Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, a married couple from Guatemala, have resided in Massachusetts for over twenty years and have four U.S. citizen children. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued Notices to Appear, charging them with removability. They applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, citing their son L.C.'s medical and educational needs. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their application, finding they did not meet the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" requirement due to insufficient corroborating evidence about L.C.'s situation in Guatemala. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision and later denied their first motion to reopen based on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.Petitioners filed a second motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel by their previous attorney, who failed to submit crucial evidence about L.C.'s educational needs. They provided new evidence, including country conditions in Guatemala and additional information about their children's medical and educational challenges. The BIA denied this motion, stating that Petitioners had not shown that their counsel's performance was so deficient that they suffered prejudice and that they had not established a prima facie case for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA provided insufficient explanation for its ruling, making it impossible to review the legal bases for its conclusions. The court noted that the BIA did not adequately address whether the failure to submit corroborating evidence about L.C.'s educational needs constituted ineffective assistance of counsel or whether Petitioners had established a prima facie case for relief. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chanchavac Garcia v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves Leika Joanna García-Gesualdo, who filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Honeywell Aerospace of Puerto Rico, Inc., and Honeywell International, Inc. García-Gesualdo alleged that Honeywell discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEOC investigated her claims but decided not to proceed further, issuing a right-to-sue letter on March 29, 2022. García-Gesualdo filed her lawsuit on July 7, 2022, 100 days after the EEOC's decision.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed García-Gesualdo's claims as time-barred, agreeing with Honeywell that the complaint was filed more than ninety days after the EEOC issued the right-to-sue letter. The court noted that García-Gesualdo's attorney received emails from the EEOC on March 29 and April 6, indicating that a new document was available on the EEOC's portal. The district court concluded that the ninety-day period began on either March 29 or April 6, making the July 7 filing untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that neither the March 29 email nor the April 6 email provided sufficient notice of García-Gesualdo's right to sue. The court emphasized that the emails did not unambiguously indicate that the EEOC had terminated its processes or that the ninety-day period to file a lawsuit had begun. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the facts establishing untimeliness were not clear on the face of the pleadings, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Garcia-Gesualdo v. Honeywell Aerospace of Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

A couple from Guatemala, Gustavo Evelio Mendez Nolasco and Blanca America Niz Mendez, entered the United States without inspection in 1981 and 2001, respectively. They married in 2004 and have four children, three of whom are U.S. citizens and one a Legal Permanent Resident. They own a landscaping business and a home in Massachusetts. They applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that their children would face exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if they were deported to Guatemala.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their applications, finding that they did not demonstrate good moral character due to undisclosed criminal histories and that their children would not face the requisite level of hardship. The IJ considered factors such as the children's limited Spanish skills, the family's financial assets, and the conditions in Guatemala but concluded that the hardships were not substantially beyond what is typically expected upon removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing with the IJ's assessment of the hardship factors and finding no need to address the good moral character determination. The BIA highlighted the children's limited Spanish skills, the couple's assets, and the potential for their oldest child to remain in the U.S. and petition for their legal status adjustment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and found no legal error in the agency's application of the hardship standard. The court noted that the BIA properly considered the relevant factors and evaluated them in the aggregate. The court denied the petition for review, concluding that the agency's decision was consistent with its precedent and that the couple did not meet the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard. View "Mendez Nolasco v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Dionel Guía-Sendeme was involved in a venture to smuggle 135 kilograms of cocaine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. He was recruited to move gasoline tanks onto a boat, initially believing it was for smuggling undocumented individuals. Upon learning it was for drug smuggling, he agreed to participate for $10,000. Guía and another individual, Abel, operated the vessel. Abel received a GPS device, a compass, phone numbers, and a handgun. They were informed that a second vessel would monitor for law enforcement. After transferring drugs from the second vessel and loading more drugs at another location, Guía agreed to accompany Abel to Puerto Rico for an additional $10,000. Upon arrival, law enforcement seized the drugs, and Guía was apprehended while Abel escaped.Guía was indicted on four counts related to drug trafficking and pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. The U.S. Probation Office recommended against a mitigating role adjustment and for a firearm enhancement. The district court adopted these recommendations, calculating an advisory guideline sentencing range of 108 to 135 months but imposed a 72-month sentence after granting a downward variance. Guía objected to the sentence, but the court stated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in its mitigating role analysis by not properly identifying the universe of participants involved in the criminal activity and failing to compare Guía's conduct to that of other participants. The appellate court vacated Guía's sentence and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to reconsider the mitigating role adjustment. The appellate court upheld the firearm enhancement, finding sufficient evidence that Guía knew his coconspirator possessed a firearm. View "US v. Guia-Sendeme" on Justia Law

