Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was fifty-five years old when he was hired to work as an assistant manager at Walgreens. In 2011, Walgreens terminated Plaintiff’s employment after Plaintiff failed to provide what Walgreens considered to be adequate customer service. Plaintiff filed suit in federal court, alleging that his employment was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(1B). The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreens. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff (1) did not raise any genuine issue as to whether Walgreens believed the truth of its stated reason for terminating him; (2) did not demonstrate pretext through a showing that Walgreens violated its policy to uniformly enforce the rules; and (3) did not demonstrate that Walgreens’ proffered reason for terminating him was pretext designed to disguise age discrimination. View "Adamson v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, in response to Congress’s enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which narrowed the eligibility of non-citizens for Medicaid and other federal benefits, the state of Maine extended state-funded medical assistance benefits to certain legal aliens rendered ineligible for Medicaid. In 2011, the Maine Legislature terminated these benefits. Appellants moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the 2011 legislation, alleging that the state violated their equal protection rights by providing state-funded medical assistance benefits to United States citizens while denying those benefits to similarly situated non-citizens due solely to their alienage. The district court denied Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, holding that Appellants’ equal protection claim failed on the merits because the state of Maine was not obligated to extend equivalent state-funded benefits to Appellants in the first place, and therefore, the termination of those benefits did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "Bruns v. Mayhew" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to commit money laundering as set forth in an indictment that also included drug-trafficking charges. The district court subsequently sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment of 220 months. Appellant appealed his sentence, contending that the district court unduly relied on evidence concerning the underlying drug crimes rather than the money-laundering itself when determining his sentence. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) remanded the matter with directions to revisit the application of the enhancement for being “in the business of laundering” funds, holding that more specific factual findings were necessary to allow the Court to adequately review the application of that enhancement; and (2) upheld the district court’s other sentencing determinations, holding that Appellant’s other claims of error were meritless. View "United States v. Lucena-Rivera" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Nepal, was subject to removal proceedings. In 2010, Petitioner conceded removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and, alternatively, voluntary departure. In support of his petition, Petitioner presented evidence to the immigration judge (IJ) that he suffered a single beating by a group of Maoists in 2003. The IJ denied the application for asylum, concluded that Petitioner also failed to establish a claim for either withholding of removal or protection under CAT, and granted his alternative request for voluntary departure. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Petitioner’s claims did not establish past persecution and that he did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of asylum, holding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that Petitioner did not establish past persecution and that he lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Thapaliya v. Holder" on Justia Law

After a search of Appellant’s vehicle turned up heroin, cocaine, and oxycodone, Appellant was arrested, indicted, and pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute. Relying on two prior felony convictions that Appellant had, the district court treated Defendant as a career offender and sentenced her to 108 months’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed her sentence, challenging her classification as a career offender. Specifically, Appellant argued that her two prior convictions should have been treated as one for sentencing purposes. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, holding that the district court properly sentenced Appellant as a career offender pursuant to section 4B1.1(a) of the 2006 United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Green Mountain Realty Corp. (“GMR”) sought to erect a 140-foot cell phone tower in Milton, Massachusetts that would fill a significant gap in the wireless coverage provided by T-Mobile’s networks. The Town of Milton rejected the proposed tower. GMR sued Milton in federal court. The district court granted summary judgment to Milton. The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of whether Milton’s denials resulted an “effective prohibition” of personal wireless services in contravention of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. On remand, GMR submitted evidence indicating that a shorter tower would suffice to eliminate the coverage gap in T-Mobile’s network. The district court granted summary judgment for Milton. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a reasonable finder of fact could have found Milton’s denials rejected the only feasible plan for remedying the coverage gap and therefore constituted an unlawful effective prohibition of T-Mobile’s provision of wireless services, unless GMR was allowed to build a cell phone tower between ninety and 120 feet tall. Remanded. View "Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Petitioner in this case was a native and citizen of Sri Lanka. In 2007, an immigration judge (IJ) rejected Petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordered Petitioner removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. In 2010, Petitioner moved to reopen her case, alleging changed country conditions. The BIA denied the motion. In 2012, more than three years after the BIA had affirmed Petitioner’s order of removal, Petitioner filed another motion to reopen, along with related relief, again alleging changed country conditions. The BIA denied relief, concluding that Petitioner’s proof did not show changed country conditions, that she had not shown prima facie eligibility for withholding of removal, asylum, or CAT relief, and that no exceptional circumstances justified exercising its discretion to reopen on its own. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the BIA did not reversibly err in concluding that Petitioner’s second reopen motion was barred by her failure to show a material adverse change in country conditions. View "Perera v. Holder" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to a drug conspiracy charge. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court made a prejudicial error in its Sentencing Guideline calculation and improperly imposed his sentence consecutive to a sentence he received earlier as a result of a conviction tangentially related to the relevant drug conspiracy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated Appellant’s sentence, where the government conceded that the district court erred in its Guideline calculation; and (2) affirmed the district court’s decision to impose the sentence in this case consecutively to Appellant’s earlier sentence, holding (i) the waiver of appeal in Appellant’s plea agreement did not bar Appellant’s appeal, but (ii) the consecutive sentence was not improper. Remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Santiago-Burgos" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with structuring financial transactions to evade reporting requirements in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3). After a trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment; (2) Defendant’s claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance required further factual development; (3) consistent with due process, Defendant could be convicted of structuring his transactions in a way that demonstrated his intent to evade the reporting requirements, even though he actually failed to evade them; and (4) the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, and the court’s sentencing guidelines calculation was not erroneous. View "United States v. Souza" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for aiding and abetting in the possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. Defendant filed a motion to suppress a series of inculpatory statements. Specifically, Defendant sought to suppress (1) a statement he made to his arresting officer, arguing that he was questioned while in formal custody but prior to being given Miranda warnings, and (2) all statements he made during his formal interrogation, arguing that the questioning resumed impermissibly soon after his initial refusal to make a statement and continued after his unambiguous request for counsel. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant waived his argument for suppression of the statement he made to his arresting officer; and (2) there was no violation of Defendant’s right to remain silent during his formal interrogation, and Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel in a manner sufficiently unambiguous and direct as to require the cessation of questioning. View "United States v. Oquendo-Rivas" on Justia Law