Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A medical device company that manufactures spinal devices was indicted, along with its CEO and CFO, for allegedly paying bribes to surgeons through a sham consulting program in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The indictment claimed the surgeons did not provide bona fide consulting services, but were paid to use and order the company’s devices in surgeries covered by federal health care programs. The company’s CFO, who is not a shareholder but is one of only two officers, allegedly calculated these payments based on the volume and value of surgeries performed with the company’s devices. During the development of the consulting program, the company retained outside counsel to provide legal opinions on the agreements’ compliance with health care law, and those opinions were distributed to the surgeons.After the grand jury returned the indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed whether the CFO’s plan to argue at trial that the involvement of outside counsel negated his criminal intent would effect an implied waiver of the company’s attorney-client privilege. The district court initially found that if the CFO or CEO invoked an “involvement-of-counsel” defense, it would waive the corporation’s privilege over communications with counsel. Following dismissal of charges against the company, the district court focused on whether the officers collectively could waive the privilege, concluded they could, and ruled that the CFO’s planned defense would constitute an implied waiver, allowing disclosure of certain privileged communications to the government. The district court stayed its order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s waiver order and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that (1) the record was insufficient to determine whether the CFO alone had authority to waive the company’s privilege, and (2) not every involvement-of-counsel defense necessitates a waiver. The appellate court directed the district court to reassess the issue in light of changed circumstances and to consider less intrusive remedies before finding an implied waiver. View "United States v. SpineFrontier, Inc." on Justia Law

A Colombian man and his family fled to the United States after a violent criminal gang, the Gulf Clan, repeatedly threatened their lives to coerce his support. The threats began after he opened a bakery and escalated to in-person confrontations. Upon receiving an armed threat at his business, he reported the incidents to local police, who responded by stationing a guard at his bakery and blocking threatening phone lines. While in-person threats ceased, the family continued to receive telephonic threats from different numbers. Fearing for their safety, they left Colombia and entered the United States, where they sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.An Immigration Judge found that while the man’s testimony was credible, he failed to establish that the Colombian government was unwilling or unable to protect him from the private gang’s threats. The judge determined that the police had taken meaningful action, including posting a guard and blocking calls, and that the government was both willing and able to provide protection. As a result, the requests for asylum and withholding of removal were denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial, agreeing with the Immigration Judge’s assessment that the Colombian authorities had demonstrated willingness and ability to protect the family.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, applying the substantial evidence standard to the agency’s factual findings. The court held that the record supported the agency’s conclusion that the Colombian government was able to protect the family, even if it could not provide absolute security. The court denied the petition for review, finding no error in the agency’s determination or its procedural handling of the case. View "Restrepo Castano v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The defendant participated in two robberies of massage businesses in Massachusetts, roughly an hour apart, alongside two co-defendants. During both incidents, firearms were displayed and used to intimidate victims, and in the course of the robberies, the victims were physically restrained and money and phones were stolen. After the crimes, the defendant was apprehended, and the investigation linked him and his co-defendants to the robberies through various forms of evidence, including testimony from an accomplice and the victims.Following his arrest, the defendant pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting. At sentencing, the district court applied enhancements to his guideline offense level based on findings that firearms were possessed and otherwise used during the robberies, and that the use of firearms by the co-defendants was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. The court relied on the presentence investigation report, testimony from a co-defendant’s trial over which the same judge presided, and other evidence. The defendant objected to the enhancements, arguing the government had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that use of firearms was foreseeable and that the weapons were real firearms as defined by the guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal, applying an abuse of discretion standard to procedural challenges and clear error to factual findings. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that firearms would be possessed and otherwise used during the robberies, nor in concluding that real firearms were involved. The court found the evidence sufficient to support both enhancements and affirmed the defendant’s 78-month sentence. View "United States v. Tang" on Justia Law

