Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

by
Several parents and a grandparent of two female high school athletes challenged actions taken by officials of a New Hampshire public school district. The dispute arose after the parents wore pink "XX" wristbands during a girls' soccer game as a passive protest against the participation of a transgender athlete, in light of recent litigation about transgender students’ eligibility for girls’ sports. School administrators, concerned about possible harassment and disruption, instructed the protestors to remove the wristbands and later issued sanctions, including no-trespass orders preventing them from attending future school events.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire reviewed the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. It analyzed the school’s actions under First Amendment principles applicable to limited public fora and determined that the administrators’ interpretation and enforcement of school policy did not constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination. The district court denied the request for injunctive relief, concluding that the school’s interests justified its response to the protest.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined whether the school district’s actions amounted to viewpoint discrimination against the plaintiffs’ passive speech. The court found that the protest did not materially disrupt the event or amount to harassment, and that the sanctions appeared motivated by disagreement with the protest’s message. The First Circuit held that the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their viewpoint discrimination claim, specifically regarding the sanctions imposed at the soccer game’s sidelines and adjacent parking lot. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings to determine whether any interim relief, such as a declaratory judgment, is warranted. No costs were awarded. View "Fellers v. Kelley" on Justia Law

by
A Jamaican national entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2004 and remained beyond his authorized stay. He was arrested by U.S. authorities in 2009 and charged as removable. Following his marriages to two U.S. citizens—both ending in divorce—he sought various forms of immigration relief, including adjustment of status and asylum. His immigration history was complicated by criminal convictions for making false statements and misrepresenting a Social Security number when applying for a U.S. passport, as well as allegations of marriage fraud. After several procedural delays and changes in representation, he eventually filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming fear of gang violence in Jamaica due to his brother’s work as a police officer.The Immigration Judge in Boston, Massachusetts, denied all applications. The judge found the petitioner ineligible for adjustment of status due to his criminal convictions and lack of a valid waiver, and further determined that even if eligible, the relief would be denied as a matter of discretion. The judge also found the asylum application untimely, not excused by changed or extraordinary circumstances, and lacking merit. The judge made an adverse credibility finding against the petitioner and concluded that his proposed social group was not legally cognizable. The judge denied withholding of removal and CAT protection on similar grounds. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of adjustment of status and the agency’s determination that the asylum application was untimely without excusing circumstances. The court dismissed the petition as to those claims. On the remaining claims, the court denied the petition, upholding the adverse credibility finding and the ruling that the proposed social group was not cognizable. View "Bromfield v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
by
A physician assistant worked for a medical practice in New Hampshire for over a decade. During her employment, she had a series of contentious interactions with one of the practice’s orthopedic surgeons, who was also a partner and vice-president of the organization. The surgeon accused her of being disrespectful and ultimately insisted that he could not remain at the practice if she continued to work there. This ultimatum led the practice’s partners to vote unanimously to terminate her employment. However, the practice allowed her to continue working during a transition period while the parties negotiated a severance agreement and a possible independent contractor arrangement.After the employee raised concerns that her termination was driven by sex discrimination, the practice ended negotiations and immediately terminated her employment. She subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire against both the medical practice and the surgeon, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under federal and state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support her claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim, finding there was no genuine issue of material fact that her termination was motivated by gender bias rather than personal conflict. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the retaliation claim against the practice. The court held there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the practice accelerated her termination and withdrew an independent contractor opportunity in retaliation for her complaint of sex discrimination. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the retaliation claim. View "Russo v. New Hampshire Neurospine Institute, P.A." on Justia Law

