Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A federal law enforcement officer made a lawful traffic stop of Appellant, but by the time the officer stopped Appellant, he and Appellant were outside the jurisdiction in which the officer was authorized to make arrests. The officer could see that Appellant was intoxicated and arrested Appellant. Appellant was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence, unsafe operation of a motor vehicle, and refusal to submit to a breath test. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence from his arrest on the grounds that the officer lacked the authority to arrest him. The magistrate judge agreed that the officer lacked statutory authority to arrest Appellant but refused to suppress the evidence because the arrest was not an unreasonable seizure. The district judge affirmed the magistrate judge's decision not to suppress the evidence. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant's arrest did not constitute the kind of invasion of privacy that the Fourth Amendment prohibits. View "United States v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The City of Providence, Rhode Island enacted two ordinances to reduce tobacco use by young people. The Price Ordinance restricted the City's tobacco and cigarette retailers from reducing prices on tobacco products through coupons and multi-pack discounts. The Flavor Ordinance restricted sales of certain flavored tobacco products other than cigarettes. The National Association of Tobacco Outlets challenged the ordinances, alleging, inter alia, that the ordinances were preempted by federal and state law. The district court upheld the ordinances. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the Price Ordinance was an appropriate regulation of price, it fell outside the First Amendment; (2) because the Flavor Ordinance was an appropriate sales regulation, it was not preempted; and (3) neither ordinance conflicted with state law. View "Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. Providence, R.I." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering pursuant to a plea agreement. Defendant stipulated to the amount of money laundered and received a prison sentence within the range of the federal sentencing guidelines. Defendant appealed, seeking to vitiate his guilty plea on grounds that the record failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for his plea and asserting a claim of sentencing error. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in accepting Defendant's guilty plea, as sufficient facts supported the plea; and (2) there was no sentencing error where Defendant's stipulation removed any necessity for independent proof of the stipulated facts. View "United States v. Torres-Vazquez" on Justia Law

Defendant stole his older brother's identity to obtain five fraudulent mortgages. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to three counts of wire fraud and one count of identity fraud pursuant to a plea agreement. Under to the agreement, Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and ordered to pay $454,207 in restitution to the two defrauded mortgage companies. The plea agreement also contained an appeal waiver. Defendant appealed, challenging the restitution component of his sentence and arguing that his appeal waiver did not extend to it. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Defendant's appeal, as the waiver unambiguously encompassed restitution. View "United States v. Okoye" on Justia Law

Appellant was a criminal defense attorney that represented a client in a criminal case relating to the discharge of sewage into public waters. After trial, the First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the client's convictions and remanded for retrial. Appellant subsequently filed ten motions in limine mostly to exclude or limit certain evidence used in the first trial. The trial court issued an order sanctioning Appellant and his client for having filed the motions in limine over the course of the six days prior to the scheduled start of the trial, "abusively late." The court suggested that the motions were filed late to avoid impacting the client's speedy trial act motion or to force a continuance of the trial. The First Circuit reversed the order, holding that the trial court erred in sanctioning Appellant, as there was no clear deadline for the filing of the motions in limine. View "United States v. Agosto-Vega" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of the Dominican Republic, pled guilty in state court to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The Department of Homeland Security later ordered Petitioner's removal. Thereafter, Petitioner successfully sought vacatur of his criminal conviction. After Petitioner had been removed to the Dominican Republic, he filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the motion, invoking a regulation known as the "post-departure bar," which precludes a noncitizen from filing a motion to reopen after his departure from the United States. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the post-departure bar cannot prevent a noncitzen from invoking his statutory right to file a motion to reopen. View "Perez Santana v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the servicer of his loan (Bank) in a putative class action, asserting that the Bank's requirement that he maintain flood insurance coverage in an amount sufficient to cover the replacement value of his home breached the terms of his mortgage contract. The mortgage was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Specifically, Defendant contended that the Bank, under a covenant of the mortgage contract, could not require more than the federally mandated minimum flood insurance. The covenant was a standard uniform covenant prescribed by the FHA pursuant to federal law. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed by an equally divided en banc First Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract, as (1) the Bank's reading of the contract was correct and Plaintiff's was incorrect; (2) Plaintiff could not avoid dismissal on the grounds that his specific understanding or the actions of the parties created an ambiguity; and (3) the United States' position articulated in its amicus brief, which stated that Plaintiff's interpretation of the contract was incorrect, reinforced the Court's conclusion. View "Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law

Respondent was involved in lengthy removal proceedings that culminated in her filing of a motion to reopen with the immigration judge that raised ineffective assistance of counsel and due process claims. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Respondent's appeals, concluding that, pursuant to a set of regulations known as the "post-departure bar," the agency lacked jurisdiction to entertain Respondent's motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted Respondent's petition for review, holding (1) as found in Perez Santana v. Holder, the post-departure bar conflicts with the unambiguous language of the motion to reopen statute; and (2) consequently, the regulation, in the circumstances applicable to this petition for review, cannot preclude Respondent from vindicating her right to seek reopening of her removal proceedings. View "Boliero v. Holder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several drug offenses. Defendant was resentenced by the district court on remand. Defendant appealed the resulting sentence, claiming that the district court failed to follow proper sentencing procedures and that it erred when determining the quantity of drugs from which Defendant would be held accountable for sentencing purposes. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding (1) the district court erred in its sentencing procedure for determining the appropriate guideline range, but the error did not warrant reversal on plain-error review; and (2) the district court's individualized drug-quantity finding was not affected by clear error, and the court's drug-quantity calculation was supported by reliable evidence in the record. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant, a pharmacist, accepted payments from "Internet pharmacy sites" for whose customers Defendant's employer, a mail-order pharmacy, filled orders. Eventually, Defendant was indicted on charges related to these payments and pled guilty to soliciting and accepting kickbacks. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court should have sentenced him for accepting an illegal gratuity rather than for demanding a bribe. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Defendant pled guilty to soliciting and receiving a bribe, not a gratuity, and because recent changes in case law did not provide Defendant with assistance on appeal, the district court did not err in its judgment. View "United States v. Gracie" on Justia Law