John Kenney, a resident of Florida, sought to obtain a retail cannabis license in Rhode Island as a social equity applicant. He argued that, as a recipient of a social equity cannabis license in the District of Columbia and someone with nonviolent marijuana convictions in Maryland and Nevada, he would otherwise qualify under Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act. Kenney challenged two provisions of the Act: the requirement that all license applicants must be Rhode Island residents or entities controlled by Rhode Island residents, and the definition of “social equity applicant,” which, according to Kenney, only recognizes nonviolent marijuana offenses eligible for expungement under Rhode Island law.After Kenney filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 6, 2025, the district court dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, reasoning that the Cannabis Control Commission had not yet promulgated final rules for retail cannabis licenses, and thus the court could not adjudicate the claims. The case was dismissed without prejudice, and Kenney appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Following the Commission’s issuance of final rules for retail cannabis licenses, effective May 1, 2025, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of ripeness. The First Circuit held that Kenney’s claims were not moot and that he had standing to pursue them. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the merits of Kenney’s constitutional challenges, instructing the district court to rule at least forty-five days before the Commission issues retail licenses. View "Kenney v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

A cannabis entrepreneur based in California sought to challenge specific provisions of Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act, which governs the licensing of retail cannabis businesses. The Act requires applicants for all retail cannabis business licenses to be Rhode Island residents or entities with a principal place of business in Rhode Island and majority ownership by Rhode Island residents. It also establishes criteria for “social equity applicants,” reserving certain licenses for individuals with past marijuana-related convictions eligible for expungement or for those who have resided in disproportionately impacted areas. The plaintiff, not a Rhode Island resident, intended to apply for a license but alleged that these requirements violated the dormant Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed the plaintiff’s action without prejudice, concluding that her claims were not ripe for judicial review. The court cited several cases but provided no substantive analysis, noting that the Commission had yet to promulgate final rules and regulations for licensing and declining to speculate on the timeline for their adoption. This order was issued just before the public comment period on the proposed regulations closed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing on ripeness grounds. The appellate court determined that the claims were ripe, not moot, and that the plaintiff had standing to bring the suit. The court found that the plaintiff faced imminent harm under the statutory requirements and that judicial intervention was warranted. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims, instructing the lower court to issue its rulings before the planned issuance of retail cannabis licenses. View "Jensen v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

Federal law enforcement agents, posing as a 14-year-old girl named "Rolianas," engaged in online communications with the defendant, who responded to an ad the agents posted on a casual encounters section of Craigslist. Over a series of emails, texts, and phone calls spanning several days, the defendant initiated and sustained contact, despite being told early in the exchange that "Rolianas" was 14. He sent sexually suggestive messages and photos and made plans to meet, including discussions of sexual activity and bringing condoms.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico conducted a jury trial, where the defendant was convicted of attempted transportation of a minor for criminal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) but acquitted of attempted sexual enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant requested a jury instruction on the entrapment defense, arguing that the government induced him to commit the offense. The district judge denied that request, concluding that the defendant had not met the threshold of producing evidence of both government inducement and lack of predisposition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed de novo whether the district court erred in refusing the entrapment instruction. The court found that the government’s conduct did not rise to the level of inducement, as the agents merely provided an opportunity for the defendant to commit the crime, and the defendant pursued the illegal activity after being informed of the purported minor’s age. The court held that the evidence did not support the defense of entrapment and affirmed the conviction, concluding that the district judge properly denied the entrapment instruction. View "United States v. Medina-Ortiz" on Justia Law

A 2018 data breach at Barracuda Networks exposed protected health information of patients of Zoll Services LLC, a subsidiary of Zoll Medical Corporation. Zoll had contracted with Fusion LLC for data security services, and Fusion in turn relied on Barracuda’s technology. The agreements between these companies included certain liability and indemnification provisions, as well as a right for Barracuda to audit Fusion’s customer contracts. After the breach, Zoll settled a class action brought by its customers whose data was compromised.Following these events, Zoll initiated arbitration against Fusion and filed suit against Barracuda in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Fusion intervened and asserted additional claims against Barracuda. The district court dismissed most claims but allowed Zoll’s equitable indemnification claim and Fusion’s breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims to proceed. After arbitration and settlements, Axis Insurance Company, as assignee and subrogee of Zoll and Fusion, was substituted as plaintiff. Barracuda moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims, which the district court granted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo. The appellate court held that Axis failed to present evidence of a relationship between Zoll and Barracuda that would support derivative or vicarious liability necessary for equitable indemnification under Massachusetts law. The court found that Fusion did not meet a condition precedent in its contract with Barracuda, and Barracuda had not waived or was estopped from asserting that condition. Further, Axis could not show that Barracuda breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as no relevant contractual right existed. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Barracuda on all claims. View "Axis Insurance Company v. Barracuda Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

