. The court imposed a sentence of thirty-six months.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the newly added U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii), which expands the circumstances for minor-role adjustments. The appellate court held that the district court misapplied the guideline by reading into it categorical exclusions for those who possessed more than user-level quantities or who were paid employees in the organization’s business model. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, directing the district court to properly consider the defendant’s primary function based on the totality of the circumstances. View "US v. Vizcaino Vizcaino" on Justia Law

A woman fled Honduras with her partner and daughter after years of harassment and stalking by a man named Jose Funes. Funes sent frequent threatening messages, stalked her at work, threatened her partner’s life, and tried to obtain her whereabouts even after she relocated within Honduras. He also allegedly orchestrated an incident that Alvarado interpreted as an attempted kidnapping of her daughter. Despite reporting these threats to local authorities, police did not intervene. Fearing further harm, the family left Honduras for the United States in 2016, where Funes continued to attempt contact via social media. Alvarado sought mental health treatment in Massachusetts due to ongoing fear.Removal proceedings were initiated in early 2017, and Alvarado applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, with her partner and daughter as derivative applicants. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all claims, finding insufficient corroboration of the alleged kidnapping attempt, questioning her testimony, and determining that the harassment did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ also made an adverse credibility finding regarding her partner’s affidavit. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the adverse credibility finding but upheld the denial of relief, concluding that Alvarado had not established past harm rising to the level of persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the final BIA decision under the substantial evidence standard. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determinations: neither the threats nor the alleged kidnapping attempt compelled a finding of persecution, and Alvarado’s fear of future harm was not objectively reasonable. The court denied the petition for review. View "Alvarado-Hernandez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Lebanese citizen who worked as a physician and educator in the United States traveled to Lebanon to visit family and, upon her return to Boston Logan International Airport, was detained by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers. During inspection, officers reviewed her phone and found photos and videos related to Hezbollah, which is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States. She acknowledged deleting some of the photos before her arrival, explained her religious motivations and familial connections, and denied supporting Hezbollah’s political or military activities. After an interview, CBP officers determined she was inadmissible as an immigrant without valid documents because her intentions could not be verified due to derogatory information found during inspection. She was issued an expedited removal order, her H-1B visa was revoked, and she was returned to Lebanon, subject to a five-year bar on reentry.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed her amended habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review expedited removal orders except in narrow circumstances not present in her case. The district court also concluded that the Suspension Clause did not preserve jurisdiction for her claims and that her remaining arguments fell outside the scope of habeas review permitted under the INA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petitioner’s challenge to the expedited removal order and the revocation of her visa because her claims did not fall within the exceptions enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2). The court further concluded that the Suspension Clause did not require broader habeas review in these circumstances and rejected arguments that her case was distinguishable from binding Supreme Court precedent. View "Alawieh v. Mullin" on Justia Law

Lucas Warner, a young man with a history of seizures and cerebrovascular disease, died after taking a single dose of Aimovig, a biologic drug manufactured by Amgen and approved by the FDA to prevent migraines. His mother, acting as representative of his estate, argued that the drug’s label was inadequate because it failed to disclose that the clinical trials excluded people with histories of seizures and neurological disorders, and did not warn of specific risks for such patients. She contended that this omission was especially relevant to Lucas’s medical circumstances.After Warner filed a wrongful death claim in Massachusetts state court, Amgen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Amgen moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing federal law preempted Warner’s state law claims because Amgen was required to use the FDA-approved label and Warner had not shown Amgen could have unilaterally changed it. At the hearing, Warner sought leave to amend her complaint, alleging newly available studies could have permitted Amgen to update the label using FDA’s Changes Being Effected (CBE) procedure. The district court dismissed the complaint as preempted and denied leave to amend, finding the studies insufficient and the amendment futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of Warner’s original complaint, holding that federal law preempted the claim because Amgen could not unilaterally alter the label during FDA approval, and the FDA would have rejected Warner’s proposed label changes. However, it reversed the denial of leave to amend, holding Warner plausibly alleged that certain studies constituted newly acquired information under the CBE process. The case was remanded for further proceedings limited to Warner’s claims based on this post-approval labeling theory. View "Warner v. Amgen Inc." on Justia Law

Several companies and associations connected to the Maine lobster industry brought a lawsuit against a California nonprofit organization, which operates a seafood rating program. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s public statements and industry reports—advising consumers to avoid American lobster due to risks posed to the endangered North Atlantic right whale—were defamatory and caused substantial financial harm. The statements described the risks in general terms about the American lobster fishery, without naming the plaintiffs individually.After the complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the “group defamation rule” barred the claims because the statements targeted the industry as a whole and not specific members. The defendant also contended that the statements were protected opinion and sought dismissal under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the statements, though directed at the industry, could reasonably be understood to refer to each plaintiff due to their membership and the statements’ factual nature. The court found that exceptions to the group defamation rule applied because the statements implicated every member of the group, included a call to action, and had directly influenced customer decisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The First Circuit held that, under Maine law and the Second Restatement of Torts, the group defamation rule precludes claims by individual members of a large group unless a statement makes particular reference to them. The court concluded that the statements at issue, while they may affect every member, were not actionable because they lacked particular reference to any plaintiff. Accordingly, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Bean Maine Lobster, Inc. v. Monterey Bay Aquarium Foundation" on Justia Law