by
Federal prosecutors obtained a seizure warrant from a magistrate judge in the District of Puerto Rico authorizing the seizure of approximately 119.65 Bitcoin from a wallet associated with Juan Carlos Reynoso. The warrant required that the assets be transferred to a government-controlled wallet within 24 hours and prohibited Reynoso from obstructing or interfering with the seizure. Reynoso’s attorney, Walter Reynoso, agreed to accept service of the warrant on his client’s behalf, but due to family commitments, did not promptly relay the warrant to Reynoso. By the time Walter opened the warrant email, the deadline had passed, and multiple transfers had already occurred from the wallet. Additional transfers took place in the days following, resulting in the complete dissipation of the assets.The government filed a motion in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hold Reynoso in civil contempt for failing to comply with the warrant. The court issued an order to show cause, and Reynoso responded by seeking to quash service and requesting an evidentiary hearing, arguing that material facts were in dispute. The government opposed, asserting there were no significant factual disputes. The District Court denied the motion to quash, granted the contempt motion, and held Reynoso in civil contempt, stating that a hearing was unnecessary because the facts were not in dispute.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Reynoso argued that the District Court abused its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing. The First Circuit affirmed the contempt order, holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required when the record reveals no genuine dispute of material fact, and that Reynoso failed to identify any evidence that would have created such a dispute regarding any element necessary for a civil contempt finding. View "US v. Reynoso" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
by
A family of four, natives and citizens of Brazil, entered the United States without authorization in October 2021 and were subsequently charged with removability. Through counsel, they conceded removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming persecution by Brazilian military police due to their association with Cristiana’s brother, who was a gang leader and imprisoned. The alleged harm included threats, intimidation, and witnessing violence against family members at Cristiana’s mother’s house, but neither Cristiana nor her husband suffered direct physical harm or arrest. After the mother’s death, Cristiana feared she would be targeted as her brother’s only remaining family in Brazil.An Immigration Judge from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review denied their applications in December 2023, finding their testimony credible but insufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ concluded that the harm experienced was indirect and limited, primarily occurring at the mother’s house, and could have been avoided by not visiting there. The IJ also found the applicants failed to show objective evidence of ongoing threats or that internal relocation within Brazil would be unreasonable. The IJ’s denial of relief was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which also dismissed arguments based on the asylum grant to Cristiana’s sister, Poliana, distinguishing her circumstances as involving direct physical harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions under the substantial evidence standard. The court held that the applicants did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, nor did they show they were similarly situated to Poliana. The petitions for review were denied, and the disposition affirmed the decisions of the BIA and IJ. View "Pereira Alves v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
by
Several former residents and the owner of a certified sober home in Falmouth, Massachusetts, brought claims against local police officers after officers entered the home on three occasions between October 2019 and January 2020. The police responded to reports of overdoses or to serve arrest warrants, and the plaintiffs alleged that the officers conducted unlawful searches and seizures, detained and interrogated residents, and made threats. The plaintiffs argued that police actions stemmed from animus related to the owner’s prior complaints about police corruption.The plaintiffs initially filed suit in Massachusetts state court, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as well as several state torts such as false arrest, invasion of privacy, and conspiracy. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant officers on all claims except those related to a January 2020 entry. The court then revisited its prior order, addressing qualified immunity and granting summary judgment on the remaining federal claims, ultimately dismissing all claims against the Falmouth police officers.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that many of the plaintiffs’ claims lacked sufficient factual support to survive summary judgment or were unsupported by specific evidence tying the alleged conduct to the defendant officers. Some claims were also deemed waived due to inadequate argument. The court held that the officers’ entries and searches were justified by consent or exigent circumstances, and that even if there were constitutional violations, the officers were protected by qualified immunity. The court also found that without an underlying tort, the conspiracy claim could not succeed. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Hurley v. Curtis" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Rights
by
A Puerto Rican distributor of HVAC products brought suit against a Miami-based manufacturer after their commercial relationship deteriorated. The distributor alleged that the manufacturer’s actions impaired its distribution rights under Puerto Rico’s Dealer’s Act (Law 75). After the distributor dismissed claims against certain non-diverse defendants, the manufacturer removed the case to federal court and asserted a counterclaim alleging the distributor owed over $235,000, as well as seeking a declaratory judgment that it had just cause to terminate the relationship.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on the Law 75 claim, finding in its favor, and dismissed the manufacturer’s declaratory judgment counterclaim as unripe. The court denied summary judgment on the remaining damages counterclaim, finding material factual disputes and setting it for trial. The distributor sought entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b), which the court denied due to overlap between the claims. The distributor’s attempt to obtain appellate review via a petition under Rule 5 was also denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Subsequently, the manufacturer moved to voluntarily dismiss its remaining counterclaim without prejudice. The district court granted that motion, dismissing the counterclaim without prejudice and denying the distributor’s requests for dismissal with prejudice or for attorney fees and costs. The court then entered judgment dismissing the distributor’s claims with prejudice and the manufacturer’s counterclaim without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction. The court held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not produce a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 when the dismissed claim could be revived in the same district court. Consequently, there was no final, appealable judgment, and the appeal was dismissed. View "Air-Con, Inc. v. Daikin Applied Latin America, LLC" on Justia Law

