Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in February, 2014
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On September 22, 2011, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Appellant with conspiracy to defraud the United States. The indictment alleged that, from about March 29, 2005 until at least June 22, 2007, Appellant knowingly and willfully participated in a sham marriage to secure a change in immigration status for her spouse. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment as time-barred, alleging that she committed no overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy within the five-year period before the return of the indictment. Following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of the charge. On appeal, Appellant revived her argument that the indictment should have been dismissed as time-barred because the conspiratorial object was achieved on October 7, 2005, when her spouse attained conditional lawful permanent resident status, and any subsequent acts could not have been in furtherance of an already-completed conspiracy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found Appellant’s signing of Form I-751 on June 22, 2007 on her spouse’s behalf was an overt act committed in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy as alleged in the indictment. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

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Appellant was charged with possessing body armor after having been convicted of a “crime of violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. 16. The crimes that Appellant was previously convicted of under Massachusetts law included breaking and entering in the daytime, breaking and entering at night, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a burglarious instrument. The district court ruled that, at a minimum, Appellant’s convictions for breaking and entering satisfied the requirements of section 16. Appellant entered a condition guilty plea to the offense, reserving the right to challenge the determination that he had previously been convicted of a crime of violence. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Appellant’s conviction, holding that none of the crimes for which Appellant was previously convicted, as defined under Massachusetts law, qualified as a crime of violence under section 16. View "United States v. Fish" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial in the U.S. District Court, Appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. Prior to trial, Appellant unsuccessfully moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police over the course of several encounters, arguing that any waiver of his Miranda right to remain silent was a product of threats and coercion. On appeal, Appellant contended that the district court failed to instruct the jury, under 18 U.S.C. 3501(a), to “give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.” The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there was no meaningful difference between the instruction called for by section 3501 and the instruction given at Appellant’s trial; and (2) even if courts should follow more closely the precise language of section 3501, any error on the court’s part to do so in this case went unchallenged and was unlikely to have affected the outcome of Appellant’s trial. View "United States v. Colon" on Justia Law

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For twenty years, Defendants, various entities of OneBeacon American Insurance Company (collectively, “OneBeacon”), had a program known as Multiple Line Excess Cover (“MLEC Program”) under which OneBeacon entered into reinsurance contracts (“MLEC Agreements”) with various reinsurers. Employers Insurance Company of Wausau, National Casualty Company, and Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation (“Swiss Re”) participated as reinsurers in the MLEC Program. Some of the MLEC Agreements Wausau entered into with OneBeacon were practically identical to OneBeacon’s MLEC Agreements with Swiss Re. In 2007, OneBeacon demanded arbitration with Swiss Re seeking reinsurance recovery for losses arising out of claims against OneBeacon by policyholders. The arbitration panel decided in favor of Swiss Re. In 2012, OneBeacon demanded arbitration with Wausau and National Casualty for, according to Wausau, the same claims OneBeacon arbitrated and lost against Swiss Re. Wausau and National Casualty petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the prior arbitration award between OneBeacon and Swiss Re had preclusive effect on the arbitration pending between OneBeacon and Wausau. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that judicial confirmation of an arbitration award “does not warrant deviation from the general rule that the preclusive effect of a prior arbitration is a matter for the arbitrator to decide.” View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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In 2012, a grand jury in the District of Rhode Island served the Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office (NITHPO) with a subpoena duces tecum directing NITHPO to appear before the grand jury with a series of documents. NITHPO refused to produce the subpoenaed records. The sitting grand jury was subsequently discharged, and in 2013, a new grand jury was empanelled. Thereafter, the government filed a motion to compel NITHPO’s compliance with the 2012 subpoena. The district court granted the government’s motion to compel and ordered NITHPO to comply with the 2012 grand jury subpoena. After NITHPO failed to appear on the agreed-upon date, the district court adjudged NITHPO in civil contempt and imposed a fine for noncompliance. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the district court’s order holding NITHPO in civil contempt, holding that a subpoena duces tecum compelling the production of documents to a now-defunct grand jury cannot be enforced by civil contempt sanctions before a successor grand jury; and (2) rejected NITHPO’s contentions that tribal sovereign immunity shielded it from subpoena and that the subpoena was unreasonably broad in scope. View "In re Grand Jury Proceedings" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial in state court, Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. After the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal district court, asserting (1) insufficient evidence supported his conviction; and (2) because the prosecutor argued at Petitioner’s state-court trial that Petitioner had shot and killed the victim but, at an earlier state-court trial, argued that Petitioner’s accomplice had shot and killed the victim, the prosecutor’s inconsistent approaches deprived him of his due process rights. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented in Petitioner’s state-court trial was adequate to support his conviction; and (2) the prosecution of Petitioner and his accomplice in different trials on materially inconsistent theories of guilt did not violate due process, as (i) state law permitted such a course of action, (ii) any potential inconsistency in result between Petitioner’s and his accomplice’s cases had been remedied by the time the Supreme Court heard Petitioner’s appeal, and (iii) the Commonwealth did not unfairly manipulate the evidence. View "Housen v. Gelb" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint against Defendants, asserting claims related to the alleged breach of various agreements involving the sale of aviation equipment. Ultimately, a jury trial was held, and the jury awarded Plaintiff $1,112,476 in damages. After dismissing the jury, the parties filed several post-trial motions, which the district court resolved partially in favor of Plaintiff and partially in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s orders, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding that Defendants did not breach a support agreement with Plaintiffs as a matter of law; (2) holding that Plaintiff waived the issue of prejudgment interest; and (3) upholding the jury’s award of damages for Plaintiff’s claim alleging breach of a purchase agreement. View "Atlantech Inc. v. Am. Panel Corp." on Justia Law

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After Plaintiff applied unsuccessfully to be a firefighter in the Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“the Corps”) Plaintiff sued the Commonwealth, claiming that the Corps refused to hire her because of her gender. The parties eventually signed a settlement agreement pursuant to which the Corps agreed to employ Plaintiff as a transitory firefighter until the next training academy was held and to hire Plaintiff as a firefighter if she graduated from the academy. Thereafter, Plaintiff again sued the Corps, alleging that, during her transitory employment, the Corps subjected her to abuse in retaliation for her earlier suit. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her claim for unlawful retaliation. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint stated a plausible claim of unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Remanded. View "Rodriguez-Vives v. P.R. Firefighters Corps" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs granted a mortgage on their property in Massachusetts to Ameriquest Mortgage Company, which assigned its interest in the mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS). MERS later purported to assign Plaintiffs’ interest to HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (HSBC). HSBC subsequently began foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs filed an eight-count complaint against HSBC, claiming the assignment was void, and therefore, HSBC never acquired the mortgage to their property and had no right to initiate foreclosure proceedings. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that Plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the assignment because they were not a party to the assignment, nor were they third-party beneficiaries of the assignment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under Massachusetts law, homeowners in Plaintiffs’ position have standing to challenge a prior assignment of their mortgage on the grounds that the assignment was void, but because Plaintiffs did not set forth a colorable claim that the mortgage assignment in question was void, Plaintiffs lacked standing to raise certain claims; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for promissory estoppel with respect to a loan modification. View "Wilson v. HSBC Mortgage Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of second-degree murder. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal by the state court. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, which denied habeas relief but issued a certificate of appealability as to three claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the state court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for second-degree murder; (2) the state court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to find a due process violation based on the unavailability of the victim’s larynx; and (3) the state court’s determination that certain statements made by the prosecutor did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to warrant setting aside Petitioner’s conviction was not an unreasonable application of the law. View "Magraw v. Roden" on Justia Law