Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Akeish Johnioy Morgan, a Jamaican national, entered the United States illegally on June 11, 2022. Prior to his entry, a Jamaican justice of the peace issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and wounding with intent. Morgan sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The IJ found Morgan ineligible for asylum, statutory withholding, and CAT withholding due to the warrants issued against him in Jamaica, concluding there were serious reasons to believe he committed a serious nonpolitical crime. The BIA affirmed this decision, agreeing that the warrants and supporting evidence barred Morgan's eligibility for non-CAT deferral relief. The BIA also upheld the IJ's determination that Morgan was ineligible for CAT deferral, finding that the beatings Morgan claimed to have suffered did not constitute past torture and that he failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of future torture upon his return to Jamaica.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the agency's serious-nonpolitical-crime finding, agreeing it was supported by substantial evidence, thus sustaining Morgan's ineligibility for asylum, statutory withholding, and CAT withholding. However, the court found that the agency's likelihood-of-future-torture finding, which determined Morgan's ineligibility for CAT deferral, was based on an erroneously narrow legal definition of torture. Consequently, the court granted Morgan's petition in part, vacating the CAT deferral determination and remanding the case to the BIA to reassess the likelihood of future torture using the correct legal definition. View "Morgan v. Garland" on Justia Law

The National Association of Government Employees, Inc. (NAGE) challenged the constitutionality of the Debt Limit Statute, alleging that it posed an imminent risk to its members, who are federal employees. NAGE claimed that if the debt limit was not raised, its members would face layoffs, furloughs, unpaid work, and loss of pension funding. NAGE sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and President Joseph R. Biden.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that NAGE's claims of past injuries were moot due to the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which suspended the debt limit until January 1, 2025, and required the Treasury Secretary to make whole the G Fund accounts. The court also determined that NAGE's claims of future harm were too speculative to establish standing, as they relied on a series of unlikely events, including a federal default, which has never occurred.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that NAGE lacked standing to pursue prospective relief because the anticipated future harms were speculative and not certainly impending. The court also found that NAGE's claims of past injuries were moot, as the Fiscal Responsibility Act had addressed the immediate concerns, and there was no reasonable expectation that the same harm would recur. The court rejected NAGE's arguments that the voluntary-cessation and capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exceptions to mootness applied, concluding that the legislative action was independent and not related to the litigation, and that the risk of future harm was not reasonably expected. View "National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. Yellen" on Justia Law

The case involves Alexander Raheb, who slipped and fell on April 13, 2019, at TD Garden in Boston, owned and operated by Delaware North Companies, Inc. Raheb purchased a hotdog and a beer at a concession stand and, while walking to his seat, slipped on a liquid on the concourse floor, rupturing his left quadricep tendon. The liquid had been spilled seconds earlier by another patron. Raheb sued Delaware North under the special mode-of-operation notice theory, claiming negligence.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Delaware North, concluding that the courts of Massachusetts would not apply the mode-of-operation theory under the circumstances presented. The court found that Raheb did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Delaware North's mode of operation created a foreseeable risk of harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the mode-of-operation theory did not apply. The court emphasized that the mode-of-operation theory, as established in Massachusetts, applies primarily to self-service contexts where the business's method of operation creates foreseeable risks. The court found that Raheb's situation, where patrons carry drinks from a concession stand to their seats at a sporting event, did not meet the criteria for this theory. The court noted that Raheb's evidence did not distinguish TD Garden's operations from any other similar establishment and did not show that the mode of operation created a recurring hazard. Therefore, the court held that Raheb could not proceed to a jury on the mode-of-operation notice theory. View "Raheb v. Delaware North Companies, Inc. - Boston" on Justia Law

