Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. Petitioner appealed his conviction, contending that the Commonwealth used its peremptory challenges to exclude young African Americans in violation of the equal protection principles laid down in Batson v. Kentucky. The Massachusetts Appeals Court (MAC) concluded that Petitioner had failed to make a prima facie showing that the Commonwealth’s use of peremptory challenges was likely motivated by the jurors’ race. Petitioner failed to obtain relief on appeal in the Massachusetts courts and subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the MAC’s application of the first Batson prong was clear error and represented an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Remanded to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to complete the Batson inquiry. View "Sanchez v. Roden" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several drug trafficking crimes. Defendant engaged in several pre-trial antics in an apparent effort to put off the trial, including seeking continuances of the trial and ostensibly firing his attorney. Because of Defendant’s continued complaints about his attorney, Defendant ended up representing himself at trial. The jury ultimately convicted Defendant on all counts. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not deprive Defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice when she allowed Defendant to represent himself at trial; and (2) the district judge did not err in refusing Defendant’s motions to continue. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff refinanced her home in Massachusetts. The mortgage contract identified MortgageIT as the lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee. MortgageIT sold Plaintiff’s note, which changed hands several times before being deposited into a Trust, of which U.S. Bank was trustee. MERS assigned the mortgage to OneWest Bank. Following the 2011 foreclosure on her home, Plaintiff filed suit against U.S. Bank, OneWest, and MERS, contending that OneWest was never assigned valid legal title, rendering the foreclosure void. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for failure to state a claim, finding that the First Circuit’s decision in Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska was fatal to Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court’s reliance on Culhane. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Culhane was on point, as Plaintiff’s argument was a variation of the same challenge raised in Culhane. View "Mills v. U.S. Bank N.A." on Justia Law

Richard Feingold’s mother purchased a life insurance policy from an Insurer listing her husband as the only beneficiary. Feingold's mother died in 2006. In 2012, Richard informed Insurer of his mother's death. The Insurer issued Feingold a check for death benefits but did not provide a copy of his mother's life insurance policy. Feingold filed a class action complaint against Insurer in 2013, alleging that the Insurer owed Feingold and the putative class of similarly situated beneficiaries damages based on the Insurer’s handling of unclaimed benefits under its life insurance policies. Specifically, Feingold claimed that the Insurer had an obligation, arising from a regulatory agreement (“Agreement”) between the Insurer and several states, to discover the death of its insureds and notify beneficiaries. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, noting that the Agreement was a contract only between Insurer and participating states. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because Feingold was neither a party nor a third-party beneficiary of the Agreement, he had no authority to enforce the terms of the Agreement. View "Feingold v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted as an accessory before the fact to George Carpenter’s murder. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) reversed the conviction, concluding that the indictment charging Petitioner improperly defined the offense on which he was tried. The Commonwealth subsequently indicted Petitioner for the murder of Carpenter. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the second prosecution was barred by double jeopardy as incorporated against the states. The SJC affirmed the trial judge’s denial of Petitioner’s motion, concluding that its earlier reversal had been based on a variance between the crime charged and the crime proved at trial under state law, and a second prosecution under these facts did not give rise to a double jeopardy problem. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas relief, claiming that his pending prosecution was barred by double jeopardy. The district court granted the petition. The First Circuit reversed, holding that under Tibbs v. Florida, the SJC’s interpretation of its earlier reversal and the requirements of Massachusetts law bound the Court, and therefore, Petitioner’s double jeopardy argument necessarily failed. View "Marshall v. Bristol Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against his former employer, DDR Corp., after his employment was terminated. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that DDR discriminated against him on the basis of sex by terminating him after his co-worker, whose sexual advances he refused, maligned his job performance. The district court granted summary judgment to DDR. The First Circuit (1) vacated the portion of the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment against Plaintiff on his sex discrimination claim, holding (i) a reasonable jury could find that the jilted co-worker’s discriminatory efforts were the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s termination, and (ii) although the co-worker was not Plaintiff’s direct supervisor, DDR could nonetheless be found liable for negligently allowing the co-worker’s discriminatory acts to cause Plaintiff’s firing; and (2) otherwise affirmed the judgment of the district court. Remanded. View "Velazquez-Perez v. Developers Diversified Realty" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former police officer with the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD), was caught providing armed protection for sham drug transactions through a sting operation controlled by the FBI. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on multiple counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, attempt to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, and possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking scheme. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant the opportunity to present entrapment, derivative entrapment or duress defenses; (3) the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were not improper; and (4) Defendant’s conviction and sentences were not improperly multiplicitous. View "United States v. Diaz-Castro" on Justia Law

Defendant was prosecuted in federal court for possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), after police officers took several digital devices from his home, including a thumb drive that contained child pornography. To establish that the pornography was “produced using materials which have been…shipping or transported” in interstate commerce, the prosecution relied on an inscription on the thumb drive stating, “Made in China.” The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) copying pornography onto a thumb drive is “producing” pornography under the statute, and the Court’s interpretation of the law did not put it beyond Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce; (2) the district court did not err by admitting as evidence the drive’s inscription over Defendant’s hearsay objection; and (3) the warrant to search Defendant’s home and the devices inside it was constitutional. View "United States v. Burdulis" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff attempted to film a police officer as he was conducting a traffic stop, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with violating New Hampshire’s wiretapping statute, among other crimes. Plaintiff was not brought to trial. Plaintiff subsequently brought a First Amendment claim against the police officers, the police department, and the Town of Weare, alleging that the wiretapping charge constituted retaliatory prosecution. The officers moved for summary judgment, claiming that they were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right to film the traffic stop. The district court denied the officers’ motions for summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) it was clearly established at the time of the stop that the First Amendment gives citizens the right to film police carrying out their duties in public if no reasonable restriction is imposed or in place; and (2) therefore, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to the officers on Plaintiff’s claim that the wiretapping charge constituted retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment. View "Gericke v. Begin" on Justia Law

In 2005, Debtor secured a loan with a mortgage on her home and stayed current on all mortgage payments on the property. Debtor’s bank, however, failed to record the mortgage with the appropriate registry. In 2011, Debtor filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Although Debtor’s home was subject to a homestead exemption, the Trustee of Debtor’s bankruptcy estate sought to sell the home as property of the bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, Trustee filed a complaint to avoid the unrecorded mortgage and to preserve it for the benefit of the estate. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the Trustee, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the Trustee’s lien avoidance and preservation powers did not justify him in selling Debtor’s home as property of the bankruptcy estate. View "Degiacomo v. Traverse" on Justia Law