by
A correctional officer participated in a "forced cell move" at a federal medical facility, where a mentally ill and physically frail inmate, KT, was handcuffed behind his back. During the incident, the officer, equipped with a shield, entered the cell at high speed and struck KT in the chin and face, causing him to fall backward and suffer serious head and facial injuries. The event was captured on video. Prior to this, KT had spat on staff, including the officer, but was not threatening or aggressive at the time the force was used.The officer was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on two counts of deprivation of rights under color of law. At the first jury trial, he was acquitted on one count, while the jury hung on the count concerning the shield strike, leading to a retrial. In the second trial, the district court excluded a training video the defense sought to introduce, finding it irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative, particularly since the circumstances in the video were materially different from those at issue. The jury convicted the officer on the remaining count. The district court denied post-trial motions and imposed a sentence of imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the officer challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, exclusion of the training video, and certain testimonial evidence, also alleging cumulative error. The First Circuit held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the officer acted maliciously and sadistically, violating the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights and meeting the willfulness standard under 18 U.S.C. § 242. The court found no error in the exclusion of the video, the jury instructions, or the evidentiary rulings, and determined that no cumulative error occurred. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Bourget" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, who were investors in a pharmaceutical company, brought a putative class action alleging securities fraud. The company had developed a drug to treat geographic atrophy, a form of age-related macular degeneration, and conducted two large clinical trials (OAKS and DERBY) before the drug's approval by the FDA. During the class period, company representatives publicly stated that there were no observed cases of retinal vasculitis, a serious eye condition, among trial participants. After the drug's commercialization, new reports emerged of retinal vasculitis in patients treated with the drug, leading to a decline in the company’s stock price and the addition of a warning to the drug’s label.The action was initially filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware and later transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs argued that the company's statements were misleading half-truths because the clinical trials were not specifically designed to detect retinal vasculitis, and this limitation was not disclosed to investors. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the statements were not materially misleading and that there was no sufficient allegation of scienter (intent to defraud). The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the motion, holding that the omissions were not actionable because the relevant trial protocols and methodologies had been publicly disclosed and disagreements over scientific methodology do not support securities fraud claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the company’s statements were not materially misleading because the information regarding the trial protocols, including when and how retinal vasculitis could be detected, was publicly available. The court concluded that no material misrepresentation or actionable omission had occurred, and thus affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "In Re: Apellis Pharm., Inc. Securities Litigation" on Justia Law

by
A German national was named as a relief defendant in a civil enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC alleged that he received approximately $3.3 million in funds, transferred from U.S.-based companies controlled by his son, who was a primary defendant in a securities fraud scheme. The SEC sought to recover those funds through disgorgement, claiming the money represented proceeds of illegal activity. The relief defendant maintained that he lived in Germany, had limited visits to the United States, and challenged the court's personal jurisdiction over him.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially denied the relief defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and later imposed sanctions against him for discovery violations. The court entered summary judgment for the SEC, ordering disgorgement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded in a prior decision that the district court could not establish personal jurisdiction over him by imputing the contacts of his son, and remanded for further proceedings.On remand, the district court permitted the SEC to seek jurisdictional discovery regarding the relief defendant’s own contacts with the United States. The relief defendant did not oppose discovery, refused to participate further, and failed to communicate directly with the court. The district court sanctioned him by deeming facts establishing personal jurisdiction as admitted, and reinstated summary judgment for the full disgorgement amount.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the relief defendant forfeited or waived any challenge to the jurisdictional discovery process, the district court’s orders, and related arguments by failing to raise them in the district court after remand. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "SEC v. Gastauer" on Justia Law