Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

US Ghost Adventures, LLC (Ghost Adventures) operates a bed and breakfast at the Lizzie Borden House in Fall River, Massachusetts, offering ghost tours and related activities. Ghost Adventures holds federal trademarks for the name "Lizzie Borden" and a hatchet logo. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC (Miss Lizzie's) opened a coffee shop next to the Lizzie Borden House, using the Lizzie Borden story in its marketing, including a hatchet logo and references to being "The Most Haunted Coffee Shop in the World." Some visitors mistakenly believed the two businesses were affiliated.Ghost Adventures sued Miss Lizzie's in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for trademark infringement and unfair competition, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop Miss Lizzie's from using the "Lizzie Borden" name and hatchet logo. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding that Ghost Adventures failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court determined that the key element in any infringement action is the likelihood of confusion, which Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate. The court found that Miss Lizzie's hatchet logo and use of the name "Lizzie" were not similar enough to Ghost Adventures' trademarks to cause confusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the hatchet logos were dissimilar and that Miss Lizzie's reference to "Lizzie" was to the historical figure, not the trademark. The court also found that any consumer confusion was due to the proximity of the businesses and their common reliance on the Lizzie Borden story, not the similarity of their marks. The court concluded that Ghost Adventures did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, and the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC" on Justia Law

Gerson Adonay Cortez-Mejia, his wife, and their two minor children, all natives and citizens of El Salvador, petitioned for judicial review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). They sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming fear of persecution by rival gangs in El Salvador. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the petitioners credible but denied their applications, determining they had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. The IJ also found they failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal and CAT protection.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the petitioners' experiences did not rise to the level of past persecution and that they had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution linked to a protected ground. The BIA also noted the petitioners had not articulated a cognizable particular social group and had not meaningfully pursued their CAT claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the petitioners' fear of gang violence was generalized and not linked to a protected ground. The court also upheld the BIA's finding that the petitioners had not established a cognizable particular social group. Consequently, the court denied the petition for judicial review, affirming the BIA's decision to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Cortez-Mejia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gloria Cocuzzo, a long-term employee of Trader Joe's East Inc., claimed she was terminated due to age discrimination. Cocuzzo, who began working at Trader Joe's in 2003 and was promoted to Merchant in 2012, received positive performance reviews and regular pay increases. In February 2021, she purchased beer for her underage grandson, also an employee at the store. This incident was reported to her supervisor, Jennifer Gillum, who, after consulting with a regional vice president, decided to terminate Cocuzzo. Cocuzzo was given the option to retire but was ultimately terminated when she refused to sign a termination notice.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Trader Joe's and Gillum, finding no evidence of age discrimination. The court held that Trader Joe's had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Cocuzzo, namely her violation of the store's alcohol policy by purchasing alcohol for an underage individual. The court also found that Cocuzzo failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that this reason was a pretext for age discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Trader Joe's had a legitimate reason for terminating Cocuzzo and that she did not provide adequate evidence to prove that this reason was a pretext for age discrimination. The court also found that the evidence presented by Cocuzzo, including her positive performance reviews and the treatment of other employees, did not support her claims of disparate treatment or discriminatory animus. Consequently, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Trader Joe's and Gillum. View "Cocuzzo v. Trader Joe's East Inc." on Justia Law

Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, a native and citizen of El Salvador, along with his wife Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia and their minor child, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of their asylum requests. Urias-Orellana also sought review of the denial of his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The denials were based on the grounds that the petitioners did not demonstrate harm rising to the level of persecution for asylum or withholding of removal and did not show they could not reasonably relocate within El Salvador. Additionally, Urias-Orellana did not prove it was likely he would face torture with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.The IJ found Urias-Orellana's testimony credible but concluded that the threats and assault he experienced did not amount to past persecution. The IJ also determined that the petitioners did not meet their burden of showing a reasonable fear of future persecution, noting that Urias-Orellana's relatives lived unharmed in El Salvador and that he had successfully relocated within the country without facing harm. The IJ further found that Urias-Orellana's CAT claim failed because he did not report his harassment to the police and did not demonstrate that doing so would be futile.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the threats and assault did not constitute persecution and that the petitioners had not shown that internal relocation would be unreasonable. The BIA also upheld the IJ's finding that Urias-Orellana had not shown he qualified for CAT relief, noting his failure to report the mistreatment to the authorities.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for judicial review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Agency's conclusions that the petitioners did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and that Urias-Orellana did not meet the burden for CAT protection. View "Urias-Orellana v. Garland" on Justia Law

An Ecuadorian woman, along with her minor daughter, entered the United States in June 2021, fleeing domestic abuse by her former partner, Fausto. She applied for asylum, arguing that Ecuadorian authorities would not protect her from Fausto. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her and her daughter. At a hearing, she conceded inadmissibility and applied for asylum. She testified about the abuse and an incident where neighbors called the police, who wanted to arrest Fausto, but she asked them not to due to fear of retaliation. She never reported Fausto to Ecuadorian authorities and eventually separated from him, moving to the U.S. with him and their daughter.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her asylum application, finding that she did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ noted that the violence was not connected to government action or inaction, as the petitioner never reported Fausto to the police, and the police had shown willingness to arrest him. The IJ also found that the petitioner did not have an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, given her continued interactions with Fausto in the U.S. and her testimony that no one in Ecuador would harm her.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the petitioner failed to show that the Ecuadorian government was unwilling or unable to protect her. The BIA also upheld the IJ's finding that the petitioner did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution, as Fausto's return to Ecuador was speculative and there was no evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution against Ecuadorian women.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence, including the petitioner's failure to report the abuse and the police's willingness to arrest Fausto. The court also found that the petitioner did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution or a pattern or practice of persecution against Ecuadorian women. View "Medina-Suguilanda v. Garland" on Justia Law