In this dispute, a charitable foundation affiliated with a musical instruments company loaned a rhinestone-adorned piano, previously owned by Liberace, to a piano retailer under an agreement made in 2011. The arrangement allowed the retailer to display and promote the piano while the foundation avoided storage responsibilities. In 2019, the foundation requested the piano’s return, but the retailer refused, which led the foundation to allege a breach of the bailment agreement.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially granted summary judgment to the retailer, holding that the bailment claim was time-barred. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, finding there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the foundation’s ownership of the piano at the time of the agreement. On remand, the case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict for the foundation on its breach-of-bailment claim, and judgment was entered accordingly.The First Circuit reviewed the retailer’s appeal, where he challenged the judgment on grounds that certain emails should not have been admitted at trial, that the foundation was judicially estopped from pursuing its claim, and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the emails under the hearsay exception for statements of intent, nor in finding the emails relevant. The court also concluded that the District Court properly declined to apply judicial estoppel, as the standard does not require proof of fraudulent intent and that the jury had sufficient evidence to find a bailment agreement existed. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. View "Gibson Foundation, Inc. v. Norris" on Justia Law

Riverdale Mills Corporation operates a wire mesh manufacturing facility in Northbridge, Massachusetts. In 2019, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted two investigations at Riverdale’s facility, which resulted in citations alleging violations of safety and health standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Riverdale contested these citations, and after a consolidated hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) in 2021, the ALJ affirmed three citation items while vacating or withdrawing the others.Subsequently, in December 2023, Riverdale applied to the ALJ for recovery of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). To establish eligibility for this recovery, Riverdale submitted its 2019 balance sheet as evidence, along with a motion to seal the document due to alleged confidential business information. The Secretary of Labor opposed the motion, arguing Riverdale had not demonstrated sufficient grounds for sealing. After considering submissions from both parties, the ALJ denied Riverdale’s motion to seal, applying balancing tests from D.C. Circuit and First Circuit case law and concluding Riverdale had not shown compelling reasons to overcome the presumption of public access. Riverdale attempted to appeal this denial to the OSHRC Commission, but the Commission automatically dismissed the appeal for lack of quorum.Riverdale then sought interlocutory review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit assumed interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and reviewed the ALJ’s denial for abuse of discretion. It held that Riverdale had waived certain arguments by not raising them earlier and determined the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion to seal, finding Riverdale failed to meet its burden to justify sealing the balance sheet. The petition for review was denied. View "Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Chavez-DeRemer" on Justia Law

The State of Maine filed two similar lawsuits against 3M Company, alleging that per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) manufactured by 3M had contaminated various natural resources across Maine. One suit targeted PFAS contamination from 3M’s production of Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF), a firefighting product, while the other (the “non-AFFF” case) sought recovery for PFAS contamination not related to AFFF. Maine included a disclaimer in the non-AFFF complaint, stating it was not seeking relief for contamination related to AFFF, including military specification (MilSpec) AFFF, which was produced under federal direction and used at military and other federally regulated sites.3M removed both cases to the United States District Court for the District of Maine under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that PFAS from AFFF and non-AFFF sources had plausibly commingled at various sites, giving rise to a colorable federal defense. Maine did not oppose removal of the AFFF case but moved to remand the non-AFFF case, contending that its disclaimer precluded any federal defense. The district court agreed with Maine, finding that the disclaimer shifted the burden to the State to prove contamination was not from AFFF, and thus remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the remand order. The court held that 3M’s theory—that PFAS contamination from MilSpec AFFF, for which it has a federal contractor defense, is commingled with other PFAS contamination—must be credited at this stage. The court concluded that the disclaimer did not eliminate 3M’s colorable federal defense or the “related to” nexus required for federal officer removal. The First Circuit ordered the case returned to federal court for further proceedings. View "Maine v. 3M Company" on Justia Law