Sophia Zhou and other investors filed a federal securities fraud class action against Desktop Metal, Inc. and several of its corporate officers after the company's stock price dropped in late 2021. The stock lost value following Desktop Metal's disclosure of an internal investigation that revealed corporate mismanagement and necessitated the recall of two key products. Zhou alleged that the defendants engaged in fraudulent schemes, including manufacturing Flexcera resin at non-FDA-registered facilities and marketing the PCA 4000 curing box for use with Flexcera without FDA certification.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Zhou's complaint for failure to state a claim. Zhou appealed, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her "scheme liability" claim and that she adequately stated a securities fraud claim based on material misrepresentations and omissions. The district court had found that Zhou did not preserve her scheme liability claim and that her complaint failed to plead any materially false or misleading statement or omission.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Zhou did not preserve her scheme liability claim because she failed to adequately argue it in her opposition to the motion to dismiss or in her supplemental briefing. The court also determined that the district court correctly found that Zhou's complaint did not allege any materially false or misleading statements. Specifically, the court held that statements about Flexcera's FDA clearance, regulatory compliance, and product qualities were not rendered misleading by the alleged omissions. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Zhou's complaint. View "Zhou v. Desktop Metal, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2002, Natale Cosenza was convicted by a Massachusetts state court jury of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and armed burglary. The prosecution's case heavily relied on the victim, Melissa Horgan, identifying Cosenza from a photo array administered by Worcester police. In 2016, state courts granted Cosenza a new trial, and in 2017, they suppressed the photo array evidence, leading the Commonwealth to drop the charges.Cosenza then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit in 2018 against the City of Worcester, alleging that the City had a policy of not properly training its officers on photo arrays and other investigative techniques, which he claimed violated his constitutional rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding no evidence of deliberate indifference to Cosenza's constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was no evidence Worcester had a policy of not training its officers on photo arrays. The court noted that officers received training at a police academy and on-the-job training, and that the law at the time did not clearly establish the procedures Cosenza argued were required. The court also found no evidence that the City had a policy of fabricating or suppressing evidence. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the City of Worcester. View "Cosenza v. City of Worcester, MA" on Justia Law

Boris Bergus and Agustin Florian, both doctors, were colleagues and later co-investors in a company managed by Florian's brother-in-law, Edgardo Jose Antonio Castro Baca. Bergus invested in the company in 2012 and 2014, purchasing stock. Years later, after their relationship deteriorated, Bergus sued Florian, alleging that Florian had omitted material information about the investments, violating the Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act (MUSA). The trial featured testimony from Bergus, Florian, and Baca. The district court precluded Florian from cross-examining Bergus about a 2013 state medical board finding that Bergus had misrepresented his medical credentials. The jury found in favor of Bergus regarding the 2012 investment but not the 2014 investment.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of Bergus for the 2012 investment, awarding him $125,000 plus interest, totaling $202,506.85, and additional attorney's fees and costs, bringing the total judgment to $751,234.86. The court dismissed Florian's counterclaim for abuse of process, suggesting it be litigated in state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed several issues, including the district court's limitation on Florian's cross-examination of Bergus. The appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion by precluding cross-examination about Bergus's misrepresentations of his medical credentials, which were probative of his character for truthfulness. The court concluded that this error was not harmless, as the case hinged on the credibility of the witnesses.The First Circuit vacated the judgment regarding the 2012 investment and remanded for a new trial on that issue. The jury's verdict on the 2014 investment remained intact. The appellate court did not address Florian's other arguments due to the need for a new trial. View "Bergus v. Florian" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Domingo Emmanuel Bruno-Cotto, pleaded guilty to two counts of carjacking and one count of kidnapping following a multi-day crime spree in Puerto Rico. The spree included carjacking an Uber driver, kidnapping an airport passenger, and committing multiple sexual assaults on a woman at a beach. The district court sentenced Bruno-Cotto to 208 months in prison, which was 20 months above the advisory guideline range, citing the unusual cruelty of his actions.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. Bruno-Cotto did not contest the facts in the presentence report but requested a lower sentence based on his difficult childhood and mental health issues. The government argued for a high-end guideline sentence, emphasizing Bruno-Cotto's leadership role and the premeditated nature of his crimes. The district court ultimately imposed a higher sentence, highlighting the severity and cruelty of Bruno-Cotto's actions, particularly the repeated sexual assaults.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. Bruno-Cotto argued that the sentence was procedurally flawed due to the district court's reliance on unreliable hearsay and that it was substantively unreasonable compared to his co-defendant's sentence. The appellate court found no plain error in the district court's reliance on the presentence report, noting that the hearsay information had sufficient indicia of trustworthiness. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, given the egregious nature of Bruno-Cotto's conduct and the differences in culpability between him and his co-defendant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's 208-month sentence. View "United States v. Bruno-Cotto" on Justia Law