A Transportation Security Officer (TSO) claimed she was terminated due to her disability, gender, and parental status, and alleged retaliation for filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Her employer, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), attributed her termination to her erratic attendance, including numerous tardies and unscheduled absences, despite multiple warnings.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment in favor of TSA on all claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her claims of discrimination and retaliation. Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiff's attendance issues persisted even when she was on a modified work schedule and that TSA had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation. However, it found that TSA had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, including the plaintiff's chronic absenteeism and failure to follow leave procedures. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that these reasons were pretextual or that TSA's actions were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for TSA on all counts, holding that the plaintiff did not meet her burden to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext and discriminatory or retaliatory intent. View "Serrano-Colon v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Local Puerto Rico merchants brought unfair competition claims against major big-box retailers, alleging that during the COVID-19 pandemic, Costco Wholesale Corp. and Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. violated executive orders limiting sales to essential goods. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants continued to sell non-essential items, capturing sales that would have otherwise gone to local retailers, and sought damages for lost sales during the 72-day period the orders were in effect.The case was initially filed as a putative class action in Puerto Rico's Court of First Instance. Costco removed the case to federal district court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court denied Costco's motion to sever the claims against it and also denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court. The district court dismissed most of the plaintiffs' claims but allowed the unfair competition claim to proceed. However, it later denied class certification and granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that the executive orders did not create an enforceable duty on the part of Costco and Wal-Mart.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case on jurisdictional grounds. The court held that CAFA jurisdiction is not lost when a district court denies class certification. It also held that CAFA's "home state" exception did not apply because Costco, a non-local defendant, was a primary defendant. However, the court found that CAFA's "local controversy" exception applied because the conduct of Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, a local defendant, formed a significant basis for the claims. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Costco's motion to sever and determined that the entire case should be remanded to the Puerto Rico courts. The court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to remand, vacated the judgment on the merits for lack of jurisdiction, and instructed the district court to remand the case to the Puerto Rico courts. View "Kress Stores of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, American Airlines and JetBlue Airways formed the Northeast Alliance (NEA), a joint venture to operate as a single airline for most routes in and out of Boston and New York City. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), along with several states, sued to stop the NEA, claiming it violated the Sherman Act by unreasonably restraining competition. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the NEA reduced competition and output without sufficient procompetitive benefits. American Airlines appealed the decision.The district court found that the NEA caused American and JetBlue to stop competing on overlapping routes, leading to decreased capacity and reduced consumer choices. The court also found that the NEA's schedule coordination and revenue-sharing provisions effectively merged the two airlines' operations in the Northeast, which resembled illegal market allocation. The court rejected the airlines' claims that the NEA increased capacity and provided significant consumer benefits, finding these claims unsupported by reliable evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the NEA had substantial anticompetitive effects. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court's factual findings and upheld its application of the rule of reason. The court concluded that the NEA's harms outweighed any procompetitive benefits, which could have been achieved through less restrictive means. The judgment of the district court was affirmed, and the NEA was enjoined from further implementation. View "US v. American Airlines Group Inc." on Justia Law

A general contractor, Tocci Building Corporation, and its affiliates were involved in a dispute with their insurers, including Admiral Insurance Company, over coverage under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. The issue was whether the CGL policy covered damage to non-defective parts of a construction project caused by a subcontractor's defective work on another part of the project. Tocci sought defense and indemnity coverage under the Admiral policy for a lawsuit filed by Toll JM EB Residential Urban Renewal LLC, which alleged various issues with Tocci's work on a residential construction project.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded that Admiral had no duty to defend Tocci. The court found that the lawsuit did not allege "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" as required for coverage under the policy. The court reasoned that the damage alleged was within the scope of the project Tocci was hired to complete and thus did not qualify as "property damage." Additionally, the court held that faulty workmanship did not constitute an "accident" and therefore was not an "occurrence" under the policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, but for different reasons. The appellate court focused on the policy's exclusions, particularly the "Damage to Property" exclusion (j)(6), which excludes coverage for property that must be restored, repaired, or replaced because the insured's work was incorrectly performed on it. The court concluded that this exclusion applied to the entire project since Tocci was the general contractor responsible for the entire construction. The court also noted that Tocci did not meet its burden of showing that any exceptions to the exclusion applied, such as the "products-completed operations hazard," because Tocci's work was not completed or abandoned. Thus, the appellate court held that Admiral had no duty to defend Tocci in the underlying lawsuit. View "Admiral Insurance Company v. Tocci Building Corporation" on Justia Law

Akeish Johnioy Morgan, a Jamaican national, entered the United States illegally on June 11, 2022. Prior to his entry, a Jamaican justice of the peace issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and wounding with intent. Morgan sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The IJ found Morgan ineligible for asylum, statutory withholding, and CAT withholding due to the warrants issued against him in Jamaica, concluding there were serious reasons to believe he committed a serious nonpolitical crime. The BIA affirmed this decision, agreeing that the warrants and supporting evidence barred Morgan's eligibility for non-CAT deferral relief. The BIA also upheld the IJ's determination that Morgan was ineligible for CAT deferral, finding that the beatings Morgan claimed to have suffered did not constitute past torture and that he failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of future torture upon his return to Jamaica.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the agency's serious-nonpolitical-crime finding, agreeing it was supported by substantial evidence, thus sustaining Morgan's ineligibility for asylum, statutory withholding, and CAT withholding. However, the court found that the agency's likelihood-of-future-torture finding, which determined Morgan's ineligibility for CAT deferral, was based on an erroneously narrow legal definition of torture. Consequently, the court granted Morgan's petition in part, vacating the CAT deferral determination and remanding the case to the BIA to reassess the likelihood of future torture using the correct legal definition. View "Morgan v. Garland" on Justia Law