Federal and state law enforcement investigated a large-scale cocaine trafficking operation led by Patrick Joseph in Massachusetts, which involved mailing parcels containing cocaine from Puerto Rico. Over 300 parcels were identified as connected to the operation, with eleven linked to Robert Monteiro either as recipient or to his residence. Monteiro communicated with Joseph about parcel deliveries, was observed at Joseph’s stash house receiving cocaine, and was implicated by cooperating witness Donald Cue. Officers also found items associated with drug trafficking at Monteiro’s residence and corroborated his prior involvement in a similar conspiracy to import cocaine from Haiti.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over Monteiro’s four-day jury trial. Monteiro was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was sentenced to sixty-nine months’ imprisonment, with the court attributing twenty-two kilograms of cocaine to him based on the parcels identified. Monteiro challenged the admission of evidence, lay opinion testimony, and the sufficiency of the evidence in postconviction motions under Rules 29 and 33. The district court denied these motions, finding ample evidence of knowing and willful participation, and admitted prior bad acts evidence as probative of intent and knowledge.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Monteiro argued errors in the admission of lay opinion testimony, prior bad acts evidence, hearsay, Confrontation Clause violations, and sentencing calculations. The First Circuit reviewed these claims under appropriate standards, finding no reversible error and holding that the lay opinion testimony was admissible, the prior bad acts evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and the evidence was sufficient for conviction. The court affirmed Monteiro’s conviction and sentence. View "US v. Monteiro" on Justia Law

The case involves challenges to a 2024 order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulating communications services provided to incarcerated individuals, following statutory amendments in 2022. The FCC's order imposed rate caps for intrastate, interstate, and international prison communications, regulated the reimbursement of facility costs, excluded site commission payments from rate calculations, prohibited service providers from paying site commissions, preempted state and local laws requiring such payments, allowed alternate pricing plans, and required clearer consumer disclosures. These actions prompted petitions for review from nonprofit organizations, service providers, and state governments, consolidated by the United States Multidistrict Judicial Panel on Litigation and transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.In the lower proceedings, the FCC's imposition of rate caps and prohibition of site commissions were challenged, and the parties disputed whether the First Circuit was the proper venue. The FCC then issued a new order in late 2025, modifying certain aspects of the 2024 order, notably by increasing rate caps to include more safety and security costs. This led to supplemental briefing on mootness. Service providers requested voluntary dismissal of their petitions, state governments argued portions of their petitions were moot, and nonprofit organizations maintained some challenges remained live.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted the voluntary dismissal of service providers' petitions, dismissed portions of state governments' petitions as moot or for lack of jurisdiction (including constitutional challenges not raised before the FCC), and denied other state challenges to the FCC's authority and rulemaking. The court denied most nonprofit organizations’ challenges except for those related to the FCC’s treatment of certain costs in rate caps, which it held in abeyance pending review of the 2025 order. The court’s disposition was to dismiss, deny, or hold in abeyance the various petitions as appropriate. View "Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. FCC" on Justia Law

A group of medical students attended the University of Science, Arts and Technology (USAT), an international medical school based in Montserrat. USAT was licensed in Montserrat and, for years, was listed in the International Medical Education Directory, allowing its graduates to seek U.S. medical licensure. After a volcanic eruption in 2007, USAT began offering classes online and at alternative sites in the United States and Puerto Rico. In 2018, the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) changed its policy, restricting certification to students educated in the country where the school was authorized. USAT students who took courses outside Montserrat after 2018 were no longer eligible for ECFMG certification, affecting their ability to obtain U.S. medical licenses. The students alleged that USAT misrepresented its accreditation and educational legitimacy, leading them to pay substantial tuition under false pretenses.The students filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, asserting federal RICO claims, as well as Puerto Rico law claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the students failed to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” as required under RICO, and dismissed the federal claims with prejudice. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Puerto Rico law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the students did not present sufficient evidence of closed- or open-ended continuity to establish a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. As a result, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the RICO claim and its decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. View "Pena-Torres v. University of Science, Arts and Tech" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, federal relief programs such as the EIDL and PPP were implemented to assist small businesses. In Puerto Rico, a scheme led by Manfred Pentzke-Lemus fraudulently obtained such loans using fabricated documents and kickbacks. Jayson Pastrana-Román, owner of a food kiosk, became involved after Pentzke contacted him and assisted with loan applications. Pastrana allowed co-conspirators to alter his documents and apply for loans in his name, resulting in approved loans and kickbacks paid to Pentzke. Pastrana also recruited his brother and friends into the scheme, relaying instructions and collecting their kickback payments, though he did not retain these funds.A federal grand jury indicted Pastrana on ten counts, including wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy. He initially planned to go to trial but later pleaded guilty to all counts. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the court determined Pastrana acted as a "manager" in the conspiracy, applying a three-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The court declined to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, finding his acceptance was not timely and he had not admitted to his full role as recruiter and intermediary. The court imposed a 33-month concurrent sentence for all counts, below the calculated Guidelines range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Pastrana challenged the sentencing enhancements and denial of the acceptance reduction. The First Circuit held the district court did not err in applying the managerial role adjustment but did clearly err in denying the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, as Pastrana had admitted relevant conduct and timely notified the government of his intent to plead guilty. The court vacated Pastrana’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "US v. Pastrana-Roman" on Justia Law