The case involves Miguel Santana-Avilés, who was convicted of assaulting a correctional officer at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. On August 20, 2020, during an inmate count, Officer Efrén Rosario found an extra pillow in the cell shared by Santana-Avilés and two other inmates, which violated prison policy. When Officer Rosario attempted to remove the pillow, one of the cellmates, Héctor Maldonado-Maldonado, attacked him. Santana-Avilés then grabbed Officer Rosario from behind, allowing Maldonado to continue the assault. Santana-Avilés also encouraged the attack by shouting "Hit him." The officers eventually subdued both inmates with the help of reinforcements.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico presided over the initial trial. Santana-Avilés did not testify but sought to introduce statements he made during the incident, claiming they were excited utterances. The court excluded these statements as hearsay. Additionally, the court admitted an email from a prison technician explaining the lack of video evidence due to technical issues, despite Santana-Avilés's objections. The jury found Santana-Avilés guilty of aiding and abetting the assault of a correctional officer, and he was sentenced to eighty-seven months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Santana-Avilés argued that the district court made erroneous evidentiary rulings by excluding his statements and admitting the email. The appellate court found that even if the exclusion of Santana-Avilés's statements was an error, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against him. The court also held that the email was properly admitted to rebut an implied charge of fabrication or improper motive. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Santana-Aviles" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted by a jury in New Hampshire state court for the first-degree murder of Larry Lemieux. The petitioner admitted to shooting Lemieux but claimed he acted in self-defense or in defense of another, arguing he did not act with premeditation. After his conviction, the prosecution disclosed a proffer letter recommending a suspended sentence for drug charges against Jose Gomez, a key prosecution witness. The petitioner argued that the failure to disclose this letter violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland.The state trial court denied the petitioner's motion for a new trial, finding that the nondisclosure of the proffer letter did not prejudice the petitioner. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the petitioner was not prejudiced under New Hampshire law, which sets stricter standards than Brady. The court found that the undisclosed evidence would not have altered the defense strategy or the trial's outcome, given the overwhelming additional evidence of premeditation presented by other witnesses.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The First Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, concluding that the New Hampshire Supreme Court reasonably determined that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the nondisclosure of the proffer letter. The court noted the overwhelming evidence of premeditation from multiple witnesses, which supported the jury's verdict independent of Gomez's testimony. View "Etienne v. Edmark" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States on a tourist visa in January 2000 and overstayed. In April 2018, he applied for asylum, citing his dangerous job as a bodyguard for a congressman in Guatemala and fear of extortion and threats from gang members. Removal proceedings were initiated against him, and he conceded removability but cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). His application mentioned only one entry into the U.S. and claimed ignorance of the one-year filing requirement for asylum.An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing in December 2018, where the petitioner testified about his fears of returning to Guatemala. The IJ found the petitioner not credible due to inconsistencies between his oral testimony and written application, such as unlisted entries into the U.S. and unmentioned incidents of threats. The IJ also noted the petitioner's use of false documentation and legal violations in the U.S. The IJ found no extraordinary circumstances to excuse the late asylum application and determined that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution or established a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ also found insufficient evidence for CAT protection.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision in September 2023, agreeing that the petitioner had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA noted the lack of evidence of threats in the past twenty years and upheld the IJ's findings on withholding of removal and CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the adverse credibility determination and agreed that the petitioner had not established eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. The petition for judicial review was denied. View "Garcia Oliva v. Garland" on Justia Law