Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Boston College (BC) undertook research into the armed conflict surrounding the independence movement of Northern Ireland during the second half of the Twentieth Century. BC compiled extensive personal interviews and testimonies from formerly active participants in that period. The materials were subject to strict confidentiality agreements entered into between BC and the interviewees. In 2011, a commissioner appointed to represent the United States (Petitioner) issued a subpoena to compel the production by BC of the recordings and/or transcripts of all interviews collected by the project's researchers containing information about an apparent casualty of the interstitial conflict in Northern Ireland. BC filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The district court denied BC's request, ordering that eighty-five interviews in BC's possession be turned over to Petitioner for eventual transfer to UK authorities. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's order, holding that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the production of several of the interviews which did not contain any information relevant to the 2011 subpoena. Remanded. View "United States v. Trs. of Boston College" on Justia Law

Appellant, on behalf of the United States, brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Guidance Corporation and Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC), alleging they engaged in a kickback scheme to promote the sale and use of their cardiac rhythm management devices. However, a former employee of BSC had previously filed a qui tam action against BSC, which was later dismissed, alleging similar claims. The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the earlier-filed complaint barred consideration of Appellant's complaint under the first-to-file rule of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(5). Appellant appealed, arguing that the earlier-filed complaint could not serve as a preclusive first-filed complaint to trigger the first-to-file bar because it did not meet the heightened pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 3730(b)(5) does not require the first-filed complaint to meet the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) to bar a later-filed complaint. View "United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp." on Justia Law

This case involved an insurance-coverage dispute governed by Massachusetts substantive law. Plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurance company after a storm caused a pile of soil to slide down a hill and into and over a retaining wall, damaging one of the buildings on Plaintiffs' property. The insurance company denied coverage. Plaintiffs sued for breach of the insurance contract and violation of the Massachusetts consumer-protection act. The insurance company counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the policy did not cover the claimed loss. The magistrate judge granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment, noting that the policy excluded damages from landslides. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the insurance company acted well within its rights in denying coverage, and the magistrate judge properly granted summary judgment for the insurance company on all claims. View "Stor/Gard, Inc. v. Strathmore Ins. Co." on Justia Law

When a tire company closed its plant in Puerto Rico, it offered its employees severance pay contingent upon the execution of general releases. Plaintiff, a former employee of the company, accepted the severance package and signed the proffered release. Almost one year later, Plaintiff sued the company, asserting claims for unjust dismissal under Puerto Rico law. The district court dismissed the case. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim under a protective Puerto Rico statute, P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 29, 185a-185m, known as Law 80. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the order of dismissal as to the Law 80 claim and remanded, holding that, in the interests of comity and federalism, the antecedent issue about whether Law 80 applied at all to Plaintiff's discharge should be decided before the question of statutory interpretation raised by the parties. View "Ruiz-Sanchez v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a disparate screening claim in the U.S. district court alleging that she arrived at the emergency department of Hospital with an emergency medical condition as defined by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), that Hospital failed to screen her appropriately, and that Hospital failed to stabilize or properly transfer her before release, thus violating the requirements of EMTALA. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint as stating facts limited to a medical malpractice claim and holding that EMTALA does not create a federal cause of action for medical malpractice. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's dismissal, holding that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that a trialworthy issue existed as to her disparate screening claim. Remanded for trial on Plaintiff's EMTALA claim as well as her Puerto Rico law claims. View "Cruz-Vazquez v. Mennonite Gen. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a non-binding plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy with intent to distribute controlled substances. The district court imposed a 210-month incarcerative sentence after applying a sentencing enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon during and in the course of the crime of conviction and construing the guideline sentencing range accordingly. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding (1) the district court's rejection of the sentencing recommendation vitiated Defendant's waiver of appeal in its entirety, and therefore, this appeal was not circumscribed; (2) the dangerous weapons enhancement was adequately grounded in the record; and (3) the sentencing court considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and adequately explained the sentence. View "United States v. Murphy-Cordero" on Justia Law

CVS Corp. and Caremark Rx Inc. merged in 2007, creating CVS Caremark Corporation. In 2010, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action against CVS Caremark and certain of its current and former employees. The complaint was later amended to add new plaintiffs - the retirement systems of the city of Brockton and the counties of Plymouth and Norfolk, Massachusetts (collectively, the Retirement Systems). The Retirement Systems claimed that Defendants made material misrepresentations in violation of the Securities Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Specifically, the Retirement Systems alleged that CVS Caremark's CEO's statements in an earnings call with investors caused a drop in CVS Caremark's share price. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of the complaint and remanded, holding that Plaintiffs' complaint alleged loss causation sufficiently plausible to foreclose dismissal. View "Mass. Ret. Sys. v. CVS Caremark Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Pakistani native, fled Pakistan in 1993 as a result of threats against him from a subsidiary of the ruling Pakistan Mulsim League. Petitioner entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor in 1999 but remained in the country beyond the time authorized. In 2005, Petitioner appeared before the Immigration Judge (IJ), conceded removability, and applied for withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. In support of his applications, Petitioner testified to the threats he received, which continued even in his absence. The IJ denied Petitioner's applications. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted in part and denied part Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the Board's withholding-of-removal decision was contrary to the evidence; and(2) the IJ and BIA's CAT rulings were supported by the record. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Javed v. Holder" on Justia Law

In an attempt to avert the foreclosure of her home, Plaintiff sought to modify the terms of her mortgage pursuant to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a federal initiative that incentivizes lenders and loan servicers to offer loan modifications to eligible homeowners. When Plaintiff's efforts did not result in a permanent loan modification, she sued Wells Fargo Bank and American Home Mortgage Servicing, alleging that their conduct during her attempts to modify her mortgage violated Massachusetts law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeal (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff's other breach of contract claim, Plaintiff's unfair debt collection practices claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and her derivative claim for equitable relief. Remanded. View "Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a police dispatcher with the Town of Camden Police Department for thirty-one years until his department was eliminated and he was laid off. In the year following Plaintiff's termination, at least two positions opened with the police department for which Plaintiff was qualified. The Town did not recall Plaintiff to either position. Plaintiff subsequently brought a procedural due process against the Town under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Town deprived him of a constitutionally protected property interest in his right to be recalled to employment. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order, holding (1) the district court correctly found that Plaintiff's complaint alleged a protected property interest in his recall right; but (2) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff's potential recourse to state law foreclosed his section 1983 claim, as Plaintiff's injury could not be fully redressed by recourse to a state law breach of contract claim or the grievance procedures in a collective bargaining agreement. Remanded. View "Clukey v. Town of Camden" on Justia Law