A Massachusetts law prohibits the sale, transfer, or possession of assault weapons and large capacity feeding devices. Joseph R. Capen, a Massachusetts resident, and the National Association for Gun Rights challenged the law, claiming it violates the Second Amendment. They sought a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions against the law's enforcement.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court found that the law is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of regulating dangerous and unusual weapons, which are not typically used for self-defense. The court also found that the law's restrictions on large capacity magazines are supported by historical precedents of regulating items that pose a significant public safety threat.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the Massachusetts law's restrictions on assault weapons, specifically the AR-15, are consistent with historical regulations that aimed to protect public safety by restricting particularly dangerous weapons. The court also found that the law's restrictions on large capacity magazines are supported by historical analogues and do not impose a significant burden on the right to self-defense. Therefore, the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Capen v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The defendant, John Volungus, a convicted pedophile, was conditionally released from civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. The Act allows for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons in federal custody. Volungus, who had been in federal prison for child-sex crimes, was civilly committed in 2012. In 2022, the facility's warden certified that Volungus would not be sexually dangerous if released under a prescribed regimen of care. The district court ordered his conditional release with specific conditions and a prescribed regimen of treatment.The district court's conditional-release order included numerous conditions, some of which Volungus objected to, arguing that the court exceeded its authority by imposing conditions beyond the prescribed treatment regimen and requiring him to pay for certain costs. The district court denied his objections and his motion to dismiss the government's motion to revoke his conditional release for alleged violations of the conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Adam Walsh Act allows judges to impose conditions beyond the prescribed regimen of treatment, provided they are related to the individual's mental illness and the safety of the public. The court also rejected Volungus's argument that the district court lacked authority to require him to pay for certain costs associated with his release conditions. The court affirmed the district court's conditional-release order, finding that the additional conditions and cost requirements were within the court's authority and aligned with the Act's purpose of protecting the public from sexually dangerous individuals. View "US v. Volungus" on Justia Law

In 1982, Lesley Phillips purchased an apartment in Cambridge, Massachusetts, assuming a preexisting mortgage. Phillips' spouse, Linda Pinti, was added to the deed in 2005. In 2008, Pinti and Phillips refinanced with a $160,000 promissory note and mortgage from Emigrant Mortgage Company (EMC). They defaulted on the note in 2009, and EMC initiated foreclosure proceedings. In 2012, EMC mistakenly issued a discharge of the mortgage, which Pinti recorded in 2015 after a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision voided the foreclosure sale.EMC filed a federal action in 2016 to strike the discharge, but the court dismissed it, ruling EMC was not the mortgagee. Emigrant Residential, LLC (Emigrant) then filed a new action in 2019. The district court granted summary judgment for Emigrant, striking the discharge and rejecting Pinti's counterclaims. Pinti appealed, contesting the district court's rulings on standing, the discharge, unclean hands, restoration to the status quo, and her Chapter 93A claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Emigrant had standing as the holder of the note, which was sufficient under Article III. The court found no genuine dispute that the discharge was a mistake, supported by EMC's policies and the fact that the note was never returned to Pinti. The court also ruled that Emigrant was entitled to equitable relief, rejecting Pinti's arguments of unclean hands and the inability to restore the status quo. Finally, the court upheld the dismissal of Pinti's Chapter 93A claim as time-barred. View "Emigrant Residential LLC v. Pinti" on Justia Law

