Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was convicted of unlawfully transferring a firearm around the same time that the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. An immigration judge found that Petitioner's conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(C) and pretermitted Petitioner's previously filed application for cancellation of removal. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed, finding that Defendnat's delivery of a firearm to a purchaser constituted "trafficking in firearms" under the statute. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA's definition of "trafficking in firearms" as encompassing any commercial exchange was reasonable and consistent with the statute. View "Soto-Hernandez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff borrowed money from Countrywide Financial and secured the loan with a mortgage on real property. The recorded mortgage was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), which also held the note on Plaintiff's property. When Plaintiff was unable to make payments on the mortgage, BONY instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure, arguing that (1) the description of his property in the mortgage did not satisfy New Hampshire's statute of frauds, and (2) Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property to the copy of the mortgage was an act of fraud that should bar BONY from foreclosing. The district court rejected both of Plaintiff's arguments. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the description of the property, in light of the surrounding circumstances, was not so imprecise as to be unenforceable under the New Hampshire statute of frauds; and (2) because the description of the property attached to the mortgage was correct, Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property was not fraudulent. View "French v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Defendant in this case was a franchisor and Plaintiffs were its franchisees. After Plaintiffs sued Defendant, the district court certified a class, excluding those franchisees whose agreements with Defendant contained clauses expressly requiring arbitration. While those franchisees pursued arbitration, the arbitrator imposed a stay of the arbitrations of ten of those franchisees. The district court later concluded that Defendant had violated an order requiring it to obtain judicial permission before making any motion to delay or prevent arbitration proceedings and sanctioned Defendant by admitting to the class the ten franchisees, relieving them of their obligations to arbitrate. Defendant then unsuccessfully filed a motion to reconsider the sanction and to stay the ten franchisees' judicial proceedings pending arbitration. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the district court's determination that Defendant violated the order was an abuse of discretion; and (2) therefore, there was no basis for the sanction, and Defendant's motion to stay should have been granted. View "Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Ghanaian national who entered the United States without inspection, conceded removability after immigration authorities initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner sought adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(i) and also applied for non-lawful permanent resident (LPR) cancellation of removal, alleging that his U.S. citizen child would suffer if he were moved. The agency found Petitioner was ineligible for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal and also denied Petitioner's motion to reconsider and reopen. The agency based its decision on the finding that Petitioner had misrepresented to immigration officials the circumstances of his marriage. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the agency did not err in concluding that Petitioner was inadmissible, and thus ineligible, for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal; and (2) Petitioner's additional evidence about the hardship of his family members would not have remedied the agency's finding of ineligibility for both cancellation and adjustment due to Petitioner's material misrepresentations. View "Agyei v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant, Hotel Melia, Inc., operated the Hotel Melia in Ponce, Puerto Rico since at least the 1890s. Defendant, however, never registered the mark "Melia" with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Plaintiff held several registered marks using the name "Melia" since the late 1990s. In 2007, Plaintiff's parent company opened a hotel called "Gran Melia" approximately eighty miles from Ponce. Plaintiff filed a petition seeking to register the mark "Gran Melia." Defendant opposed Plaintiff's registration petition. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against Defendant, seeking a declaration that Plaintiff had the right to use the mark Melia throughout Puerto Rico. The district court entered summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that, with the exception of the city of Ponce, Plaintiff was entitled to exclusive use of the Melia mark throughout Puerto Rico. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's entry of summary judgment, holding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Hotel Melia and Gran Melia marks cannot co-exist in Puerto Rico without creating an impermissible likelihood of confusion among reasonable consumers. Remanded. View "Dorpan, S.L. v. Hotel Melia, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996, Congress passed a statute known as the "stop-time rule," which provides that a noncitizen's years of physical presence are cut off when he is served with notice of the commencement of removal proceedings. Petitioner, a national of Columbia, entered the United States without inspection in 1986. In 1987, Petitioner was placed into deportation proceedings. In 2007, Petitioner applied for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner applied for suspension of deportation, which required him to show he had accrued seven years of continuous physical presence in the United States since his arrival. Because Petitioner arrived in the United States in 1986, and his proceedings began in 1987, the immigration judge concluded that, under the stop-time rule, Petitioner had not accrued the necessary years of physical presence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the stop-time rule applied retroactively to Petitioner; and (2) Petitioner's remaining argument was not exhausted before the agency. View "Aguirre v. Holder" on Justia Law

After losing his job as a stockbroker and financial advisor and his accompanying health insurance, Appellant applied for and received subsidized health insurance for several years. Russell represented on each application that he had no income to report and was unemployed, but Appellant was working under the table during those years. After a government investigation and an ensuing jury trial, Appellant was convicted of making false statements in connection with the payment of health care benefits. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the jury instruction on the definition of willfulness was not error; (2) the government presented sufficient evidence that Appellant's false statements were material to support the conviction; (3) the district court did not err in excluding certain testimony as state-of-mind hearsay; and (4) neither the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments nor his questions in eliciting testimony from a witness necessitated reversal. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

Appellant, an experienced real estate developer, defaulted on his personal-guaraty obligations after obtaining a loan for his limited liability company with a "materially false" personal financial statement (PFS). Appellee, the lendor, successfully sued O'Donnell in state court on the personal guaranty. Thereafter, Appellant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Appellee responded by initiating this adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, alleging that Appellant's debt to him was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(B), which makes debts for money procured by use of a written statement nondischargeble if the statement was "materially false" related to the debtor's "financial condition" and the debtor made it with "intent to deceive." The bankruptcy judge refused to discharge Appellant's debt to Appellee, and the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the BAP did not clearly err in its finding that Appellant's act of willfully turning "a blind eye" to the accuracy of the PFS proved his intent to deceive. View "Toye v. O'Donnell " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants Salvatore DiMasi, the former Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and Richard McDonough, a lobbyist, were convicted of several crimes, including honest-services fraud and conspiracy to commit honest-services fraud, resulting from a scheme to funnel money to DiMasi in exchange for political favors. The district court sentenced DiMasi to ninety-six months' imprisonment and McDonough to eight-four months' imprisonment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendants' convictions; (2) the trial court did not prejudicially err in instructing the jury; (3) the trial court did not err in its challenged evidentiary rulings; and (4) the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendants. View "United States v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were a group of chess players and their opponent, the Puerto Rico Chess Federation. The chess players filed suit against the chess federation in Puerto Rico court, alleging violations of their rights under the United States and Puerto Rico constitutions and Puerto Rico law. The chess federation successfully removed the case to federal court. The chess players subsequently filed a second case, again in Puerto Rico court, excluding any claims under federal law. The federation also removed this case. The district court consolidated the two cases and declared jurisdiction over the second case under the All Writs Act. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the federation on all claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court had federal subject matter jurisdiction over the first case but did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the second case; and (2) the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment to the federal on some of the chess players' Commonwealth law claims. View "Ortiz-Bonilla v. Federacion de Ajedrez de P.R., Inc." on Justia Law