Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the district court did not err by declining to grant Appellant’s motion to suppress cocaine found in the trunk of a vehicle in which Appellant was a passenger; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing the attorneys of the driver of the vehicle to testify about her statements claiming responsibility for the drugs; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not declaring a mistrial based on certain statements made at trial. View "United States v. Awer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine base. Appellant was sentenced to seventy months in jail. On appeal, Appellant challenged his conviction and his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly admitted testimony from a government agent because the testimony was not improper overview; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting law enforcement officers to interpret for the jury what was taking place on recordings; (3) the government’s failure to lay a foundation for certain identification testimony did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights; and (4) Appellant’s sentence was not violative of Alleyne v. United States. View "United States v. Etienne" on Justia Law

In this case involving a class action complaint filed against CVS Pharmacy Inc. in Massachusetts Superior Court for wage and hour violations, the First Circuit clarified the removal time periods and mechanisms under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. CVS filed a second notice of removal, claiming that there was a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, holding (1) CVS’s notice of removal came too late to meet the thirty-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1), and the second thirty-day deadline in section 1446(b)(3) did not apply; and (2) CVS had not met its burden to establish the substantive amount in controversy requirement. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the time limits in section 1446(b) apply when the plaintiffs’ pleadings or the plaintiffs’ “other papers” provide the defendant with a clear statement of the damages sought or with sufficient facts from which damages can be readily calculated; (2) CVS’s second notice of removal was timely under section 1446(b)(3); and (3) CVS sufficiently demonstrated that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. View "Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal concerned a preliminary injunction entered against Joshua Powell in litigation resulting from several contracts between the company Powell founded and a new joint venture formed with a non-party. At issue before the First Circuit was whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. The First Circuit left the preliminary injunction temporarily in place and remanded with instructions, directing that the district court review the matter of irreparable injury and vacate the preliminary injunction if it finds irreparable harm to be lacking, and if the court find irreparable harm and an otherwise sufficient basis for injunctive relief, that it hear the parties’ arguments on the appropriate scope and language of the injunction. View "JL Powell Clothing LLC v. Powell" on Justia Law

Brendon Lydon, a member of Local 103 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, sued Local 103 in district court, alleging that the union violated several federal labor laws by running its hiring hall in a discriminatory way, retaliating against him for complaining about the discrimination, and breaching its duty of fair representation. Local 103 moved to dismiss the complaint. The district judge granted a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, concluding that Lydon’s complaint failed to allege a plausible theory of relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim. View "Lydon v. Local 103, Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers" on Justia Law

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued Frontier Fishing a notice of violation and assessment and a notice of permit sanction after determining that Frontier Fishing was liable for trawling in a restricted gear area in violation of regulations promulgated under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishing Conservation and Management Act. Frontier Fishing denied liability. On appeal, Frontier Fishing argued that the record lacked substantial evidence for a rational finding that its vessel trawled in the restricted area. The district court upheld the NOAA Administrator’s final decision. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the NOAA’s finding. View "Frontier Fishing Corp. v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Indonesian citizen, submitted an application for asylum, alleging that she experienced persecution as an Indonesian Christian. An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and granted her request for voluntary departure, concluding that Petitioner’s account did not rise to the level of past persecution, nor did Petitioner demonstrate that she would be persecuted if she returned to Indonesia. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the order of removal, holding that the IJ’s and BIA’s legal conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Remanded to the BIA to make a well-reasoned determination as to Petitioner’s eligibility for asylum. View "Panoto v. Holder" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the regulation by the state of Massachusetts of the display of billboards and other outdoor signage. Plaintiffs, related companies engaged in the business of erecting and displaying billboards and outdoor signage, brought suit against Massachusetts state agencies and officials charged with administering the regulations, alleging, among other things, that the regulations violated Plaintiff’s free speech rights under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the First Amendment claim for want of standing. The First Circuit reversed the order dismissing the First Amendment claim, holding that Plaintiffs had standing to proceed with their challenge because the complaint plausibly alleged that Plaintiffs were subject to a regulatory permitting scheme that chilled protected expression by granting a state official unbridled discretion over the licensing of their expressive conduct and that posed a real threat of censorship. View "Van Wagner Boston, LLC v. Davey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the parents of a minor child with Asperger’s Syndrome, filed suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Department of Education under a number of federal and state statutes for alleged retaliation and discrimination against their child. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the claims against it pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead either discrimination or retaliation, and therefore, dismissal of their federal claims was proper; and (2) Plaintiffs’ argument that the Commonwealth waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment was waived for lack of development. View "Lebron v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice complaint in the Puerto Rico Court of the First Instance then voluntarily dismissed their suit and re-filed in federal court. In their federal complaint, Plaintiffs named as defendants Hospital Damas, Inc., various hospital employees, and several unnamed entities. Six weeks before the scheduled start of trial, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint to include Fundacion Damas, Inc. as a defendant. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion because of Plaintiffs’ undue delay in moving to amend. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to act with sufficient speed in seeking to add the new defendant. View "Perez v. Hosp. Damas, Inc." on Justia Law