Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed this ERISA action against Sun Life and Health Insurance Company (Sun) after Sun reduced his disability payments under an ERISA-qualified plan (Plan) because he was also receiving disability compensation under the Veterans' Benefits Act. The district court entered judgment on the record for Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Sun's decision to offset Plaintiff's service-connected disability compensation (VA benefits) was governed entirely by its interpretation of several statutes, the district court ought to have reviewed de novo Sun's determination that Plaintiff's VA benefits were "other income" under the plan; and (2) Plaintiff's VA benefits were not "other income" for purposes of reducing the payment Sun owed Plaintiff under the Plan. View "Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co." on Justia Law

During Appellee's chapter 13 bankruptcy, Educational Credit Management Corporation (ECMC) filed a proof of claim based on Appellee's allegedly unpaid student loans. Appellee objected to the claim because she believed her loans had been repaid. The bankruptcy court sustained Appellee's objection. After the bankruptcy concluded, ECMC resumed collection efforts. Appellee reopened her case and filed an adversary complaint against ECMC, alleging that it had violated the order sustaining her objection. The bankruptcy court concluded the order reflected the prior judge's determination that the obligation remaining on ECMC's claim was zero and therefore sanctioned ECMC for attempting to collect on the debt. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. ECMC appealed, arguing that the bankruptcy court never adjudicated the amount outstanding on Appellee's student loans. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) during bankruptcy proceedings, the issue of the amount ECMC would get from Appellee's estate was resolved by way of the subsidiary factual issue of whether the debt had already been repaid; and (2) the bankruptcy court did not err in imposing sanctions, as ECMC's conduct was an abuse of the bankruptcy process. View "Hann v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

Four corporations acknowledged they owed the federal government more than $24 million in taxes and penalties, but before the IRS could collect its dues, the corporations transferred all of their assets to other entities. At issue was whether the previous owner of the four corporations, a trust (Trust), was liable to the IRS for the corporations' unpaid taxes and penalties. The tax court looked to state substantive law to determine the Trust's liability and concluded that the Trust could not be held liable because the IRS (1) failed to prove the Trust had knowledge of the new shareholders' asset-stripping scheme, and (2) did not show that any of the corporation's assets were transferred directly to the Trust. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the tax court correctly looked to Massachusetts law to determine whether the Trust could be held liable for the corporations' taxes and penalties; but (2) the tax court misconstrued Massachusetts fraudulent transfer law in making its decision. Remanded for a determination of whether the conditions for liability were met in this case. View "Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, her son Kyle, and Kyle's girlfriend Catherine lived together. In 2008, Kyle was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident in New Hampshire. Defendant was among the police officers who responded to the scene. Kyle was then arrested. Catherine, who witnessed the accident, and Plaintiff went to the police station. Defendant warned Catherine against leaving the police department and threatened to obtain a warrant for her arrest if she left. Plaintiff, however, counseled Catherine to leave and escorted her out of the police station. Defendant subsequently filed a criminal complaint charging Plaintiff with witness tampering. The charge was later dismissed. Plaintiff then filed an action against Defendant in the U.S. district court for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution under state law. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal constitutional claim and official immunity on the state-law claim. Finding no error, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Moses v. Mele" on Justia Law

