Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

George Rodrique, II, a photographer for WCVB-TV, sued his employer, Hearst Stations, Inc. ("Hearst"), after it denied his request for a religious exemption from the company's COVID-19 vaccination requirement and subsequently terminated him for refusing to receive the vaccine. Rodrique claimed that Hearst's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits religious discrimination in employment.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Hearst's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Rodrique's objections to the vaccine were not religious in nature. The court did not address whether accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on Hearst.Rodrique appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that his objections were indeed religious and that granting the exemption would not have caused undue hardship. He contended that Hearst provided insufficient evidence that the COVID-19 vaccine reduces virus transmission.The First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Rodrique's objections were religious. However, it affirmed the district court's summary judgment on different grounds, holding that Hearst reasonably relied on objective medical evidence, including public health guidance, to conclude that the vaccine reduces the likelihood of transmitting COVID-19. The court found that Hearst's reliance on such evidence was reasonable and that accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on the company. Thus, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Hearst. View "Rodrique v. Hearst Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Maine healthcare workers who were terminated from their employment for refusing to comply with a COVID-19 vaccine mandate based on their religious beliefs. The mandate, initially promulgated by emergency rule on August 12, 2021, was no longer enforced as of July 12, 2023, and was repealed effective September 5, 2023. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, asserting that the mandate's lack of religious exemptions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Their motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was denied, and the denial was affirmed by the First Circuit. The Supreme Court also denied their application for emergency injunctive relief.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, which was granted. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, reinstating the First Amendment Free Exercise and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against state health officials. Following the repeal of the mandate, the defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims as moot, and the district court granted the motion, also denying the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's determinations. The court held that the challenge was moot because the COVID-19 vaccine mandate had been repealed and was no longer in effect. The court also found that no exceptions to mootness, such as voluntary cessation or capable of repetition yet evading review, applied. The court further affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint, concluding that justice did not require permitting further amendments to broaden the scope of their claims. View "Lowe v. Gagne-Holmes" on Justia Law

Humana, a health insurance company and Medicare Part C and Part D sponsor, filed a lawsuit against Biogen, a drug manufacturer, and Advanced Care Scripts, Inc. (ACS), a specialty pharmacy, in the District of Massachusetts. Humana alleged that Biogen and ACS engaged in fraudulent schemes involving three multiple sclerosis drugs, violating the civil RICO statute. Humana claimed that Biogen "seeded" the market with these drugs, funneled patients into Medicare, and indirectly funded patient copays through third-party patient-assistance programs (PAPs). Humana also alleged that ACS aided Biogen's scheme by steering patients and acting as an intermediary between Biogen and the PAPs, causing the submission of false certifications to Humana.The district court dismissed the case, ruling that Humana lacked standing to bring RICO claims because it was an indirect purchaser and failed to plead the RICO claims with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court found that Humana did not specify the time, place, and content of the alleged fraudulent communications and failed to detail the false certifications' language, timing, and context. Humana's motion for leave to amend the complaint was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Humana failed to meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) for its RICO claim. The court held that Humana did not provide specific details about the fraudulent certifications or the use of mail or wire communications in furtherance of the scheme. The court also upheld the denial of leave to amend, citing undue delay and the inefficiency of seeking amendment after dismissal. View "Humana Inc. v. Biogen, Inc." on Justia Law

Jesse Sutherland was employed as an oil service technician at Peterson's Oil Service, Inc. ("Peterson's"). Two months into his job, he injured his right knee, leading to a torn meniscus and damaged patella. Sutherland requested reduced work hours due to his injury and eventually took a 12-week leave for knee surgery. Upon attempting to return to work, he was informed of his termination, effective the date he was supposed to return, citing a lack of work during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sutherland sued Peterson's for disability discrimination and related claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Peterson's, leading Sutherland to appeal. The district court concluded that Sutherland did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, particularly questioning whether his knee injury qualified as a disability under the ADA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its analysis. The appellate court concluded that Sutherland provided sufficient evidence to show that his knee injury was a disability under the ADA, as it substantially limited his major life activities. The court also found that Sutherland's requests for reduced work hours were reasonable and that Peterson's failed to engage in the interactive process required by law. The appellate court vacated the district court's summary judgment on Sutherland's disability-related claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision regarding Sutherland's wrongful termination claim based on alleged violation of Massachusetts public policy, as Sutherland did not provide sufficient evidence of a well-defined public policy supporting his views on biofuel. View "Sutherland v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Regina M. Thornton was employed by Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. as Associate Director - Patient Safety. In September 2021, Ipsen required employees to receive COVID-19 vaccinations. Thornton requested a religious exemption, which Ipsen denied. After she did not comply with the vaccination requirement, Ipsen terminated her employment. Thornton sued Ipsen in the Superior Court of Massachusetts, alleging violations of Title VII, Massachusetts law (Chapter 151B), the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (MDR). Ipsen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and moved to dismiss all counts. The Magistrate Judge granted Ipsen's motion, dismissing Thornton's complaint. Thornton appealed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Thornton's complaint, finding that she failed to state a plausible claim of religious discrimination under Title VII or Chapter 151B. The court concluded that Thornton did not adequately state her religious beliefs or how they related to vaccines. The court also found that Thornton's federal constitutional claims failed because Ipsen was not a state actor, and her MDR claims failed because the MDR does not provide a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the Magistrate Judge's dismissal of Thornton's religious discrimination claims under Title VII and Chapter 151B, finding that she had plausibly alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the vaccination requirement. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of her federal constitutional claims, as the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private actors like Ipsen. The court also affirmed the dismissal of her MDR claims, noting that Thornton had waived any argument that her claim should be reimagined under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. View "Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

