Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jesse Sutherland was employed as an oil service technician at Peterson's Oil Service, Inc. ("Peterson's"). Two months into his job, he injured his right knee, leading to a torn meniscus and damaged patella. Sutherland requested reduced work hours due to his injury and eventually took a 12-week leave for knee surgery. Upon attempting to return to work, he was informed of his termination, effective the date he was supposed to return, citing a lack of work during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sutherland sued Peterson's for disability discrimination and related claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Peterson's, leading Sutherland to appeal. The district court concluded that Sutherland did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, particularly questioning whether his knee injury qualified as a disability under the ADA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its analysis. The appellate court concluded that Sutherland provided sufficient evidence to show that his knee injury was a disability under the ADA, as it substantially limited his major life activities. The court also found that Sutherland's requests for reduced work hours were reasonable and that Peterson's failed to engage in the interactive process required by law. The appellate court vacated the district court's summary judgment on Sutherland's disability-related claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision regarding Sutherland's wrongful termination claim based on alleged violation of Massachusetts public policy, as Sutherland did not provide sufficient evidence of a well-defined public policy supporting his views on biofuel. View "Sutherland v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Regina M. Thornton was employed by Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. as Associate Director - Patient Safety. In September 2021, Ipsen required employees to receive COVID-19 vaccinations. Thornton requested a religious exemption, which Ipsen denied. After she did not comply with the vaccination requirement, Ipsen terminated her employment. Thornton sued Ipsen in the Superior Court of Massachusetts, alleging violations of Title VII, Massachusetts law (Chapter 151B), the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (MDR). Ipsen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and moved to dismiss all counts. The Magistrate Judge granted Ipsen's motion, dismissing Thornton's complaint. Thornton appealed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Thornton's complaint, finding that she failed to state a plausible claim of religious discrimination under Title VII or Chapter 151B. The court concluded that Thornton did not adequately state her religious beliefs or how they related to vaccines. The court also found that Thornton's federal constitutional claims failed because Ipsen was not a state actor, and her MDR claims failed because the MDR does not provide a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the Magistrate Judge's dismissal of Thornton's religious discrimination claims under Title VII and Chapter 151B, finding that she had plausibly alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the vaccination requirement. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of her federal constitutional claims, as the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private actors like Ipsen. The court also affirmed the dismissal of her MDR claims, noting that Thornton had waived any argument that her claim should be reimagined under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. View "Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

On June 1, 2021, two masked men, later identified as Hall and Medina, abducted a U.S. postal worker at gunpoint to interrogate him about a package with missing contents, which was found to contain illicit drugs. During an undercover operation, law enforcement arrested Hall, Garay, and Medina while they attempted to collect other drug-laden packages. Officers seized five telephones from the defendants and obtained search warrants for the phones' contents and historical cell site location information (CSLI) for two defendants. A federal grand jury indicted the defendants on charges including kidnapping, conspiracy, and drug possession.The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island found the warrants lacked probable cause due to missing referenced exhibits in the applications and suppressed the evidence. The court also rejected the government's argument that the good faith exception from United States v. Leon should apply, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the officer executing the warrants acted in good faith. The court noted that the officer, Inspector Atwood, had no reason to believe the affidavits were not attached and relied reasonably on the USAO to file the applications correctly. The court distinguished this case from United States v. Sheehan, emphasizing that the incorporation language was explicit and the error was not systemic but isolated. Consequently, the First Circuit vacated the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Medina" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, a local attorney, was contracted by Theory Wellness, a marijuana dispensary operator, to assist in obtaining a host community agreement from the City of Medford, Massachusetts. Instead of legitimate lobbying, the defendant attempted to bribe Medford's chief of police through the chief's brother. This led to the defendant's convictions on two counts of honest-services wire fraud and one count of federal programs bribery.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the trial, where a jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent twenty-four-month terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of certain testimony, and the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the honest-services wire fraud convictions, finding that the district court erroneously admitted the only evidence establishing the jurisdictional element of those counts. However, the court affirmed the federal programs bribery conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant intended to bribe the chief of police.The court held that the defendant's actions constituted a bribery scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 666, even if the defendant did not believe the chief had accepted the bribe. The court also found that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the requirement of an "official act" was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the defendant sought official acts from the chief. The court rejected the defendant's entrapment defense, finding no improper inducement by the government and that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. View "United States v. O'Donovan" on Justia Law

Dario Giambro was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The conviction stemmed from evidence found by police officers who forcibly entered his home in Hebron, Maine, without a warrant. The officers entered the home based on information from Giambro's son, Antonio, who reported that his mother, Arline, had died and was not in the house. Giambro argued that the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the evidence should be suppressed. He also challenged the charge on Second Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied Giambro's motion to suppress, ruling that the entry fell within the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The court found that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Arline might be in need of immediate aid, despite Antonio's report that she had died and was not in the house. The court also denied Giambro's motion to dismiss the charge on Second Amendment grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's application of the emergency aid exception. The appellate court held that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Arline was alive and in need of immediate aid, given that Antonio had been in the house that morning and reported that she was not there. The court emphasized that the officers should have spoken to Antonio and Giambro, who were available for questioning, before forcibly entering the home. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, vacated Giambro's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address the Second Amendment claim due to its ruling on the Fourth Amendment issue. View "United States v. Giambro" on Justia Law