Héctor Maldonado-Maldonado was involved in an altercation with a senior corrections officer (SCO) at the Metropolitan Detention Center Guaynabo in August 2020. During a routine lockdown, the SCO noticed Maldonado was not in his cell and found contraband (an extra pillow). When the SCO removed the pillow, Maldonado returned, yelled profanities, and punched the SCO. Maldonado and his cellmate, Miguel Santana-Avilés, then assaulted the SCO, causing bodily injuries. Maldonado was indicted and charged with assaulting a federal officer. He entered a plea agreement proposing a sentencing calculation resulting in a Total Offense Level (TOL) of 13.The probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) with a different guidelines calculation, applying the "aggravated assault" guideline and recommending a TOL of 24. Maldonado objected to the PSR, arguing that the facts did not support the aggravated assault guideline. The government’s sentencing memorandum and the prosecutor at the hearing advocated for a higher sentence, including a four-point enhancement for "serious bodily injury," which was not part of the plea agreement. The district court adopted the PSR’s calculation and sentenced Maldonado to 78 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The government conceded that it breached the plea agreement by advocating for a higher enhancement and not adhering to the agreed-upon sentencing range. The court agreed that the breach was clear and obvious, affecting Maldonado’s substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings. The court vacated Maldonado’s sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge, emphasizing that the fault lay with the prosecutor, not the sentencing judge. View "United States v. Maldonado-Maldonado" on Justia Law

The defendant, Carlos Vázquez-Narvaez, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The probation office calculated a guideline sentencing range of fifty-one to sixty-three months of imprisonment and five years to life of supervised release. However, the district court sentenced Vázquez to time served (twenty-one days) and seven years of supervised release. The government appealed, arguing that the sentence was substantively unreasonable due to a lack of a plausible sentencing rationale.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico accepted Vázquez's guilty plea and agreed with the probation office's guideline calculation. Despite this, the court imposed a significantly lower sentence than the guideline range, citing Vázquez's cooperation, compliance with bail conditions, and participation in specialized treatment for sex offenders. The court also noted that Vázquez had no direct contact with the victims and did not produce or entice child pornography. The government objected, arguing that the sentence was too lenient given the seriousness of the offense and the potential for sentencing disparities.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court did not adequately explain its basis for the extraordinary downward variance. The appellate court emphasized that the district court's rationale focused almost exclusively on Vázquez's post-arrest conduct and potential for rehabilitation, without sufficiently addressing the seriousness of the offense, the need for general deterrence, or the potential for sentencing disparities. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, requiring a more thorough and comprehensive explanation for any significant variance from the guideline range. View "United States v. Vazquez-Narvaez" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a husband and wife from Guatemala, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision upholding the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of their applications for cancellation of removal. They argued that their removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to their U.S. citizen children. The IJ found that the petitioners did not meet this hardship requirement, despite finding them otherwise eligible for cancellation of removal. The IJ's decision was based on the conclusion that the children would not suffer the requisite level of hardship if the family relocated to Guatemala.The IJ's decision was appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's findings. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the petitioners had not demonstrated that their removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to their children. The BIA reviewed the IJ's factual findings for clear error and found none, particularly regarding the health and well-being of the petitioners' son, A.B.M., who had experienced past trauma and had ongoing health issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA had legally erred by failing to consider key evidence, specifically a psychological report detailing the mental health status of A.B.M. The court held that the BIA must consider all relevant evidence in the record when reviewing the IJ's findings for clear error. The First Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the BIA to adequately consider the full record, including the psychological report, in its determination. View "Blanco Contreras v. Bondi" on Justia Law