On June 1, 2021, two masked men, later identified as Hall and Medina, abducted a U.S. postal worker at gunpoint to interrogate him about a package with missing contents, which was found to contain illicit drugs. During an undercover operation, law enforcement arrested Hall, Garay, and Medina while they attempted to collect other drug-laden packages. Officers seized five telephones from the defendants and obtained search warrants for the phones' contents and historical cell site location information (CSLI) for two defendants. A federal grand jury indicted the defendants on charges including kidnapping, conspiracy, and drug possession.The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island found the warrants lacked probable cause due to missing referenced exhibits in the applications and suppressed the evidence. The court also rejected the government's argument that the good faith exception from United States v. Leon should apply, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the officer executing the warrants acted in good faith. The court noted that the officer, Inspector Atwood, had no reason to believe the affidavits were not attached and relied reasonably on the USAO to file the applications correctly. The court distinguished this case from United States v. Sheehan, emphasizing that the incorporation language was explicit and the error was not systemic but isolated. Consequently, the First Circuit vacated the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Medina" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, a local attorney, was contracted by Theory Wellness, a marijuana dispensary operator, to assist in obtaining a host community agreement from the City of Medford, Massachusetts. Instead of legitimate lobbying, the defendant attempted to bribe Medford's chief of police through the chief's brother. This led to the defendant's convictions on two counts of honest-services wire fraud and one count of federal programs bribery.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the trial, where a jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent twenty-four-month terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of certain testimony, and the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the honest-services wire fraud convictions, finding that the district court erroneously admitted the only evidence establishing the jurisdictional element of those counts. However, the court affirmed the federal programs bribery conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant intended to bribe the chief of police.The court held that the defendant's actions constituted a bribery scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 666, even if the defendant did not believe the chief had accepted the bribe. The court also found that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the requirement of an "official act" was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the defendant sought official acts from the chief. The court rejected the defendant's entrapment defense, finding no improper inducement by the government and that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. View "United States v. O'Donovan" on Justia Law

Dario Giambro was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The conviction stemmed from evidence found by police officers who forcibly entered his home in Hebron, Maine, without a warrant. The officers entered the home based on information from Giambro's son, Antonio, who reported that his mother, Arline, had died and was not in the house. Giambro argued that the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the evidence should be suppressed. He also challenged the charge on Second Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied Giambro's motion to suppress, ruling that the entry fell within the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The court found that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Arline might be in need of immediate aid, despite Antonio's report that she had died and was not in the house. The court also denied Giambro's motion to dismiss the charge on Second Amendment grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's application of the emergency aid exception. The appellate court held that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Arline was alive and in need of immediate aid, given that Antonio had been in the house that morning and reported that she was not there. The court emphasized that the officers should have spoken to Antonio and Giambro, who were available for questioning, before forcibly entering the home. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, vacated Giambro's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address the Second Amendment claim due to its ruling on the Fourth Amendment issue. View "United States v. Giambro" on Justia Law

A family of four from Ecuador, including Milton Geovanny Vargas Panchi, his wife, and their two children, entered the United States in August 2021. They sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming persecution based on race and membership in the social group of "Indigenous Ecuadorian men." Vargas Panchi cited frequent discrimination, including verbal harassment, threats, and a physical attack after a soccer game, as well as denial of medical treatment due to his indigeneity. He provided declarations, photographs, and country-conditions evidence to support his claims.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and Vargas Panchi conceded removability but applied for asylum and withholding of removal. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found his testimony credible but concluded that the attack after the soccer game was motivated by the opposing team's loss rather than his indigeneity. The IJ also found that other discrimination he faced did not rise to the level of persecution and that his fear of future persecution was not objectively well-founded. Consequently, the IJ denied his asylum and withholding of removal claims.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that there was no clear error in the IJ's finding that the soccer game attack lacked a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA also concurred that the other discrimination Vargas Panchi faced did not constitute persecution. As a result, the BIA concluded that he was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's findings, including the lack of a nexus between the soccer game attack and a protected ground, and the determination that the denial of medical care did not rise to the level of persecution. The court also agreed that Vargas Panchi did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Vargas Panchi v. Garland" on Justia Law

Justin and Jared Brackett own and operate two restaurants in Harwich, Massachusetts: Ember Pizza, Inc. and The Port Restaurant and Bar, Inc. Both establishments held liquor and entertainment licenses issued by the town. Allegedly, they violated Harwich's noise ordinance and Massachusetts COVID-19 restrictions, leading to suspensions and restrictions on their permits. In response, they sued Harwich, several town officials, and other individuals in federal district court, asserting various federal and state claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts largely granted the defendants' dispositive motions, rejecting all of Ember and The Port's claims. The court also denied their request for leave to amend their complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. Ember and The Port then appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that Ember and The Port failed to state a plausible claim for relief under federal law, including their First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and procedural due process claims. The court also found that the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims and common law claims, including civil conspiracy and defamation, were inadequately pleaded. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the original complaint. View "3137, LLC v. Town of Harwich" on Justia Law