A family of four from Ecuador, including Milton Geovanny Vargas Panchi, his wife, and their two children, entered the United States in August 2021. They sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming persecution based on race and membership in the social group of "Indigenous Ecuadorian men." Vargas Panchi cited frequent discrimination, including verbal harassment, threats, and a physical attack after a soccer game, as well as denial of medical treatment due to his indigeneity. He provided declarations, photographs, and country-conditions evidence to support his claims.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and Vargas Panchi conceded removability but applied for asylum and withholding of removal. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found his testimony credible but concluded that the attack after the soccer game was motivated by the opposing team's loss rather than his indigeneity. The IJ also found that other discrimination he faced did not rise to the level of persecution and that his fear of future persecution was not objectively well-founded. Consequently, the IJ denied his asylum and withholding of removal claims.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that there was no clear error in the IJ's finding that the soccer game attack lacked a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA also concurred that the other discrimination Vargas Panchi faced did not constitute persecution. As a result, the BIA concluded that he was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's findings, including the lack of a nexus between the soccer game attack and a protected ground, and the determination that the denial of medical care did not rise to the level of persecution. The court also agreed that Vargas Panchi did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Vargas Panchi v. Garland" on Justia Law

Justin and Jared Brackett own and operate two restaurants in Harwich, Massachusetts: Ember Pizza, Inc. and The Port Restaurant and Bar, Inc. Both establishments held liquor and entertainment licenses issued by the town. Allegedly, they violated Harwich's noise ordinance and Massachusetts COVID-19 restrictions, leading to suspensions and restrictions on their permits. In response, they sued Harwich, several town officials, and other individuals in federal district court, asserting various federal and state claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts largely granted the defendants' dispositive motions, rejecting all of Ember and The Port's claims. The court also denied their request for leave to amend their complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. Ember and The Port then appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that Ember and The Port failed to state a plausible claim for relief under federal law, including their First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and procedural due process claims. The court also found that the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims and common law claims, including civil conspiracy and defamation, were inadequately pleaded. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the original complaint. View "3137, LLC v. Town of Harwich" on Justia Law

Rasheed Akinsanya, a Nigerian citizen, petitioned for review of the administrative denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Akinsanya argued that he would be tortured by Boko Haram if returned to Nigeria. He had previously served in the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of the Nigeria Police Force and cooperated in an investigation against his unit for corruption and ties to Boko Haram. After receiving threats and learning of attacks on his family, Akinsanya overstayed his visa in the United States. He was later convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft, leading to his identification as a removable noncitizen.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Akinsanya and his witnesses credible but concluded that he was ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT. The IJ determined that Akinsanya failed to prove that he would be tortured with the acquiescence of Nigerian officials. The IJ noted the Nigerian government's efforts to combat Boko Haram, including designating it a terrorist organization and engaging in counterterrorism efforts, but found these efforts insufficient to establish government acquiescence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the Nigerian authorities' inability to protect Akinsanya did not amount to acquiescence. The BIA emphasized that the Nigerian government was taking some measures to combat Boko Haram, and the potential ineffectiveness of these measures was not enough to prove government acquiescence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA did not adequately analyze whether Nigerian authorities would likely acquiesce in Akinsanya's torture. The court noted that the BIA failed to apply the correct legal standard for acquiescence, which requires identifying the government's legal duty and considering whether the steps taken by officials satisfy that duty. The court granted the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Akinsanya v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves the fate of the Frank J. Wood Bridge, a historic bridge in Maine connecting Topsham and Brunswick. Built in 1932, the bridge is no longer safe without substantial rehabilitation or replacement. The Maine Department of Transportation (MDOT) decided that replacing the bridge was more sensible than rehabilitating it. Since federal funds would be used, MDOT needed approval from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and compliance with federal statutes, including Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, due to the bridge's historic status.The FHWA approved MDOT's plan to replace the bridge, despite objections from preservation groups. The plaintiffs challenged this decision in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, which rejected their challenges. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the FHWA's decision in part, remanding the case to determine whether a 53% price differential between rehabilitation and replacement constituted a cost of extraordinary magnitude under Section 4(f).On remand, the FHWA concluded that the 53% differential was indeed a cost of extraordinary magnitude. Plaintiffs argued that updated cost estimates showed that rehabilitation would now be cheaper than replacement. The FHWA, however, found the plaintiffs' updated estimates flawed and did not recalculate the differential. The plaintiffs then sued again, and the district court granted summary judgment for the agencies, finding that the FHWA had complied with the remand instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the FHWA acted within the scope of the remand by deciding whether the 53% price differential was a cost of extraordinary magnitude and was not required to reopen the record to consider new cost information. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

In September 2021, Jonathan Fargas-Reyes pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a modified Glock pistol. He was sentenced to 33 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release, starting in November 2021. In January 2022, Puerto Rico police observed Fargas with firearms outside his home. After a brief chase, Fargas and his girlfriend, Mary Herrera-Cruz, were arrested. They were found with multiple firearms and ammunition. Fargas pled guilty to illegally possessing firearms and ammunition as a convicted felon, while Herrera pled guilty to aiding and abetting.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced Fargas to 120 months in prison for the new crime, above the recommended range of 57 to 71 months, and an additional 24 months for violating his supervised release, to be served consecutively. Herrera received a 37-month sentence, within the guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Fargas argued that the government breached the plea agreement by effectively advocating for a higher sentence and that his sentences were procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court found no plain error in the government's conduct, noting that the prosecutor adhered to the plea agreement's terms. The court also held that the district judge adequately explained the reasons for the upward variance, emphasizing the seriousness of Fargas's conduct and the need for deterrence and public protection. The court rejected Fargas's argument about sentencing disparity with Herrera, noting significant differences in their criminal histories and circumstances.The First Circuit affirmed Fargas's sentences but allowed him the right to seek resentencing under a retroactive guideline amendment that could eliminate the status points added to his criminal history score. View "United States v. Fargas-Reyes" on Justia Law