Brothers Thomas and Michael Tessier allegedly swindled brothers Frederick and Thaddeus Jakobiec and the estate of their mother out of millions of dollars. This lawsuit covered the Tessiers' theft of almost $100,000 in life insurance proceeds due to a trust benefitting Thaddeus. Thaddeus and various persons affiliated with the trust and estate (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against Merrill Lynch, the company that issued the life insurance policy, claiming that Merrill Lynch made out the insurance proceeds check to the wrong trust entity in breach of the insurance contract, thus allowing the Tessiers to steal the money. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch, concluding that even if Merrill Lynch did breach the contract, its breach was not the cause of Plaintiffs' losses because the Tessiers would have stolen the money even if the check had been made out correctly. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the extensive groundwork laid by the Tessiers for their criminal scheme, they could have and would have stolen the insurance money regardless of how Merrill Lynch made out the check; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Merrill Lynch. View "Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2009, federal agents, acting without a warrant, placed a global positioning system (GPS) tracker on a car used by Craig Sparks. The agents located the car at the scene of a bank robbery and chased down the car on the highway after it fled, all by using the tracker. A subsequent search of the car revealed evidence tying Sparks and Michaud (Appellants) to the bank robbery. After Appellants were indicted for bank robbery, they moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the placement of the GPS tracker on the car. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the case was governed by United States v. Knotts, which held that using a radio-based tracking device to tail a suspect's car was not a Fourth Amendment search. Appellants appealed, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Jones required reversal of the district court's decision. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed without reaching the question, holding that the agents' conduct fit within the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying Appellants' motion to suppress. View "United States v. Sparks" on Justia Law

Petitioner was granted conditional permanent residency in the U.S. on the basis of her marriage to a U.S. citizen. Petitioner and her husband then began divorce proceedings. Petitioner subsequently sought to remove the conditions on her residency. The Department of Homeland Security (Department) denied Petitioner's petition, terminated her conditional resident status, and initiated removal proceedings against her, concluding that Petitioner did not establish that she married her husband in good faith. In removal proceedings, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's request for removal of conditions and determined Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because she could not establish the requisite good moral character. Consequently, the IJ ordered Petitioner's removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusion that Petitioner did not establish she married her husband in good faith; and (2) the Board did not err in concluding that Petitioner was subject to a mandatory bar to a finding of good moral character on the basis of false testimony in her immigration proceedings. View "Reynoso v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were former employees of the Puerto Rico Administration of Juvenile Institutions. After an election that produced a regime change, Plaintiffs were ousted from their positions, notwithstanding solid qualifications and positive evaluations. Plaintiffs sued several government defendants, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983 and alleged discrimination based on political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs also lodged pendent claims under Puerto Rico law. The district court ruled that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief because it did not assert facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the prima facie case is not the appropriate benchmark for determining whether a complaint has met the plausibility standard under Bell Atlantic v. Twombly; (2) the factual allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint, taken as true, state plausible section 1983 claims for political discrimination with respect to two of the defendants; and (3) the pendent claims against those two defendants, which were dismissed without prejudice when the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, must be reinstated. Remanded. View "Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Egyptian-American, filed a workplace discrimination suit against the Mohegan Council, Boy Scouts of America alleging that he was denied career advancement opportunities on account of his religion of Islam and his national origin. After a jury trial, the district court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Mohegan Council's motion for judgment as a matter of law, where (1) the district court correctly found that Mohegan Council was an "employer" with the requisite fifteen or more employees under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) Plaintiff's complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination was timely filed; and (3) sufficient evidence supported a finding of discrimination. View "Aly v. Mohegan Council, Boys Scouts of Am." on Justia Law

Defendants, both Chinese nationals, shipped tens of millions of dollars worth of sophisticated electronic components from the United States to China with little regard for whether the parts they sold were export-controlled. In 2008, Defendants were arrested and later indicted for thirty-four counts of export-related offenses. The two were ultimately convicted of, among other things, exporting without a license items designated as defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List and items controlled under the Commerce Control List, conspiracy to violate the Munitions List and Commerce Control List restrictions, and conspiracy to file materially false Shipper's Export Declarations (SED) with the Commerce Department. On appeal, Defendants argued that the federal government's arms export control system constituted a regulatory scheme that violated the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the Commerce Control List convictions and SED convictions, holding that the federal government's arms export control system does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; and (2) vacated the Munitions List convictions, holding that the district court erred by not submitting to the jury an element of the offense, and the error was not harmless. Remanded. View "United States v. Wu" on Justia Law